Le principe de coopération est considéré depuis longtemps comme l’une des pierres angulaires du droit international, toutefois, l’existence d’une obligation de coopérer en droit international reste encore controversée. Les ressources en eau, à cause de leur fluidité et de leurs multiples usages, démontrent toujours l’interdépendance humaine. En matière de cours d’eau transfrontaliers, la Convention de New York inclut explicitement dans son texte l’obligation générale de coopérer comme l’un de ses trois principes fondamentaux. Il nous incombe alors de voir quelle obligation de coopérer les États souverains s’imposent dans leurs pratiques ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous procédons tout d’abord à une étude positiviste du contenu normatif de l’obligation de coopérer. Nous constatons que l’incorporation de la notion de l’obligation de coopérer dans le principe de la souveraineté est une tendance manifeste du droit international qui a évolué du droit de coexistence composé principalement des règles d’abstention, au droit de coopération qui comporte essentiellement des obligations positives de facere, dont la plus représentative est l’obligation de coopérer. Néanmoins, il n’existe pas de modèle unique d’application pour tous les États, chaque bassin disposant de son propre régime coopératif. Pour mesurer l’ampleur des régimes coopératifs, nous étudions cinq paramètres : le champ d’application, les règles substantielles, les règles procédurales, les arrangements institutionnels et le règlement des différends. Quatres modèles de coopération ressortent : le mécanisme consultatif (l’Indus), le mécanisme communicateur (le Mékong), le mécanisme de coordination (le Rhin) et le mécanisme d’action conjointe (le fleuve Sénégal). Pour ce qui est de la Chine, il s’agit de l’État d’amont en voie de développement le plus important dans le monde qui a longtemps été critiqué pour son approche unilatérale dans le développement des eaux transfrontières. Nous ne pouvons pas cependant passer sous silence les pratiques de coopération qu’elle a développées avec ses voisins. Quelle est son interprétation de cette obligation générale de coopérer ? Notre étude des pratiques de la Chine nous aide, en prenant du recul, à mieux comprendre tous les aspects de cette obligation de coopérer en droit international. Afin d’expliquer les raisons qui se cachent derrière son choix de mode de coopération, nous introduisons une analyse constructiviste qui est plus explicative que descriptive. Nous soutenons que ce sont les identités de la Chine qui ont déterminé son choix de coopération en matière de cours d’eau transfrontaliers. Notre étude en vient à la conclusion que même s’il y a des règles généralement reconnues, l’obligation de coopérer reste une règle émergente en droit international coutumier. Ses modes d’application sont en réalité une construction sociale qui évolue et qui peut varier énormément selon les facteurs culturels, historiques ou économiques des États riverains, en d’autres mots, selon les identités de ces États. La Chine est un État d’amont en voie de développement qui continue à insister sur le principe de la souveraineté. Par conséquent, elle opte pour son propre mécanisme consultatif de coopération pour l’utilisation des ressources en eau transfrontalières. Néanmoins, avec l’évolution de ses identités en tant que superpuissance émergente, nous pouvons probablement espérer qu’au lieu de rechercher un pouvoir hégémonique et d’appliquer une stratégie unilatérale sur l’utilisation des ressources en eau transfrontalières, la Chine adoptera une stratégie plus coopérative et plus participative dans l’avenir. / The principle of international cooperation has been one of the cornerstones of international law. However, the existence of an obligation to cooperate in international law is still controversial. Like air, water is fundamental to life. As a flowing resource, the use of water in any one place is affected by its use in other places. It always marks the interdependence between human beings. The New York Convention includes expressly a general obligation to cooperate which is one of the three fundamental principles. We should then look into the practices of the states in order to find out the answer to one question : what obligation to cooperate needs to be imposed ? To answer this question, we start with a positive study of the normative content of the obligation to cooperate. We notice that the incorporation of the obligation to cooperate in the principle of sovereignty is a clear trend in international law which has already evolved from the law of coexistence to the law of cooperation. If the law of coexistence is composed of the obligations of non facere, then the law of cooperation is mainly about the positive obligations of facere, among which, the obligation to cooperate is probably the most important one. However, there is no panacea for the management of transboundary rivers in the world, every basin having its own cooperative regime. In order to evaluate the depth and breadth of the cooperative regimes, we study five parameters : the scope, the substantive rules, the procedural rules, the institutional arrangements and the dispute settlement mechanisms. Four models of cooperation are thus identified : the consultative mechanism (Indus River Basin), the communicative mechanism (Mekong River Basin), the coordinative mechanism (Rhine River Basin) and the joint action mechanism ( Senegal River Basin). As the most important developing upstream country in the world, China has been criticized for its unilateral approach in the development of transboudary waters. However, we can not neither ignore its recent efforts in establishing the cooperation with its neighbors. An analysis of China’s practice serves not only to reveal its interpretation of the general obligation to cooperate, but also helps us to better understand different aspects of this obligation to cooperate in international law. In order to explain the reasons behind the Chinese choice of mode of cooperation, then we introduce a constructivist analysis which is more explanatory than descriptive. We argue that the identities of China determine its choice of cooperation in the field of transboudary waters. Our study comes to the conclusion that despite the fact that most of the concerned rules are genarally accepted by the international community, the obligation to cooperate is still coming into being in customary international law. The modes of application of the obligation to cooperate are actually the result of the evolving process of social construction which varies according to cultural, historic or economic differences, in other words, according to the identities of states. Mainly due to its different view of sovereignty, China has adopted a consultative mechanisme of cooperation in its own style. However, we have reason to expect that China, with the evolution of his identities as a rising superpower in the world, rather than searching for a hegemonic control and adopting a unilateral strategy in the utilization of transboundary waters, would opt for a more cooperative and participative strategy in the near future.

This study seeks to examine the precise way it may be said that God takes risks in creating and governing this world. In order to articulate this model of providence various texts of scripture are studied which have either been overlooked or interpreted differently in discussions of divine providence. These texts reveal a deity who enters into genuine give-and-take relations with creatures, a God who is genuinely responsive and who may be said to take risks in that God does not get everything he desires in these relationships. Furthermore, the traditional texts used to defend the no-risk view of providence are examined and shown that they do not, in fact, teach the idea that God is the cause of everything which happens in the world such that the divine will is never thwarted in the leas detail. The biblical teaching of God in reciprocal relations with his creatures is then discussed in theological and philosophical terms. The nature of God is here understood as loving, wise, faithful yet free, almighty, competent and resourceful. These ideas are explicated in light of the more traditional theological/philosophical understanding of God. Finally, some of the implications of this relational model of God are examined to see the ways in which it may be said that God takes risks and whose will may be thwarted. The crucial watershed in this regard is whether or not there is any conditionality in the godhead. The no-risk view denies, while the risk model affirms, that some aspects of God's will, knowledge, and actions are contingent. In order to grasp the differences between the two models the doctrines and practices involved in salvation, the problem of evil, prayer and guidance are examined to see what each model says about them. It is claimed that· .the relational or risk model is superior to the no-risk model both in terms of theoretical coherence and the practice of the Christian life. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / Th. D. (Sytematic Theology)

This study seeks to examine the precise way it may be said that God takes risks in creating and governing this world. In order to articulate this model of providence various texts of scripture are studied which have either been overlooked or interpreted differently in discussions of divine providence. These texts reveal a deity who enters into genuine give-and-take relations with creatures, a God who is genuinely responsive and who may be said to take risks in that God does not get everything he desires in these relationships. Furthermore, the traditional texts used to defend the no-risk view of providence are examined and shown that they do not, in fact, teach the idea that God is the cause of everything which happens in the world such that the divine will is never thwarted in the leas detail. The biblical teaching of God in reciprocal relations with his creatures is then discussed in theological and philosophical terms. The nature of God is here understood as loving, wise, faithful yet free, almighty, competent and resourceful. These ideas are explicated in light of the more traditional theological/philosophical understanding of God. Finally, some of the implications of this relational model of God are examined to see the ways in which it may be said that God takes risks and whose will may be thwarted. The crucial watershed in this regard is whether or not there is any conditionality in the godhead. The no-risk view denies, while the risk model affirms, that some aspects of God's will, knowledge, and actions are contingent. In order to grasp the differences between the two models the doctrines and practices involved in salvation, the problem of evil, prayer and guidance are examined to see what each model says about them. It is claimed that· .the relational or risk model is superior to the no-risk model both in terms of theoretical coherence and the practice of the Christian life. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / Th. D. (Sytematic Theology)