This thesis concerns the issue of injunctive relief and specific performance in arbitration. The availability of such relief varies significantly between different jurisdictions and the issue is further complicated when parties opt out of litigation in favor of arbitration, not the least in terms of enforcement. In light of this, the thesis aims to determine the consequences for parties opting for arbitration instead of litigation with regard to the availability and enforceability of specific performance and injunctive relief. This overall research question has been answered under the laws of Sweden and the United States of America. First, this thesis has concluded that there are considerable differences between the jurisdictions in the availability of specific performance and injunctive relief in litigation. In Sweden, remedies are issues of substantive law and for many kinds of contracts, the primary remedy for breach. Consequently, courts do not differentiate claims for specific performance or injunctive relief, and routinely grant such claims in no different way than granting monetary relief. Conversely, in the United States, remedies are viewed as procedural issues, not substantive. There, specific performance and injunctive relief are discretionary matters of equity and not rights at law. Hence, the availability of specific performance and injunctive relief is limited as compared to damages. Further, this thesis has concluded that the categorization of reliefs and remedies as substantive and procedural, respectively, is mirrored also in arbitration. While in Sweden, the choice of arbitration as proper contract forum does not affect the availability of the reliefs now in question, it does so in the United States. There, courts have held that the division of remedies into legal and equitable is not applicable in arbitration. Thus, parties have the freedom to by contract control which reliefs an arbitrator may grant. In absence of such agreements, courts have presumed arbitrators to have been given a broad grant of authority, allowing otherwise unavailable reliefs.Third, this thesis has concluded that, inter alia, because of the inherent contempt powers of courts in the United States, the means of enforcing arbitral awards providing specific performance and injunctive relief are more extensive in the United States than in Sweden, where comparable powers do not exist. Further, parties may by means of contract, grant arbitrators the authority to supervise such reliefs and enforce previously granted specific performance and injunctions by contractual fines and sanctions. Again, in absence of explicit contract language such authority is presumed in the United States, but not in Sweden. Overall, the choice of arbitration has consequences in both jurisdictions. In the United States, mostly for the availability of the reliefs in question and in Sweden, mostly for the enforcement.

La question de la mesure du pouvoir du juge s’impose lorsqu’on souhaite comparer l’étendue des pouvoirs du juge dans différents ordres juridiques donnés. Or force est de constater que les pouvoirs du juge sont appréhendés sous diverses notions dans les systèmes juridiques nationaux : il est fait tour à tour référence au pouvoir souverain d’appréciation du juge du fond, au pouvoir facultatif du juge, à son pouvoir modérateur, discrétionnaire, arbitraire. Toute la difficulté de la comparaison réside dans l’absence d’un instrument de mesure uniforme. A l’échelle supranationale, le terme anglais « Judicial discretion » constitue souvent le point de départ de discussions et d’analyses comparatives sur les pouvoirs du juge. Cette notion à forte coloration doctrinale sert de critère de mesure de l’ampleur des pouvoirs du juge dans les systèmes juridiques respectifs. On entend par pouvoir discrétionnaire le pouvoir donné au juge de choisir entre deux ou plusieurs décisions également conformes à la légalité. Le critère du libre choix est au cœur de la notion du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge. Le pouvoir discrétionnaire constitue ainsi la forme la plus libre du pouvoir exercé par le juge. Bien qu’elle fasse office de dénominateur commun, la notion de pouvoir discrétionnaire est diversement entendue en droits français et allemand. Il en va ainsi en particulier à propos des notions-cadre et standards : ces derniers confèrent-ils au juge un pouvoir discrétionnaire ? Les réponses divergent d’un système à l’autre, ce qui a un impact sur l’image qu’on se fait des pouvoirs du juge. Une fois ces malentendus dissipés, reste à déterminer la part faite à ce pouvoir dans les suites de l’inexécution du contrat : exécution forcée en nature, délai d’exécution et révision, résolution. / How to measure a judge’s power? This question is necessary, when it comes to comparing the extent of the powers of a judge in various given jurisdictions. It has tobe noted, that the powers of a judge are gathered under diverse notions in national legal systems: successively, references are made to the sovereign judicial authority of the judge, the unfettered discretion of the lower courts, the authority to modify the legal situation, the discretionary power, the arbitrary power. The challenge in the comparison lies in the absence of a uniform measuring tool. On a supranational level,the English term“Judicial discretion”is very frequently the starting point for discussions and comparative analyses regarding the judge’s power. This notion serves as criteria to measure the extent of the judge’s powers in the respective legal systems. Discretionary power means the power given to the judge to choose between different decisions that are all conformable to law. The criterion of freedom of choice is in the center of the judge’s discretionary power. The discretionary power is the most powerful authority of the judge. It is common sense that the judge has a discretionarypower but the meaning of this term is differently interpretated by the national law,especially by the German and French law systems. This applies especially to the standards provisions or“open-textured”provisions : do they grant the judge a discretionary power? The answers vary from one system to the other, which has an impact on the image one has on the judge’s powers. Once these misunderstandings are dispelled, it remains to determine the proportion this power has in the consequences of the non-performance of contract: specific performance, delay inexecution, revision and termination.