The current criminal law of England and Wales does not assess mens rea in a consistent manner. The law applies two distinct methods of assessing mens rea – subjectivism and objectivism – which are based on conflicting principles of criminal liability. A subjective test depends upon what the defendant himself foresaw, believed or intended whereas an objective test will label the defendant culpable for what a hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ would have foreseen or how he would have reacted. This thesis will show that, if the law is ever to take a consistent approach to assessing mens rea, both subjectivism and objectivism must be cast aside. As they place undue importance on foresight of the consequences, neither of these doctrines are capable of providing an accurate reflection of an individual’s moral culpability. Subjectivism is too narrow because it ignores any other states of mind that, although inconsistent with subjective foresight, may be considered to display a high degree of moral culpability. Objectivism is too broad because, by labelling all who fall below the reasonable standard as culpable, it takes no account of those individuals who lack the capacity to foresee what the reasonable person would have foreseen. It will be shown that an approach based on the defendant’s attitudes and reasons for acting will allow for a much more accurate inference of an individual’s moral culpability than is achieved by either subjectivism or objectivism. Accordingly, this new approach is one that could be applied across the scope of the criminal law without the need for any special exceptions or illogical deviations from the norm. As a result, the way in which the English and Welsh criminal law assesses mens rea would achieve a consistency that it currently lacks.

This thesis is a critical examination of the boundaries of recklessness and negligence in English and Welsh criminal law and of the extent to which these mentes reae terms reflect the leading theories of culpability. The general principle requiring mens rea to be established before criminal liability is justified stems from the maxim ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, and the historical foundations of this concept will be analysed to assess whether there can be criminal liability for inadvertent conduct whilst still upholding this tenet. The interpretation of recklessness and negligence has proven to be problematic as both have included inadvertent actions and subjective and objective labels have been employed inconsistently, exacerbating an already difficult situation. What becomes clear is that the recent judicial pronouncements that have given rise this state of affairs is the result of a desire for flexibility so that justice can be done in a particular case, but this has culminated in a lack of transparency and some confusion. The aim of this work is to determine appropriate limits for criminal recklessness and negligence with regard to serious offences. Over the last century recklessness has had three main interpretations, none of which are satisfactory as will be demonstrated. This is partly because they cannot be adequately underpinned by the theories of choice and character, the leading theories of culpability. Further, the objective/subjective labels attached to the three interpretations are inaccurate and misleading, with the potential for injustice. Accordingly, other culpability theories are scrutinised and a new interpretation of recklessness is advocated in an attempt to provide a more consistent philosophical and practical approach to determining criminal recklessness and negligence.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

The United States has a drug issue that is perpetually problematic. Efforts are being made on every level of government to reduce drug use and deter current and potential future users. Some of these efforts however are putting citizen's rights at risk in a manner that threatens the United States Constitution that hails over both the state and federal governments. My thesis will examine Florida's avant-garde approach to simplifying drug convictions through unprecedented legislation that has already been ruled unconstitutional on its face by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The decade long struggle will soon culminate in the Florida Supreme Court, and if found unconstitutional, could potentially impact thousands of inmates among other legal consequences. Through literature review and case study I will discuss the history of this issue and conclude by discussing possible rulings of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Adkins, SC11-1878 (2D11-4559, 2nd DCA). In addition, I will analyze the case timeline that led to the legislative action which is being called into question in Adkins. I hypothesize that the ruling in Adkins will declare Florida's drug statute unconstitutional; however, I further presume that the currently incarcerated defendants will continue to serve their sentences virtually unaffected by the ruling, with some extraordinary exceptions. First, I will discuss the underlying legal premises, succeeded by an analysis of all pertinent case law and literature to assess the constitutionality of Florida's drug statute to further support my hypothesis. My goal for this thesis is to give perspective to the layperson as well as contribute to the statewide legal community through my organization of the subject, and analysis of case law.

This thesis focuses on the treatment of insanity in the criminal law and its implications for the concepts and mechanisms of legal accountability. In order to address this issue, I examined the historical background of the insanity defense and five specific cases that demonstrate the complications arising from insanity’s present legal condition. From this case study I drew the conclusion that, because liability to punishment requires particular internal conditions, criminal responsibility is the proper measure of legal accountability for insane persons. Ultimately, my research demonstrated that insanity occupies a unique position in both the theory of crimes and the theory of punishment and that a trial by jury is not the most appropriate way for adjudicating issues of insanity. In each of these spheres, judges consider how mental conditions relate to criminal responsibility and the role that juries play shrinks as the content of guilt shifts to criminal responsibility. For this reason, I conclude that judges are the best candidates for addressing insanity and its effect on criminal responsibility.

Indecent assault consists in an unlawful and intentional indecent assault which is and is intended to be indecent. There is some controversy in the case law whether the indecency is committed only by acts which are, objectively speaking indecent, against the view that even though the act is not indecent itself, may nevertheless found a conviction of indecent assault if it was the intention of the accused to act indecent and such intention was conveyed to the victim. It is submitted that the last mentioned approach is to be preferred but that the following test should be used: 1. If the act, is objectively speaking indecent and there is no doubt about the unlawfulness as well as the indecent intention of the accused, the crime of indecent assault was committed. 2. If the act is objectively speaking indecent but the indecent intention of the accused can not be proven, there is a rebuttable presumption that the accused acted with an indecent intention. Such as presumption must be rebutted b the accused himself. 3. If the act is not objectively speaking, indecent but the indecent intention of the accused can for example be proven by the accused confession to such an intention, the act became indecent. / Text in Afrikaans / Law / LL.M.

Indecent assault consists in an unlawful and intentional indecent assault which is and is intended to be indecent. There is some controversy in the case law whether the indecency is committed only by acts which are, objectively speaking indecent, against the view that even though the act is not indecent itself, may nevertheless found a conviction of indecent assault if it was the intention of the accused to act indecent and such intention was conveyed to the victim. It is submitted that the last mentioned approach is to be preferred but that the following test should be used: 1. If the act, is objectively speaking indecent and there is no doubt about the unlawfulness as well as the indecent intention of the accused, the crime of indecent assault was committed. 2. If the act is objectively speaking indecent but the indecent intention of the accused can not be proven, there is a rebuttable presumption that the accused acted with an indecent intention. Such as presumption must be rebutted b the accused himself. 3. If the act is not objectively speaking, indecent but the indecent intention of the accused can for example be proven by the accused confession to such an intention, the act became indecent. / Text in Afrikaans / Law / LL.M.

Le discernement est traditionnellement rattaché à l’étude de l’élément moral de l’infraction.Sous l’empire du Code pénal de 1810, des fondements de droit naturel sont à l’oeuvre, si bien que le discernement fut défini par emprunt au droit canon comme une aptitude à distinguer le bien du mal. Mais cette acception ne révèle pas la teneur originelle du critère du libre-arbitre :il correspondait à la connaissance de la loi divine dont le droit séculier n’était que le reflet.L’analyse du droit positif laïcisé invite à découvrir l’existence d’une présomption de connaissance de la loi toujours aussi impérative que dans les systèmes de pénalité antiques.Le discernement peut alors être défini comme une conscience réflexive : la connaissance des droits et devoirs reconnus à chaque personne, au sein de statuts juridiques que la prolifération des normes contribue à préciser. Aussi, la culpabilité n’est pas une connaissance de l’illicéité d’un résultat ; elle procède de l’ignorance des prescriptions légales chez celui qui est présumé en connaître l’existence. En procédure pénale, cette présomption devient protectrice des droits du mis en cause. Aucun acte coercitif ne peut être exercé à son encontre s’il n’a été avisé du statut dont il relève. Cette information assure ainsi la finalité rétributive de la peine chez celui qui n’ignore pas les raisons de sa condamnation. En tout état de cause, la soumission des individus au droit pénal est le seul objectif poursuivi en la matière, ce qui nécessite parfois la présence de victimes au procès pénal, à la seule fin de préserver leur foi en son impérativité. / Discernment is traditionally attached to the study of the « moral element » of the offense. Under the influence of the Penal Code of 1810, the foundations of natural law are at work, so that the discernment was defined by canon law as the ability to distinguish good from evil. But this understanding does not reveal the content of the original criterion of free will: it used to correspond to the knowledge of the divine law which secular law was only the reflection. The analysis of positive law secularized invites you to discover the existence of a presumption of knowledge of the law as imperative as it was in the systems of ancient penalty. Discernment can then be defined as a reflexive consciousness: the awareness of rights and obligations identified to each person within legal statutes that the proliferation of standards helps to clarify. Also, guilt is not a knowledge of the wrongfulness of an outcome; it proceeds fromignorance of the legal requirements in the person who is presumed to know of its existence. In criminal proceedings, this presumption becomes protective of the rights of the suspect. No coercive act can be exercised against him if he has not been notified of the status to which he belongs. This information ensures the retributive purpose of punishment, for the one who can’t ignore the reasons for his conviction. In any event, the submission of individuals to the established rules is the only objective of the criminal law, which might imply that it accepts the presence of victims in criminal proceedings, for the sole purpose of preserving their faith in his imperativity.

An accused cannot be held criminally liable by a court until he is considered to be culpable, a process which entails establishing criminal capacity and intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa). Determining a perpetrator’s necessary intent in the form of dolus eventualis has proved to be a predicament in South African jurisprudence. This type of intent occurs when a person does not aim to cause the unlawful act, however, he subjectively foresees the likelihood that in pursuing with his conduct, the unlawful result will possibly happen, and he reconciles himself to this possibility. The problem with this form of intention, especially where the death of another is caused recklessly, is, amongst others, reservations as to whether the perpetrator’s foresight was of a real, reasonable or a remote possibility. This research examines the imperatives and rationale for preceding and current interpretations and applications of dolus eventualis and associate concepts in South African as well as in selected foreign legal frameworks in order to provide a comprehensive perspective on the subject. In this regard, the study challenges conflicting judgments on the application of dolus eventualis in domestic courts, especially as regards homicide- and putative private defence cases, amongst others. It is evidenced that in case law concerning dolus eventualis, legal rules were not properly articulated when determining this type of criminal intent. In this investigation, the legislative framework applicable to dolus eventualis under international law is also critically evaluated with the aim of facilitating the comprehension of this element in South African law. As the concept of dolus eventualis is an indispensable concept in South African criminal law, recommendations are proposed on the application and interpretation of dolus eventualis suitable to the South African landscape, which includes possible law reform. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)

A brief analysis of South African Law relating to intoxication as a defence prior to 1988 is given. This is followed by an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the statutory crime created by section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. Various points of criticism against the wording of section 1 (1) as well as the problems with regard to its application in practice are set out. In conclusion a draft for a new, more effective wording for section 1 (1) is given / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)