Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-12-14T13:30:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Victor Manoel Fernandes_.pdf: 1268347 bytes, checksum: e887aa9ed3f37aacb3975c704fdaaddc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-12-14T13:30:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Victor Manoel Fernandes_.pdf: 1268347 bytes, checksum: e887aa9ed3f37aacb3975c704fdaaddc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-19 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação de mestrado tem por objetivo investigar as críticas de Kierkegaard à Ciência da Lógica de Hegel contidas em seu Pós-Escrito. A respeito da relação Kierkegaard-Hegel, foram diferenciadas duas perspectivas frente a ela: a primeira é a que visa a relação do ponto de vista psicológico, isto é, que pretende saber se Kierkegaard estava contra Hegel, se ele escrevia seus livros com o intuito de atacar Hegel; e a segunda, por sua vez, que visa a relação do ponto de vista filosófico ou teórico, isto é, concentra-se em saber se as críticas de Kierkegaard cabem à filosofia de Hegel, sem pretender saber se esse autor era o verdadeiro alvo kierkegaardiano. Para atingir seus objetivos, essa pesquisa adotou a segunda perspectiva. Esta dissertação também analisou a posição de Niels Thulstrup e Jon Stewart acerca dessa relação. A atenção foi concentrada no segundo deles, tido como o status quæstionis sobre a relação investigada – resultando, no posicionamento frente a ele, um objetivo secundário para essa pesquisa. A fim de oferecer uma outra interpretação a uma pequena parcela de sua visão geral e também a uma interpretação específica a respeito da relação Kierkegaard-Hegel, essa dissertação investigou a relação filosófica entre Kierkegaard e Trendelenburg. Os resultados da pesquisa são os de que há aspectos importantes da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel contidos no Pós-Escrito de Kierkegaard e que aí são criticados – fazendo com que a relação Kierkegaard-Hegel também seja teórica e crítica, e não apenas passiva ou inexistente acerca da lógica; item relativo à visão geral de Stewart –, que Kierkegaard e Hegel não têm a mesma posição a respeito do início da lógica – item relativo a uma interpretação específica de Stewart – e que as condições colocadas por Kierkegaard em "(a) um sistema lógico pode haver" têm influência trendelenburguiana e, assim, são incompatíveis com princípios defendidos por Hegel. / This Master’s dissertation aims to investigate Kierkegaard's criticisms of the Hegel's Science of Logic contained in his Postscript. In regard to the Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship, two perspectives have been differentiated from it: the first one is that which relates to the psychological point of view, that is, whether Kierkegaard was against Hegel, if he wrote his books for the purpose of attacking Hegel; and the second one, in turn, is concerned with the relationship from a philosophical or theoretical point of view, that is, it focuses on whether Kierkegaard's criticisms fit Hegel's philosophy, without pretending to know whether this author was the true Kierkegaardian target. To reach its objectives, this research had adopted the second perspective. This dissertation also analyzed the position of Niels Thulstrup and Jon Stewart on this relationship. Attention was focused on the second of them, considered as the status quæstionis on the investigated relation – resulting, in the positioning before him, a secondary objective for this research. In order to offer another interpretation to a small part of his overview and also to a specific interpretation of the Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship, this dissertation investigated the philosophical relationship between Kierkegaard and Trendelenburg. The results of the research are that there are important aspects of Hegel's Science of Logic contained in Kierkegaard's Postscript and criticized there – making the Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship also theoretical and critical, not just passive or non-existent about logic; item on the general view of Stewart – that Kierkegaard and Hegel do not have the same position regarding the beginning of logic – an item relating to a specific interpretation of Stewart – and that the conditions put by Kierkegaard in "(a) a logical system can be given" has a Trendelenburgian's influence and thus are incompatible with principles defended by Hegel.

This thesis is not a life history of Archie Mafeje. Instead, it is an attempt to grapple with his ideas. This thesis is said to be a ‘biography’ insofar as it is dedicated to a study of one individual and his contribution to knowledge. In trying to understand Mafeje’s ideas and the intellectual and political environment that shaped them, the thesis relies on Lewis R. Gordon’s concept of ‘epistemic possibility’. The thesis comprises four main parts. Part I locates Mafeje and his work within the broader African intellectual and political environment. Part II evaluates his critique of the social sciences. Part III focuses on his work on land and agrarian issues in sub-Saharan Africa. Part IV deals with his work on revolutionary theory and politics. Broadly speaking, this thesis is the first comprehensive engagement with the entire body of Mafeje’s scholarship. Specifically, the unique perspective of this thesis, and therefore its primary contribution to the existing body of knowledge, is that it seeks to overturn the idea that Mafeje was a critic of the discipline of anthropology only. The view that Mafeje was a mere critic of anthropology is in this thesis referred to as the standard view or the conventional view. The thesis argues that Mafeje is best understood as criticising all of the bourgeois social sciences for being Eurocentric and imperialist. This is offered as the alternative view. The thesis argues that the standard view makes a reformist of Mafeje, while the alternative view seeks to present him as the revolutionary scholar that he was. This interpretation lays the foundation for a profounder analysis of Mafeje’s work. In arguing that all the social sciences are Eurocentric and imperialist, he sought to liquidate them and therefore called for ‘non-disciplinarity’. It should be noted that in this regard, the primary focus of this thesis consists in following the unit of his thought and not whether he succeeded or failed in this difficult task. / Sociology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Sociology)