On trouve sur les côtes de l’estuaire du Saint-Laurent des vestiges de quai dont la ressemblance mutuelle suggère leur contemporanéité. Les vestiges de ces «quais du gouvernement » relatent une importante conjoncture (1870-1930) caractérisée par l'intégration des localités côtières dans une économie interrégionale. Le quai, autrefois lieu d'interface entre la ruralité et le cabotage, devient pour l'archéologue une occasion de retracer les éléments entrant dans sa conception et sa réalisation. L’observation des éléments architecturaux permet de distinguer les traits architecturaux associés aux quais du gouvernement parmi l’ensemble des techniques de construction déjà employées dans l’estuaire au XIXe siècle. / In the St. Lawrence estuary, there are many ancient wharves whose mutual resemblance of their remains suggests they are contemporaneous. The remains of the “government wharves” relate an important conjecture (1870-1930) formed by the integration of the coastal localities in an interregional economic network. The wharf, formerly an interface between the rural land and the estuarial cabotage, presents an opportunity for the archaeologist to recognize the architectural character of the conception and the realization of the wharves. The examination of their frame construction allows us to distinguish the architectural character of the government wharves among the techniques already employed in the estuary in the 19th century.

On trouve sur les côtes de l’estuaire du Saint-Laurent des vestiges de quai dont la ressemblance mutuelle suggère leur contemporanéité. Les vestiges de ces «quais du gouvernement » relatent une importante conjoncture (1870-1930) caractérisée par l'intégration des localités côtières dans une économie interrégionale. Le quai, autrefois lieu d'interface entre la ruralité et le cabotage, devient pour l'archéologue une occasion de retracer les éléments entrant dans sa conception et sa réalisation. L’observation des éléments architecturaux permet de distinguer les traits architecturaux associés aux quais du gouvernement parmi l’ensemble des techniques de construction déjà employées dans l’estuaire au XIXe siècle. / In the St. Lawrence estuary, there are many ancient wharves whose mutual resemblance of their remains suggests they are contemporaneous. The remains of the “government wharves” relate an important conjecture (1870-1930) formed by the integration of the coastal localities in an interregional economic network. The wharf, formerly an interface between the rural land and the estuarial cabotage, presents an opportunity for the archaeologist to recognize the architectural character of the conception and the realization of the wharves. The examination of their frame construction allows us to distinguish the architectural character of the government wharves among the techniques already employed in the estuary in the 19th century.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, built cooperatively between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the United States, is the largest navigable inland waterway in the world and the largest borderlands project ever undertaken jointly by two countries. This thesis combines diplomatic, political, and environmental history to chart the course of domestic and international negotiations, particularly in the 1945-1954 period, that resulted in the bilateral 1954 agreement to build the seaway. The focus is on the Canadian federal government and to a lesser extent the U.S. federal government, as well as involved state and provincial governments and their public power utilities. These negotiations are extremely revealing in terms of the history of Canadian-American relations, and this thesis also examines issues connected to North American attitudes toward water resources, state-building, high modernism, and technology in the early Cold War period. After a number of failed attempts at a cooperative waterway, in the late 1940s the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent began to explore the possibility of an all-Canadian seaway, and backed by widespread public support, had adopted this as policy by 1952. The drive for an all-Canadian seaway stemmed from various forms of nationalism which framed the St. Lawrence as an exclusively “Canadian” resource that was intimately tied to Canadian identity. However, the Truman administration and different American interests deemed a unilateral Canadian waterway to be an economic and national security threat to the United States, and delayed the requisite power licenses needed for Canada to undertake the transborder St. Lawrence project. Canada partly contributed to this situation by repeatedly making vague offers to leave the door open for American involvement in the hopes that this would expedite the hydro aspect of the project. The Eisenhower administration also stalled Ottawa’s efforts to “go it alone” until American participation was finally sanctioned by Congress in 1954 and the requisite licenses were granted. The St. Laurent government then reluctantly acquiesced to the American desire for a joint endeavour in order to maintain harmonious Canada-U.S. relations, although Canada did extract key concessions from Washington about the shape and placement of the project.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Les sédiments sont des sites importants d’élimination d’azote (N) puisqu’ils possèdent des gradients d’oxydoréduction leur conférant les conditions idéales pour les réactions microbiennes de transformation de N. L’eutrophisation des régions côtières peut altérer ces gradients, par des changements dans la concentration d’oxygène (O2) de l’eau interstitielle, et modifier l’importance relative des processus transformant le N. Afin de mieux comprendre comment l’O2 pourrait influencer les transformations de N, nous avons mesuré les flux diffusifs de diazote (N2), nitrate (NO3-), oxygène et ammonium (NH4+) dans les sédiments de l’Estuaire Maritime du St-Laurent (EMSL), et nous avons estimé les taux de dénitrification. L’importance du couple nitrification-dénitrification en fonction d’un gradient de concentrations d’O2 dans la zone d’hypoxie de l’EMSL fut aussi évaluée. La concentration des gaz dissous fut mesurée en utilisant une nouvelle approche développée dans cette étude. Les flux diffusifs de N2, O2, NO3- et NH4+ variaient de 5.5 à 8.8, de -37.1 à -84.8, de -4.0 à -5.8 et de 0.6 à 0.8 μmol N m-2 h-1 respectivement. Les concentrations de N2 et NO3- dans l’eau porale et les flux de NO3- et de N2 des sédiments, suggèrent que la diffusion de NO3- provenant de l’eau à la surface des sédiments ne peut pas expliquer par elle-même la production de N2 observée. En utilisant une approche stoichiométrique, les taux de nitrification potentielle estimés comptent pour 0.01 à 52% du flux total de NO3 nécessaire pour aboutir aux flux de N2 observés et diminuent avec l’augmentation de l’hypoxie. / Sediments display strong redox gradients and represent important sites of various microbially mediated nitrogen (N) transformation pathways resulting in the loss of fixed N. Increased eutrophication of coastal systems will likely impact the overall function of these sediments via changes in the oxygen (O2) concentration in the overlying water, thus influencing the redox gradient and the relative importance of different N processes. To have a better understanding of how O2 could influence N transformations, we measured dinitrogen (N2), nitrate (NO3-), oxygen and ammonium (NH4+) diffusive fluxes in the sediments of the Lower St. Lawrence Estuary (LSLE) and estimated denitrification rates. The importance of the nitrification-denitrification couple as a function of a gradient of hypoxic O2 concentrations was also evaluated. Dissolved gas concentrations were measured using a new approach developed in this study. N2, O2, NO3- and NH4+ diffusive fluxes varied respectively from 5.5 to 8.8, from -37.1 to -84.8, from -4 to -5.8 and from 0.6 to 0.8 μmol N m-2 h-1 among the five stations sampled. N2 and NO3- concentrations in sediment pore water and measured fluxes of NO3- in and N2 out of the sediments suggested that NO3- diffusion from the overlying water alone could not support N2 production. Using a stoichiometric approach, estimated potential nitrification rates varied among sites, from 0.01 to 52% of the total NO3 supply rate. The relative importance of nitrification decreased with increasing hypoxia.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

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