Media framing is present in everything one observes on social media. In athletics, mainly collegiate football, media framing goes into each and every detail that goes out to the public. With Power 5 sports, such as the Southeastern Conference, football is one of the most profitable, newsworthy and highly recruiting-based sports out there. Therefore, the planning that goes into all of the social media channels, specifically on the website called Twitter, is planned down to a science. However, there are times where that is not the case, as crises can arise at any given moment. This research explains how seven SEC football sports information contacts were interviewed about their social media habits for any and all situations that could arise on their platforms, and how they plan to handle it while keeping the brand, overall message and trust of its fanbases.

The dissertation examines how member institutions in the Southeastern Conference (SEC) managed their college football programs during World War II. This time period in college sport history is unique because a few university presidents at SEC institutions believed the war gave them the opportunity to permanently implement reforms such as reducing practice hours and limiting the high salaries of coaches. Previous historiography demonstrates that these reforms did not come to fruition. Why were the university presidents and faculty, who claimed responsibility for governing the SEC, unable to capitalize on the opportunity they believed the war had given them to reform college sport? To examine this question, the author visited university archives of all thirteen institutions that competed in the SEC from its founding in 1933 until the end of World War II in 1945. Sources from these archives included correspondence between university presidents, faculty, trustees, athletic department employees, and other university stakeholders. The author also examined articles from newspapers throughout the Southeast, university publications such as yearbooks, alumni magazines, and student newspapers, trustee board minutes, and SEC meeting minutes. Despite the perceptions of some SEC presidents and faculty that the war provided an opportune moment for reform, how universities ran their athletic departments during World War II suggests that attempts to place less emphasis on college athletics would be temporary and driven only by pragmatics. As institutions began to lose athletes to military service, the SEC’s university presidents suspended academic reforms that existed before the war so that their college football teams could survive, which was necessary since only four of the twelve member institutions formally competed in college football during the 1943 season. Given the primary source evidence, it is clear that since university presidents and faculty were unable to reform college athletics during the war, at a time where they perceived athletics as susceptible to reform, then reforms such as reduced practice time and lower coaching salaries are unlikely to come from these university leaders at any point in the future because practicalities, not principles, were the driving force behind wartime reforms.