Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide stipulates the definition of the crime. A key element of genocide is the criterion of “intent”; this requisite must be met in order to determine criminal liability. Even though “intent” is a paramount element of the crime neither definition nor guidance regarding its interpretation is provided for under Article II, this void of interpretation is absolute throughout the Genocide Convention. Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to examine this void in the provision. In order to fulfill the purpose of this thesis the following research questions have been regarded: How is the requisite intent defined in relevant preparatory work of Genocide Convention? How is the requisite intent interpreted in relevant case law and judicial doctrines and are these interpretations in line with the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention? Is the definition and interpretation of the requisite intent in the abovementioned legal sources consistent with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention? We found that in the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention, the requisite intent has not been labeled. However, the Drafters definition of intent is in accordance with international criminal law’s definition of specific intent. Also, the case law and judicial doctrines that we have examined all fall within either the purpose-based or the knowledge-based approach. Both approaches acknowledge that a perpetrator needs to possess an inner aim or desire to meet the level of intent required for the Crime. Notwithstanding, the knowledge-based approach holds that “policy or plan” is part of the Crime whereas the purpose-based approach rejects it and consequently the application of genocidal intent is distinctively different. With regard to preparatory work, the purpose-based approach is in line with the definition of the Drafters whereas the knowledge-based approach is not in its literal meaning. However, the Drafters did not explicitly reject the knowledge-based approach in the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention. We have concluded that the purpose-based approach is not consistent with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. We hold that the knowledge-based approach is in line with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, and hence this approach upholds the goal of preventing and punishing genocide. Moreover, the method for this thesis is in accordance with the method in international law for interpretations of international treaties; the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties. Hence, the selection, systemization and interpretation of legal sources are in line with the Vienna Convention.

A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to 1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is given / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to 1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is given / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

L’article 33.1 est une disposition du Code criminel qui vise à interdire l’utilisation de la défense d’intoxication extrême à l’encontre d’infractions violentes d’intention générale. La première version de cette disposition avait été ajoutée au Code criminel en 1995 en réaction à l’arrêt Daviault où la Cour suprême avait reconnu pour la première fois que l’état d’intoxication extrême pouvait constituer une défense admissible en droit pénal canadien. En adoptant cette disposition, le Parlement voulait s’assurer que les personnes qui avaient commis des crimes violents d’intention générale ne puissent invoquer leur état d’intoxication pour s’exonérer de leur responsabilité. Pendant plus de 25 ans, cette première version aura force de loi, mais en mai 2022 la Cour suprême rend l’arrêt Brown dans lequel elle déclare son inconstitutionnalité. En moins de six semaines, le Parlement adopte une nouvelle version de l’article 33.1 qui devrait, selon lui, corriger les lacunes de l’ancienne version et combler le vide juridique laissé par sa déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité. L’objet ultime du présent mémoire est donc d’évaluer si le nouveau libellé de l’article 33.1 du Code criminel sera en mesure d’atteindre les objectifs que le Parlement s’était fixés lors de son adoption. / Section 33.1 is a provision of the Criminal Code that is intended to prohibit the use of the defense of extreme intoxication against violent offences of general intent. The first version of this provision was added to the Criminal Code in 1995 in response to Daviault decision, where the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that a state of extreme intoxication could constitute an admissible defense in Canadian criminal law. By adopting this provision, Parliament wanted to ensure that people who had committed violent crimes of general intent could not invoke their state of intoxication to exonerate themselves from their responsibility. For more than 25 years, this first version will have the force of law, but in May 2022, the Supreme Court renders Brown judgement in which it declares its unconstitutionality. In less than six weeks, Parliament adopted a new version of article 33.1 which, in its view, should correct the shortcomings of the old version and fill the legal void left by its declaration of unconstitutionality. The ultimate purpose of this brief if therefore to assess whether the new wording of section 33.1 of the Criminal Code will be able to achieve the objectives that Parliament set for itself when it was adopted.