The proposed study aims to capture the unique experiences surrounding grief of first-generation Indian-American undergraduate students. Tummala-Narra (2013) defines immigrants as having been raised in the country of origin and migrating to the United States in late adolescence or adulthood and first-generation as those born in the United States or arrived to the United States as young children. Research has shown that bereavement can have profound emotional health consequences for those surviving a loss (W. Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987). Additional components such as loss of expectations, traditions, and culture (Price, 2011) may contribute to mental health challenges for the South Asian population that are often overlooked across the immigrant and first-generations (Tummala-Narra, 2013). The United States Census Bureau (2010 ) stated that the total U.S. population on April 1, 2010 was 308.7 million, out of which 14.7 million or 4.8 percent were Asian. South Asians (i.e., people from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal) were the fastest growing subgroup among the Asian population. (United States Census Bureau, 2007). Trends in Education shifted for Asians over time. In 1988, at least 38% of Asians had earned at least a bachelor’s degree, whereas in 2015, 54% of Asians who were 25 years old or older had a bachelor’s degree or higher (Ryan & Bauman, 2016) implying that there is a continued increase in the Asian undergraduate student population. Content includes a description of immigrant demographics, reasons for immigration, impact of immigration to the United States on family dynamics across generations, mental health stigma for this population, a review of the literature, gaps in the literature, theoretical foundation for the proposed study, purpose and relevance of the study, and future implications of this research.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Ashland Theological Seminary, 2002. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-217).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [339]-366).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Ashland Theological Seminary, 2002. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-217).

Thesis (Ph. D. in Anthropology)--University of California, Berkeley, Dec. 1994. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-311).

Thesis (Ph. D. in Anthropology)--University of California, Berkeley, Dec. 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-311).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Philosophy, Interpretation and Culture Program, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 174-183).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-263). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

<p> The issue of southern Thailand becoming the next battleground for international <i> jihadist</i> terrorist organizations&mdash;such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Jemaah Islamiyah&mdash;has reemerged as a prominent security concern following the defeats sustained by ISIS in the Middle East and the dispersion of its fighting force. While the prospect was hotly debated a decade ago, the majority of contemporary scholarship contends that <i> jihadism</i> will find little audience with the Malay Muslims in Thailand&rsquo;s Deep South, whose Shafi&rsquo;i population does not espouse the conservative Salafist beliefs underlying global <i>jihad</i>&mdash;a religiously-charged violent campaign against <i>infidels</i> (non-believers), <i> munafik</i> (traitorous Muslims), and bastions of state secularism and Western liberal values. It is furthermore believed that because southern Thailand&rsquo;s armed groups are fighting a nationalist struggle for independence, as opposed to fighting for more ideological reasons, they would not be amenable to <i>jihadist</i> involvement in their conflict. </p><p> Although it is true that Malay-Muslim militants in Thailand have declined offers of foreign fighters from international terrorist organizations, the cooperation between various separatist movements in Mindanao and global <i> jihadist</i> groups reveals that ethno-nationalism and ideological dissonance are insufficient causes for a rejection of <i>jihadism</i>. Rather, I argue that secessionists develop ties with <i>jihadist</i> groups when they are in need of political, financial, or military support they cannot secure from a legal entity, such as a state. This often occurs when one militant faction breaks away from its state-sponsored parent group following the signing of a peace deal it considers unappealing. Insurgent groups in Thailand have been inclined to distance themselves from <i>jihadism</i> because they have already acquired state patronage from Malaysia, and association with terrorist organizations would likely undermine that relationship. Strategic decisions to cooperate with <i>jihadist</i> organizations are thus executed according to a cost-benefit analysis and are not exclusively determined by ideological predilections.</p><p>

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