"Blocking" refers to judgments of a moderate contingency being lowered when contrasted with a strong contingency. The Rescorla-Wagner model and causal model theory account for blocking through different mechanisms. To examine the predictions from these two models, seven experiments tested the extent to which "causal scenario" and "causal order" would influence whether blocking was observed in human contingency learning tasks. "Causal scenario" was manipulated by contrasting responses to two causes of one effect or to one cause of two effects; "causal order" was defined as causes preceding effects or effects preceding causes. The four conjunctions of these two factors were investigated separately in Experiments 1 to 5. In Experiments 1 and 2, two causes preceded one effect and two effects preceded one cause, respectively. Blocking was observed regardless of whether the predictors were causes or effects. In Experiments 3, 4 and 5, participants were presented with one antecedent cue and made separate predictions about each of the trial's two outcomes. Blocking was not observed, irrespective of whether the antecedent cue was a cause or an effect. These initial results were consistent with the Rescorla-Wagner model. An alternative explanation was that blocking failed to occur in Experiments 3 to 5 because participants were asked questions between the predictor and two outcomes. Predicting the outcomes might have implicitly led participants to monitor them separately and to report on subsets of the data at the time of judgment. To address this issue, the volunteers in Experiment 6 observed the events on each trial but did not make any predictions about the outcomes. Blocking was observed, signifying that the intervening questions between the antecedent and consequent cues constitute an important variable influencing cue competition effects. In Experiment 7, all four conjunctions of causal scenario and causal order were tested simultaneously. Furthermore, participants w

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2009. / Thesis directed by Alfred Freddoso for the Department of Philosophy. "January 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-171).

This dissertation grows out of the collapse of traditional Christian justifications for evil in the wake of Enlightenment critiques of religion and the atrocities of the twentieth century. Skeptical of teleological narratives that sought to domesticate suffering as part of a necessary plan - whether God's plan, or some more secularized ideal of progress - a generation of Critical Theorists adopted the concept of contingency as their central tool for political critique. Defined as the realm of chance, change, and the unnecessary, contingency serves for most contemporary thinkers to remind us that even seemingly natural categories, such as sex, race, and religion could have been otherwise. Yet in using contingency to make sweeping statements about the nature of history, scholars often overlook how contingency is understood on the ground by those who feel their bodies and identities abruptly made unstable. This project seeks to reground contingency in the specificity of human experience by returning to a neglected Christian tradition that understood contingency as a state of finitude, defined in contrast to the necessary, impassive God. For such thinkers, contingency was experienced most acutely in the sense of touch as it renders the body vulnerable to the external world and the passions as they ambush the soul. Accordingly, this work picks up at one of the last junctures before questions of history swept away the tactile, affective understanding of contingency: the end of the eighteenth century with the influence of Pietism on the Early German Romantics. This work draws this particular moment into conversation with the history of science, literature, and the anthropology of the senses, asking questions about the influence of shifting medical theories on the cultural understanding of touch; the historical ties between this version of contingency and theories of psychological pathology; and the relationship between literature and theology within this intellectual tradition. To focus those conversations, each chapter centers on a different situation in which a given thinker experiences contingency through touch or the passions. The opening chapter looks at Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's 1813 philosophical fable, Ages of the World, which locates contingency in the uncaused, unconditioned - and ultimately pathological - desire for companionship of an omnipotent will at the beginning of time. The chapter argues that Schelling's depiction of the contingency of desire offers a phenomenology of loneliness that grows out of a broader engagement with the problem of evil. The second chapter turns to the argument of the poet Novalis (1772-1801) that we experience contingency as a form of wonder that connects us to a divine whole we can only asymptotically approach. This wonder, he thinks, is experienced most clearly through our physical contact with books that impress on us our inability to ever do more than touch upon fragments of knowledge, given the proliferation of texts in the wake of the printing press. The third chapter reads together Eugène Minkowski's phenomenology of lived space for the mentally ill with Jean Améry's essay on torture during the Third Reich. This chapter pushes against the optimism and revelatory nature of contingency in Novalis by following cases where contingency is experienced as violation through unwanted touch. The final chapter asks whether contingency is solely disruptive, or if it can be incorporated into lasting social structures, by exploring the work of Michel Serres (1930-present). It argues a model of contingency as "common tangency" underlies his environmentalism, leading him to urge the creation of a "natural contract" where humans combat global warming from recognition that they are in co-implicated contact with nature, much like lovers during sex.

No description available.

This thesis is the first dedicated sociological attempt to offer a critical response to cultural studies and allied discourses that concern themselves with the relationship between technology and violence. A critical reconstruction is necessary because these cultural theorists have failed to adequately contextualize their arguments in relation to both the globally ascendant neoliberal policy outlook and its associated social Darwinian technoculture: the combined pernicious effects of which could be described as the logic of ???social constructionism as social psychosis???. The most prominent manifestation of this theoretical psychosis has to do with an interest in biotechnology in particular. The problem I identify in the treatment of this theme is how easily it can be used to support a technologically determinist position. One undesirable side effect is that these determinists are able to project from present trends a dystopian exhaustion of all critique through their focus on violence. In the thesis of ???bioglobalism??? this state of affairs is also deployed to take sociologists to task for insufficient recognition of processual ???network??? forms of distributed agency in technological processes. At stake therefore is the recovery of sociological critique. It follows that the core of my thesis is the radical reworking of two related heuristic devices: seriality and contingency. Seriality is taken to refer to social practices as diverse as the possible relationships between the social problem of rationality, case studies of individuals who have run amok, and the functioning of network characteristics. I use contingency to eschew seriality???s deterministic accounting of the social. Here I propose a new conceptual relationship between creativity and action. Emphasis is accordingly placed upon two related normative projects: Raymond Williams???s cultural materialism, and three of the ???problematiques??? Peter Wagner has identified as inescapable for theorizing modernity: the continuity of the acting person, the certainty of knowledge, and the viability of the political order. I conclude with a renewed conception of the role of normative critique as a form of conceptual therapy for bioglobal projections of seriality.

This thesis is the first dedicated sociological attempt to offer a critical response to cultural studies and allied discourses that concern themselves with the relationship between technology and violence. A critical reconstruction is necessary because these cultural theorists have failed to adequately contextualize their arguments in relation to both the globally ascendant neoliberal policy outlook and its associated social Darwinian technoculture: the combined pernicious effects of which could be described as the logic of ???social constructionism as social psychosis???. The most prominent manifestation of this theoretical psychosis has to do with an interest in biotechnology in particular. The problem I identify in the treatment of this theme is how easily it can be used to support a technologically determinist position. One undesirable side effect is that these determinists are able to project from present trends a dystopian exhaustion of all critique through their focus on violence. In the thesis of ???bioglobalism??? this state of affairs is also deployed to take sociologists to task for insufficient recognition of processual ???network??? forms of distributed agency in technological processes. At stake therefore is the recovery of sociological critique. It follows that the core of my thesis is the radical reworking of two related heuristic devices: seriality and contingency. Seriality is taken to refer to social practices as diverse as the possible relationships between the social problem of rationality, case studies of individuals who have run amok, and the functioning of network characteristics. I use contingency to eschew seriality???s deterministic accounting of the social. Here I propose a new conceptual relationship between creativity and action. Emphasis is accordingly placed upon two related normative projects: Raymond Williams???s cultural materialism, and three of the ???problematiques??? Peter Wagner has identified as inescapable for theorizing modernity: the continuity of the acting person, the certainty of knowledge, and the viability of the political order. I conclude with a renewed conception of the role of normative critique as a form of conceptual therapy for bioglobal projections of seriality.

Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez Benoit / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T11:44:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pereira_ReinaldoSampaio_D.pdf: 6973767 bytes, checksum: 4adf120b73d1bb84c7c412ebf15ce026 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Advertimos que não temos como propósito a releitura de algum ponto específico de alguma parte da obra de Aristóteles ou uma nova interpretação acerca de alguma passagem, conceito ou 'doutrina¿ do corpus. Pretendemos tão somente estabelecer certo percurso de análise de um dos importantes conceitos da sua filosofia, a saber, o lógos, a partir da investigação de outro conceito de fundamental importância nos seus textos, a potência, percurso esse que conduz a um aparente paradoxo (o qual constituir-se-á no objeto norteador da nossa pesquisa), qual seja, por um lado, de uma perspectiva física, o lógos confere potencialidade para o homem não ficar totalmente sujeito à necessidade do mundo sublunar, permitindo-lhe agir na contingência que este comporta; por outro, de um ponto de vista prático, esse mesmo lógos tende a encerrar o homem em certa necessidade. / Abstract: Not informed. / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia Antiga / Doutor em Filosofia

OPSOMMING Gebeurlikhede kan omskryf word as onsekere omstandighede van positiewe of negatiewe aard wat, onafhanklik van die verweerder se optrede en indien dit sou realiseer, waarskynlik 'n persoon se gesondheid, inkomste, verdienvermoë, lewenskwaliteit, lewensverwagting of onderhoudsafhanklikheid in die toekoms kan beïnvloed of in die verlede kon beïnvloed het en wat gevolglik op billike en realistiese wyse in ag geneem moet word ter bepaling van die skadevergoedingsbedrag. Die skadevergoedingsbedrag kan vanweë gebeurlikhede verminder of vermeerder word waar die eiser wel met `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid die volle omvang van die skade bewys het, maar die hof nie kon oortuig dat geen ander oorsaak die skade waarskynlik ook sou kon veroorsaak nie (sg "gebeurlikheids-aanpassings"). In gevalle waar die eiser nie die volle omvang van die skade op `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid kon bewys nie, kan die hof nogtans `n verminderde bedrag toeken op grond van die gebeurlikheid dat die skade wel waarskynlik in die toekoms kan realiseer (sg "gebeurlikheidstoekennings"). Die eiser moet getuienis voorlê van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verhoog, en die verweerder van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verlaag. Die waarskynlikheid dat die gebeurlikheid sal realiseer, moet deur die hof aan die hand van objektiewe maatstawwe en op grond van feitelike bewerings en logiese afleidings uit deskundige en ander getuienis in die vorm van `n waarskynlikheidsgraad van tussen vyf persent en tagtig persent uitgedruk word. Hipotetiese kousaliteit word deur die hof aangewend om gebeurlikhede op `n billike wyse in ag te neem en verwys na die kousale ketting van hipotetiese feite wat waarskynlik sou gerealiseer het indien die skadestigtende gebeurtenis nie plaasgevind het nie. Gebeurlikhede kan in twee kategorieë geklassifiseer word: Algemene gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik in enige stadium by alle persone kan voorkom (bv vroeë dood, siekte ens) en spesifieke gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik op spesifieke tydstippe by spesifieke individue kan voorkom (bv hertroue, egskeiding ens). Terwyl die hof geregtelik kennis behoort te kan neem van die invloed van algemene gebeurlikhede, behoort die hof hoofsaaklik op grond van ondersteunende getuienis van die invloed van spesifieke gebeurlikhede oortuig te word. Algemene gebeurlikheidsaanpassings is gewoonlik relatief laag (gemiddeld tien persent), terwyl gebeurlikheidsaanpassings vir spesifieke gebeurlikhede fluktueer (gewoonlik tussen vyf persent en vyftig persent), afhangende van die getuienis en omstandighede van die eiser. Gebeurlikheidstoekennings is gewoonlik laer as vyftig persent. SUMMARY Contingencies can be described as uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, independent of the defendant's conduct and if it should realise, would probably influence a person's health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy or dependency on support in future or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be taken into account in a fair and realistic manner in the quantification of damages. Contingencies can be used to increase or reduce damages in circumstances where the plaintiff succeeded in proving the full loss on a preponderance of probability, but could not convince the court that there was no probability that any other cause could also have given rise to the loss (so-called "contingency adjustments"). In circumstances where the plaintiff could not prove the full loss on a preponderance of probability, the court can nevertheless award a reduced amount on the basis of the contingency that loss could probably realise in future (so-called "contingency allowances"). The plaintiff must adduce evidence of contingencies that can increase damages, and the defendant of contingencies that can reduce damages. The degree of probability that the contingency will realise, must be expressed by the court as a percentage of between five percent and eighty percent, in view of objective measures and on the basis of factual allegations and logical deductions derived from expert and other evidence. Hypothetical causation assists the court in taking account of contingencies in a fair manner and refers to the causal link of hypothetical events which would probably have realised if the damage-causing event did not occur. Contingencies can be classified into two categories: General contingencies that usually can be present in the lives of all people at any point in time (eg early death, sickness, etc) and specific contingencies that usually are present in the lives of specific individuals at specific times (eg remarriage, divorce, etc). While the court should be able to take legal notice of the influence of general contingencies, the court should be convinced of the influence of specific contingencies primarily on the basis of supporting evidence. General contingency adjustments are usually relatively low (on average ten per cent), while contingency adjustments for specific contingencies fluctuate (usually between five per cent and fifty per cent), depending on the evidence and circumstances of the plaintiff. Contingency allowances are usually lower than fifty per cent. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

This study seeks to examine the precise way it may be said that God takes risks in creating and governing this world. In order to articulate this model of providence various texts of scripture are studied which have either been overlooked or interpreted differently in discussions of divine providence. These texts reveal a deity who enters into genuine give-and-take relations with creatures, a God who is genuinely responsive and who may be said to take risks in that God does not get everything he desires in these relationships. Furthermore, the traditional texts used to defend the no-risk view of providence are examined and shown that they do not, in fact, teach the idea that God is the cause of everything which happens in the world such that the divine will is never thwarted in the leas detail. The biblical teaching of God in reciprocal relations with his creatures is then discussed in theological and philosophical terms. The nature of God is here understood as loving, wise, faithful yet free, almighty, competent and resourceful. These ideas are explicated in light of the more traditional theological/philosophical understanding of God. Finally, some of the implications of this relational model of God are examined to see the ways in which it may be said that God takes risks and whose will may be thwarted. The crucial watershed in this regard is whether or not there is any conditionality in the godhead. The no-risk view denies, while the risk model affirms, that some aspects of God's will, knowledge, and actions are contingent. In order to grasp the differences between the two models the doctrines and practices involved in salvation, the problem of evil, prayer and guidance are examined to see what each model says about them. It is claimed that· .the relational or risk model is superior to the no-risk model both in terms of theoretical coherence and the practice of the Christian life. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / Th. D. (Sytematic Theology)