The characteristics of the Sino-Soviet Alliance have been analyzed extensively for more than three decades. However, the economic aspects of this Alliance remain unclear. A number of factors, such as statistical discrepancies, complexity of interpretation, and the quality and reliability of the Chinese and Soviet sources , are accountable for this obscurity. A more narrowly focused study examining the role Sino-Soviet economic relations played in shaping the Alliance is useful to better our understanding. After a chronological, review of the Sino-Soviet economic relationship, its significance in shaping the Alliance is examined through the reappraisal of three major areas. Firstly, the relative costs and benefits for each partner are assessed in an objective and detached way. The Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to China's industrialization. Soviet financial aid , though modest in figure, was provided in a timely way. Together with the provision of scientific and technological knowledge, the value of Soviet aid must be regarded as considerable. The benefits to the Soviet Union were less impressive; but since the imported Chinese consumer goods were largely consumed in the Soviet Far East, the benefits should not be underestimated. The cost for both sides remains obscure; though it is obvious that the questions of "Soviet exploitation", concerning the joint-stock companies, the overvaluation of the rouble and the pricing in Sino-Soviet trade are highly complex and should be interpreted with greater care. Secondly, the effect of Sino-Soviet economic cooperation on the Alliance — whether it strengthened or weakened it — is explored. Undoubtedly, the economic relationship had both unifying and divisive effects. It was a unifying factor because the Soviets had provided China with support and assistance that would have been difficult to obtain elsewhere . Another factor which had tied China to the USSR was the strong Soviet influences resulting from the implementation of the Soviet model and the close cooperation in the fields of education and sciences. On the other hand, these Soviet influences proved to be a divisive factor as well, because they produced a domestic political and social situation that Mao found profoundly distasteful. Different economic interests and competition in foreign aid programs also created tensions and frictions. The independent outlook of China's leaders made them resentful of their role as a junior partner in the early 1950's, and prevented them from entering a long-term trade agreement with the USSR or joining the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, as the Soviets had wished. Finally, the impact of Sino-Soviet economic relations upon China's policy-making is discussed, albeit speculatively. In the early 1950's, China's economic and military dependence on the USSR made its leaders exercise greater caution in their claim of "Mao's Road " as the model for other Asian countries. As China gained strength, however, Soviet influence declined. While the discontinuation of Soviet financial aid can reasonably be regarded as one of the major factors contributing to China's decision to abandon the Soviet model in 1958, the economic pressure applied by Khrushchev failed to change China's policy, and proved counterproductive. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines evolving Soviet perspectives on the "correlation of forces" between the socialist world and the capitalist countries in general and the Soviet Union and the United States in particular. The focus is on the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases of Soviet history. The term "correlation of forces" is primarily an analytic concept used by Soviet leaders and scholars to understand and interpret the pace of what they view as the inevitable historical development in favor of socialism. A rough Soviet equivalent of the Western concept of the "balance of power," "correlation of forces" as it is used by Soviet spokesmen encompasses economic, political, and military-security dimensions. The methodology employed in the thesis in charting the chronological evolution of Soviet thinking regarding the correlation of forces consists of a careful and discriminating textual analysis of terminological variations in Soviet scholarly and official use of the concept over time, with due regard to contextual fluctuations in the domestic and international realms. For its source material, this study relied heavily on the speeches and writing of Soviet leaders as well as utilizing analyses of international developments published in Soviet scholarly journals. The differing stress on each of the three aspects of the correlation of forces—economic, political, and military—between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods allowed us to trace the change and evolution of the Soviet world view from a primary stress on economic factors of the distribution of power under Khrushchev, to an emphasis on the military dimension of the balance under Brezhnev. By monitoring terminological variations in the concept, we were able to identify periods of optimism and pessimism during both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases. We also noted the important role played by the divergent personalities of Khrushchev and Brezhnev on Soviet portrayal of the correlation of forces. Whereas the exuberant Soviet optimism in the military area lacked any basis in fact under Khrushchev, the depiction of the military correlation, while more muted under Brezhnev, was solidly based. These and other such differences, we argued, were a function of the stamp superimposed on Soviet politics by the respective leaders of the time. This study will, by clarifying the context within which the Soviet leadership makes its choices, contribute to an enhanced understanding of the general foreign policy trends of the USSR. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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