Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-05-18T15:45:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 elizabethvallebotti.pdf: 722506 bytes, checksum: 0c0579d6b119fb986b7382a190d5ed78 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-01T18:50:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 elizabethvallebotti.pdf: 722506 bytes, checksum: 0c0579d6b119fb986b7382a190d5ed78 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-01T18:50:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 elizabethvallebotti.pdf: 722506 bytes, checksum: 0c0579d6b119fb986b7382a190d5ed78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-27 / É fato o vertiginoso crescimento das taxas de criminalidade e da população carcerária no ocidente nas últimas três décadas, população essa eminentemente pobre. Da mesma forma observa-se o aumento e a especialização dos contingentes policiais, a disseminação e a sofisticação de mecanismos de vigilância, a ampliação dos poderes dos órgãos de controle social, além do desenvolvimento e da adoção de instrumentos, tecnologias e saberes científicos que procedam a avaliações e exames técnicos de criminosos. Dos estudos que buscam entender essa realidade dois conceitos se destacam especialmente, o de “cultura do controle”, de David Garland (2004); e o de “governo através do crime”, de Jonathan Simon (2007), esse último conjugando os conceitos de biopolítica e de “governamentalidade”, de Michel Foucault (1992, 1979). Tomando esse arcabouço teórico como referência para pensar o modelo brasileiro de tratamento da criminalidade e do criminoso, e considerando que uma das formas de vigilância e controle social na contemporaneidade se dá através da punição dos criminosos tidos como perigosos para o convívio social, por força de transtornos mentais ou de comportamento - avaliação a cargo do psiquiatra forense -, a presente pesquisa dá visibilidade ao discurso psiquiátrico presente em laudos oriundos de exames de sanidade mental, dependência toxicológica e de verificação de periculosidade produzidos em processos criminais. Sugere-se que a psiquiatria, ao identificar o indivíduo perigoso repete o padrão do encarceramento em geral, o fazendo sustentada em argumentação de cunho eminentemente subjetivo e incompatível com os avanços técnico-científicos que apregoa, inclusive o da antipsiquiatria ou reforma psiquiátrica, mostrando-se de fácil adequação tanto a um contexto de controle social rígido, quanto a uma proposta de governamentalidade através do crime. / In the past three decades, the huge growth in crime rates and prison population -- this predominantly a poor one -- in the West is indisputable. Likewise there is an increase and specialization of police contingents, the espread and sophistication of surveillance mechanisms, expanding the powers of social control, and the development and adoption of tools, technologies and scientific knowledge to undertake assessments and technical examinations of criminals. Among the studies seeking to understand this reality, two concepts stand out especially: the "culture of control" by David Garland (2004), and the "government through crime", by Jonathan Simon (2007). The latter combines the Michel Foucault´s (1992, 1979) concepts of biopolitics and governmentality. Taking this theoretical framework as a reference for thinking about the Brazilian model of treatment of crime and criminal, and considering that one of the forms of surveillance and social control in contemporary society is undertaken through the punishment of offenders regarded as dangerous to the social environment, by virtue of mental or behavioral - evaluation of forensic psychiatrist in charge - this research gives visibility to this psychiatric discourse in findings from examinations of mental health, addiction and verification of dangerousness made in criminal cases. It is suggested that psychiatry, to identify the dangerous individual repeats the pattern of incarceration in general, in making sustained argument eminently subjective and inconsistent with the technical-scientific advances that proclaims, include the psychiatric reformation, the being both an easy adaptation to an environment of tough social control and a proposal of governmentality through crime.

Le discernement est traditionnellement rattaché à l’étude de l’élément moral de l’infraction.Sous l’empire du Code pénal de 1810, des fondements de droit naturel sont à l’oeuvre, si bien que le discernement fut défini par emprunt au droit canon comme une aptitude à distinguer le bien du mal. Mais cette acception ne révèle pas la teneur originelle du critère du libre-arbitre :il correspondait à la connaissance de la loi divine dont le droit séculier n’était que le reflet.L’analyse du droit positif laïcisé invite à découvrir l’existence d’une présomption de connaissance de la loi toujours aussi impérative que dans les systèmes de pénalité antiques.Le discernement peut alors être défini comme une conscience réflexive : la connaissance des droits et devoirs reconnus à chaque personne, au sein de statuts juridiques que la prolifération des normes contribue à préciser. Aussi, la culpabilité n’est pas une connaissance de l’illicéité d’un résultat ; elle procède de l’ignorance des prescriptions légales chez celui qui est présumé en connaître l’existence. En procédure pénale, cette présomption devient protectrice des droits du mis en cause. Aucun acte coercitif ne peut être exercé à son encontre s’il n’a été avisé du statut dont il relève. Cette information assure ainsi la finalité rétributive de la peine chez celui qui n’ignore pas les raisons de sa condamnation. En tout état de cause, la soumission des individus au droit pénal est le seul objectif poursuivi en la matière, ce qui nécessite parfois la présence de victimes au procès pénal, à la seule fin de préserver leur foi en son impérativité. / Discernment is traditionally attached to the study of the « moral element » of the offense. Under the influence of the Penal Code of 1810, the foundations of natural law are at work, so that the discernment was defined by canon law as the ability to distinguish good from evil. But this understanding does not reveal the content of the original criterion of free will: it used to correspond to the knowledge of the divine law which secular law was only the reflection. The analysis of positive law secularized invites you to discover the existence of a presumption of knowledge of the law as imperative as it was in the systems of ancient penalty. Discernment can then be defined as a reflexive consciousness: the awareness of rights and obligations identified to each person within legal statutes that the proliferation of standards helps to clarify. Also, guilt is not a knowledge of the wrongfulness of an outcome; it proceeds fromignorance of the legal requirements in the person who is presumed to know of its existence. In criminal proceedings, this presumption becomes protective of the rights of the suspect. No coercive act can be exercised against him if he has not been notified of the status to which he belongs. This information ensures the retributive purpose of punishment, for the one who can’t ignore the reasons for his conviction. In any event, the submission of individuals to the established rules is the only objective of the criminal law, which might imply that it accepts the presence of victims in criminal proceedings, for the sole purpose of preserving their faith in his imperativity.