In both western and Russian historiography the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40 enjoys, at best, only a passing reference in any narrative of the period and is poorly integrated into existing scholarly analyses of the Soviet regime under Stalin. It is my contention that this conflict offers an invaluable opportunity to test for continuity and change in the form and function of the Stalinist system. Between the disastrous efforts of its forces and the condemnation of the international community, the Kremlin was confronted with the serious challenge of how to portray the events of the war in the media, while managing domestic and international opinion over the course of the fighting. This thesis examines the extent to which the Soviet regime under Stalin had the institutions and agents in place at the close of the 1930s to cope with the crisis of war in Finland; to be in command of the military campaign, while simultaneously controlling the direction of the official narrative about the fighting; and to censor conflicting interpretations, experiences and information channels, which might expose the Red Army's woeful performance on Finnish territory. This mobilisation of press, propaganda and censorship organs in the face of widespread international condemnation and domestic disquiet constituted a significant challenge for a regime still dealing with the sudden reorientation of the Communist International, required after the Soviet Union's conclusion of a non-aggression treat with Nazi Germany in August 1939. An international perspective is central to this thesis, with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the public face and private practice of Soviet information controls.

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis is a general examination of the Soviet and East European crisis which followed the death of Joseph Stalin in March, 1953. Stalin's character, position, and power were such that the methods he employed in the government of the vast multi-national and multi-state empire bequeathed to his successors could not be made to function in his absence without reform and redefinition. The post-Stalin leadership realized that in order to consolidate its position at the head of the empire a careful program of "de-Stalinization" was mandatory. The prosecution of that program from the announcement of collective leadership in April, 1953, to the 1957 Moscow celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the upheavals associated ·with the period comprise the four year long Soviet and East European crisis of de-Stalinization.

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This study seeks to explore the role of peasant women in resistance to the antireligious campaigns during collectivization and analyze how the interplay of the state and resistors formed a new culture of religion in the countryside. I argue that while the state’s succeeded in controlling most of the public sphere, peasant women, engaging in subversive activities and exploiting the state’s ideology, succeeded in preserving a strong peasant adherence to religion prior to World War II. It was peasant women’s determination and adaptation that thwarted the party’s goal of nation-wide atheism.

The Soviet economy experienced a marked decline in the rate of growth of output in the mid 1970s. Research was conducted for Soviet postwar industry in order to try and identify when the shift was strongest, and in which industrial branches. A statistical technique known as the "Chow Test" was used to test for a "break" year -- the year when the production function most dramatically changed. Regression results showed that two types of industry -- that which was closely associated with military production, and industry responsible for producing consumer goods, showed little or no shift in the mid 1970s. The remaining sectors, which were primarily resource intensive, did show a significant shift in 1974. A description of the investigation, including input data and regression results, is included. / M.A.

This dissertation will analyse the history of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople, which operated between 1895 and 1914. Established under the administrative structure of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, the institute occupied a place at the intersection of science and politics. Focusing nearly exclusively on Byzantine and Slavic antiquities in the Ottoman Empire, the activities of the institute reflected the imperial identity of Russia at the turn of the century. As was explicitly expressed by Russian diplomats, bureaucrats, and scholars, the establishment of an archaeological institution in the Ottoman capital was regarded as a foreign policy tool to extend Russia’s influence in the Near East, a tool of “soft power” in modern parlance. On the Ottoman side, foreign archaeological activities were regarded with suspicion especially in the later part of the 19th century. In an attempt to preserve its vulnerable sovereignty, Ottoman Empire closely monitored foreign archaeological activities on its territories. For the Ottoman Empire, archaeology was also a way of projecting its image as a modern, Westernised empire. For both Russian and Ottoman archaeologists, European scholarship was regarded as an example that should be followed, and a rival at the same time. Russian archaeologists had to close down their office with the outbreak of World War I. The complications that arose with the disintegration of the institute were solved only in the late 1920s between the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey, under completely different political circumstances.