This Master's thesis focuses on the analysis of the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. It studies how to measure and express competitiveness. It also describes the path of Spain to economic growth through periods of recession and looks into the different Spanish economic sectors and thoroughly examines the economic situation of the various autonomous communities. This thesis also includes a case study of the Catalan separatist movement. The last chapter tries to make an economic outlook.

Chapters 2-3: A global games approach to sovereign debt crises The first chapters present a model that investigates the risks involved when a fiscal authority attempts to roll-over a stock of debt and there is the potential for coordination failure by investors. A continuum of investors, after receiving signals about the authority's willingness to repay, decides whether to roll-over the stock of debt. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates, the authority defaults. With one fiscal authority, private information results in a deterministic outcome. When a public signal is available, the model behaves in a similar manner to a sunspot model. In line with much of the global games literature, improving public information has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Finally, the model is extended to include a second fiscal authority, which captures a similar sunspot result and illustrates the potential for externalities in fiscal policy. Lower debt in the less indebted authority can push a more indebted authority into crisis. Lower debt makes the healthier authority relatively more attractive, which causes the investors to treat the heavily indebted authority more conservatively. In certain circumstances, this is sufficient to cause a coordination failure. Chapter 4: A debt game with correlated information This chapter models of debt roll-over where a continuum of investors receives correlated signals on whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent. The investors face a collective action problem: a sufficient proportion of investors must agree to participate in the debt roll-over for it to be a success. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates in the deal, the debtor will default. The game has a unique switching strategy, which results in global uncertainty being preserved. The ex ante distribution of play (conditional on the true solvency of the debtor) follows a Vasicek credit distribution. The ex ante probability of a debt crisis is affected by the exogenous model parameters. Of particular interest is the observation that increasing private noise unambiguously reduces the probability of a debt crisis. Unsurprisingly, increasing the fiscal space or return on debt also decreases the probability of a crisis. Chapter 5: Bailouts and politics The final chapter examines the political-economic equilibrium in a two-period model with overlapping generations and a financial sector, which is inspired by the model in Tabellini (1989). The public policy is chosen under majority rule by the agents currently alive. It demonstrates that the bailout policy adopted in the second period has important effects on the bank's financing decisions in the first period. By adopting a riskier financing regime (i.e. higher leverage) in the first period, the older generation can extract consumption from the younger generation in the second period. Sovereign backstops of the financial sector are state-contingent: they can appear costless for long periods of time but eventually result in a socialization of private-sector debt. It is this mechanism that makes implementing capital requirements costly to investors yet beneficial to the younger generation. The model also highlights two important issues: (i) bank capital is endogenous and (ii) proposed resolution mechanisms must be politically credible. It suggests that a major benefit of increasing and narrowing equity-capital requirements or increasing liquidity ratios is that they are implemented ex ante and therefore available either to absorb losses in the event of a crisis or to reduce the possibility of large drops in asset values. Finally, this chapter also provides a structure by which to interpret the stylized facts of Calomiris et al. (2014): that more populist political institutions are associated with more fragile financial systems.

Este trabalho testa, através da metodologia de cópulas, a hipótese de contágio financeiro entre ações brasileiras e índices de mercado dos países que deram origem às crises do Terror em 2001, da Argentina em 2001, dos Subpprimes em 2007 e do Débito Soberano Europeu em 2009. Além disso, ainda é feita uma análise dos setores econômicos que mais foram afetados por cada crise. Os testes da crise do Terror apresentaram evidências de contágio do SP500 para 24 ações brasileiras, afetando, principalmente os setores ligado à indústria e à energia. As crises da Argentina e do Débito Soberano Europeu apresentaram evidências de contágio dos índices Merval e Athex para apenas 3 empresas. A crise dos Subprimes apresentou evidências de contágio do SP500 para 35 empresas brasileiras, sendo a maioria ligada aos setores financeiros, de energia e industrial. 7 ações foram afetadas pelas duas crises norteamericanas. Os resultados reforçam a importância da análise de contágio em cada empresa individual, ao invés de utilizar o índice do mercado brasileiro como um todo. / This paper tests, through the copulas methodology, the hypothesis of financial contagion between the individual Brazilian stocks and the market indices of the countries where the crises were originated. The crises analyzed are the Terror crisis in 2001, the Argentina’s crisis in 2001, the Subprime crisis in 2007 and the Sovereign Debt crisis in 2009. In addition to this, the Brazilian economic sectors are examined in order to find out which were most affected by each crisis. The tests of the Terror crisis presented evidence of SP500 contagion to 24 Brazilian stocks, affecting, mainly, sectors related to industry and energy. The Argentina’s crisis and the European Sovereign Debt crisis presented contagion’s evidence of the Merval and Athex indices for only 3 Brazilian companies. The Subprimes crisis presented evidence of SP500 contagion for 35 Brazilian companies, mostly related to the financial, energy and industrial sectors. 7 Brazilian stocks were affected by both American crises. The results reinforce the importance of contagion analysis in each individual company, rather than using the Brazilian market index.

This paper analyses if European citizens are willing to show solidarity with debt-ridden EU member states during the recent crisis. Based on a theoretical concept comprehending four di-mensions of solidarity - generalised willingness to support, existence of social cleavages, rea-sons of supporting others, acceptance of conditions a crisis country has to meet to receive as-sistance - we derived hypotheses stating that the existence of a European wide solidarity is rather unlikely. We analysed data from two Eurobarometer surveys 2010 and 2011 and a unique survey conducted in Germany and Portugal in 2012. Descriptive and multilevel analyses indi-cated that in 2010 and 2011, a narrow majority of all EU citizens supported fiscal assistance for crisis countries, and socio-economic and cultural cleavages in attitudes regarding financial as-sistance for crisis countries were rather low. Findings from the two country comparison showed that the willingness to show solidarity was predominantly guided by moral reasoning instead of the respondent’s self-interest. However, German and Portuguese respondents disagree on austerity measures, with the exception of social spending cuts. Taken all together, we come to the conclusion that recent years have brought a new legitimacy to the use of EU bailout measures which are now a given European practice.

Este trabalho testa, através da metodologia de cópulas, a hipótese de contágio financeiro entre ações brasileiras e índices de mercado dos países que deram origem às crises do Terror em 2001, da Argentina em 2001, dos Subpprimes em 2007 e do Débito Soberano Europeu em 2009. Além disso, ainda é feita uma análise dos setores econômicos que mais foram afetados por cada crise. Os testes da crise do Terror apresentaram evidências de contágio do SP500 para 24 ações brasileiras, afetando, principalmente os setores ligado à indústria e à energia. As crises da Argentina e do Débito Soberano Europeu apresentaram evidências de contágio dos índices Merval e Athex para apenas 3 empresas. A crise dos Subprimes apresentou evidências de contágio do SP500 para 35 empresas brasileiras, sendo a maioria ligada aos setores financeiros, de energia e industrial. 7 ações foram afetadas pelas duas crises norteamericanas. Os resultados reforçam a importância da análise de contágio em cada empresa individual, ao invés de utilizar o índice do mercado brasileiro como um todo. / This paper tests, through the copulas methodology, the hypothesis of financial contagion between the individual Brazilian stocks and the market indices of the countries where the crises were originated. The crises analyzed are the Terror crisis in 2001, the Argentina’s crisis in 2001, the Subprime crisis in 2007 and the Sovereign Debt crisis in 2009. In addition to this, the Brazilian economic sectors are examined in order to find out which were most affected by each crisis. The tests of the Terror crisis presented evidence of SP500 contagion to 24 Brazilian stocks, affecting, mainly, sectors related to industry and energy. The Argentina’s crisis and the European Sovereign Debt crisis presented contagion’s evidence of the Merval and Athex indices for only 3 Brazilian companies. The Subprimes crisis presented evidence of SP500 contagion for 35 Brazilian companies, mostly related to the financial, energy and industrial sectors. 7 Brazilian stocks were affected by both American crises. The results reinforce the importance of contagion analysis in each individual company, rather than using the Brazilian market index.

Este trabalho testa, através da metodologia de cópulas, a hipótese de contágio financeiro entre ações brasileiras e índices de mercado dos países que deram origem às crises do Terror em 2001, da Argentina em 2001, dos Subpprimes em 2007 e do Débito Soberano Europeu em 2009. Além disso, ainda é feita uma análise dos setores econômicos que mais foram afetados por cada crise. Os testes da crise do Terror apresentaram evidências de contágio do SP500 para 24 ações brasileiras, afetando, principalmente os setores ligado à indústria e à energia. As crises da Argentina e do Débito Soberano Europeu apresentaram evidências de contágio dos índices Merval e Athex para apenas 3 empresas. A crise dos Subprimes apresentou evidências de contágio do SP500 para 35 empresas brasileiras, sendo a maioria ligada aos setores financeiros, de energia e industrial. 7 ações foram afetadas pelas duas crises norteamericanas. Os resultados reforçam a importância da análise de contágio em cada empresa individual, ao invés de utilizar o índice do mercado brasileiro como um todo. / This paper tests, through the copulas methodology, the hypothesis of financial contagion between the individual Brazilian stocks and the market indices of the countries where the crises were originated. The crises analyzed are the Terror crisis in 2001, the Argentina’s crisis in 2001, the Subprime crisis in 2007 and the Sovereign Debt crisis in 2009. In addition to this, the Brazilian economic sectors are examined in order to find out which were most affected by each crisis. The tests of the Terror crisis presented evidence of SP500 contagion to 24 Brazilian stocks, affecting, mainly, sectors related to industry and energy. The Argentina’s crisis and the European Sovereign Debt crisis presented contagion’s evidence of the Merval and Athex indices for only 3 Brazilian companies. The Subprimes crisis presented evidence of SP500 contagion for 35 Brazilian companies, mostly related to the financial, energy and industrial sectors. 7 Brazilian stocks were affected by both American crises. The results reinforce the importance of contagion analysis in each individual company, rather than using the Brazilian market index.

Située à l’articulation de la sociologie de l’économie, de l’histoire de la finance et de la sociologie de la connaissance, cette thèse présente donc une analyse du rôle de la notation du crédit dans la régulation financière, et plus largement, du rôle de l’incertitude et de l’incomplétude juridiques sur les anticipations économiques des acteurs financiers. Le cadre d’analyse de la recherche se résume en quatre points : Premièrement, la thèse rompt avec une lecture strictement intellectualiste de l’action publique et présente une approche de la régulation financière par ses instruments, empruntant ainsi l’approche pragmatiste développée par les social studies of finance et par la nouvelle sociologie économique d’inspiration américaine. Deuxièmement, l’hypothèse centrale de la recherche est que les instruments réglementaires sont à la fois des techniques de connaissance et des outils juridiques. Aussi, ce sont les frictions qu’occasionnent les deux activités parfois contradictoires de calculer et de gouverner qui donnent au changement réglementaire sa dynamique historique. Troisièmement, prenant l’exemple de l’usage de la notation dans la supervision financière comme dispositif de calcul et technique de gouvernement, la thèse propose une histoire de longue durée (1865-2010) de l’activité réglementaire sur les marchés financiers aux Etats-Unis et en Europe au travers de cinq régimes de régulation (régime statutaire, d’appel, disciplinaire, fictionnel et contractuel). Quatrièmement, l’originalité de la recherche est de combiner une approche macroscopique du changement réglementaire avec une approche méticuleuse de plusieurs courtes séquences historiques durant lesquelles d’importantes innovations réglementaires ont vu le jour, notamment le New Deal aux Etats-Unis et la crise de la dette souveraine en Europe. Ainsi, en plus de définir les contours de cinq régimes réglementaires, la thèse analyse la façon dont les régulateurs se sont saisis de la notation financière comme « mécanisme d’embrayage » afin d’opérationnaliser la transition d’un régime à un autre. / Located at the intersection of economic sociology, financial history, and the sociology of knowledge, this dissertation examines the role of credit ratings in financial regulation, and more broadly, the role of financial uncertainties and legal incompleteness on financial actors’ anticipatory decisions. The framework set forth in this study can be summarized as follows. First, this study breaks with an intellectualist approach of public action to analyze financial regulation from the perspective of its instruments. As such, this research draws on a pragmatist agenda developed in social studies of finance and recent work in economic sociology. Second, the main hypothesis of this dissertation is to approach regulatory instruments as technologies of knowing and tools of government. From this double viewpoint, I hypothesize that the frictions generated by the two competing activities of calculating and governing impart the regulatory activity with both its structural features and historical dynamics. Third, using the example of regulatory reliance on ratings, I propose a longue durée historical analysis (1865-2010) of the regulatory activity in the U.S. and Europe through the examination of five regulatory regimes (statutory, appeal, disciplinary, fictional, and contractual). Four, one original feature of this dissertation is to combine a macroscopic analysis of regulatory change with a meticulous approach of several short historical sequences during which important regulatory innovations came into being, notably the New Deal in the U.S. and the European sovereign debt crisis. Thus, in addition to setting the contours of five regulatory frameworks, this dissertation analyses the ways in which regulators used ratings as “clutching” devices to operationalize the legal transition from one regime to another.

The thesis analyses co-movement of 10Y sovereign bond yields of 11 EU mem- bers (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark) divided into the three groups (the Core of the Eurozone, the Periphery of the Eurozone, the states outside the Eurozone). In the center of attention are changes of co-movement in the crisis period, especially near the two significant dates - the fall of Lehman Brothers (15.9.2008) and the day, when increase of Greek public deficit was announced (20.10.2009). Main contribution of the thesis is usage of alternative methodol- ogy - wavelet transformation. It allows to research how co-movement changes across scales (frequencies) and through time. Wavelet coherence is used as well as wavelet bivariate and multiple correlation. The thesis brings three main findings: (1) co-movement significantly decreased in the crisis period, but the results differ in the groups, (2) co-movement significantly differs across scales, but its heterogeneity decreased in the crisis period, (3) near to the examined dates sharp and significant decrease of wavelet correlation was observable across lower scales in some states. JEL Classification C32, C49, C58, H63 Keywords Co-movement, Wavelet Transformation, Sovereign Debt Crisis, Sovereign Bond Yields,...

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, titled "Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking", I propose a general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and a drop in investment and output. With some opacity in bank balance sheets, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on bank deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by risky asset purchases and weak economic fundamentals lead to a banking crisis. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening their risk-taking incentives. Due to this trade-off, liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when it is not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate the bad equilibrium. The second chapter, titled "Gambling Traps", analyzes macroeconomic dynamics under this framework in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that self-fulfilling expectations about high bank risk-taking may lead to 'gambling traps' associated with slow recovery from crises. In a gambling trap, high bank funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent decline in economic activity. I bring this model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Finally, I show that subsidized loans to banks, similar to the European Central Bank's longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) may perpetuate gambling traps. The third chapter, titled ''Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks'', is joint work with Matthieu Darracq-Paries, Christo¤er Kok, and Dawid · Zochowski. In this chapter, we present a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. We show that depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2007-09 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Financial stability is achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits or collateralized liquidity support to traditional banks.

This dissertation thesis focuses on complex analysis of the problem, which is the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. The aim of this paper is to provide a complex overview and analysis of the current sovereign debt crisis, from the theoretical definition of the term, through an analysis of the causes and consequences of this crisis to outline the economic policy response to it. The text is divided into two parts. The first part deals with theoretical problem solving. In the second part is analyzed and described course of sovereign debt crisis. This section also analyzes in detail causes and consequences of the sovereign debt crisis in certain countries. This section is completed by an analysis of economic policy response to the sovereign debt crisis and an expert estimate of the future development of public debt countries analyzed.