Thesis--Freiburg im Breisgau. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 289-295).

Thesis--Helsinki. / Summary in English. Errata slip inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 299-314).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1967. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 309-317).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Deron Boyles, committee chair; Wayne Urban, Susan Talburt, Philo Hutcheson, committee members. Electronic text (206 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed August 2, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 190-206).

Across Europe, the welfare state is a focus of social and political contention. Participating in the democratic process offers a means for the public to voice their preferences. However, not everyone participates in politics. Research shows that there are significant participatory inequalities as those with greater socioeconomic resources are more likely to participate in politics. In light of these participatory inequalities, this thesis examines the representativeness of the welfare state preferences of the politically active. The main hypothesis posits that, if less advantaged socioeconomic groups are less likely to participate in politics, the welfare state preferences of the politically active are unlikely to be representative. The thesis brings together the comparative study of participatory inequality and social differences in welfare state preferences to examine data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2008-09 for Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Latent Class Analysis examines how preferences about the welfare state vary within Europe. By grouping individuals, the analysis shows that within societies there are different views about what should be the responsibilities of government. Using the latent classes, and considering a range of political actions, multivariate regression models show how social inequality determines conflict over the welfare state and transforms into political inequality. The association between preferences and political activity is examined to establish the representativeness of participant preferences. Finally, models combining welfare state preferences, political activity and social position address how social inequality shapes the link between political activity and welfare state preferences. Based on survey data for four European countries, the thesis finds that the politically active are not always representative in their preferences; however, the preference bias of participation varies in direction across countries and forms of political participation. Participatory inequalities do lead to the under-representation of support for the welfare state among the politically active but not in all cases. Examining the social stratification of preferences and participation, the thesis suggests that cross-national variations in the representativeness of participants may result from how preferences and participation are socially stratified. For instance, significant participatory inequalities can occur in contexts where there is less contention over the welfare state. Conversely, contention over the welfare state can coincide with egalitarian patterns of political activity. A concluding proposition is that the factors inhibiting the political participation of the socio-economically disadvantaged may also cultivate weaker levels of support for the welfare state.

As many political observers have pointed out, political participants in the United States are particularly unrepresentative of the population as a whole. Citizens who are politically active tend to be those on the upper end of the socioeconomic scale, for example, the wealthy and highly educated. This dissertation examines the ways in which inequalities in political participation lead to differences in the behavior of elected officials and their subsequent actions related to policy making. That is, politicians have the ability, and under certain circumstances the incentive, to vary how they govern and who they govern for, depending on how political influence is distributed throughout the citizenry. I argue that considering the economic status of various groups in society is an important and often overlooked aspect of representation. Economic status is linked closely with economic need, which is especially important for the disadvantaged and may be difficult to measure by relying on issue positions or priorities gathered from opinion surveys. Income affects the types of government programs people are influenced by and rely on; for example, welfare, health care, and public housing policies are more likely to directly influence the poor while those with higher economic status are unlikely to encounter any of these programs. This suggests that different levels of political activity by various groups in society can have an influence on lawmakers' decisions regarding how to address certain issues. To assess the influence of unequal participation on public policy I examine various stages of the policy process, including policy outcomes and issue agenda setting in the states. Few studies have assessed the effect of inequalities in participation on the public policy, and research assessing the link between inequality and policy has almost entirely overlooked the potential effects of unequal participation on agenda setting. This research explores whether states with higher economic inequalities in political participation have policies that are less likely to be beneficial to disadvantaged groups. Both policy outcomes and issue agendas are examined to fully understand the consequences of political inequality in the American states.

Thesis (Ph.D.(Education Management and Policy Studies))-University of Pretoria, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D. (Public affairs))-University of Pretoria, 2005. / Includes summary. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 383-404). Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

State legislatures have variable levels of professionalism. Measures of state legislative professionalism typically include metrics such as the number of legislative staff, legislative session length, and legislator compensation. This research considers the influence of variability in levels of legislative professionalism on the state’s oversight process. Few prior studies engage the legislative oversight process in states. To fill this gap, this research takes a grounded theory approach that uses thirty-three interviews with legislators, legislative staff, committee staff, and legislative research organizations in five states to test existing concepts and to develop new directions for research. The current scholarship on oversight and legislative institutions emphasizes the importance of broad factors like elections and committees, as well as more specific concepts like inter-branch conflict, partisanship, and legislative term-limits. This research confirms and extends those ideas, reaching the conclusion that oversight in states is a deeply political action. A central contribution of this work is a consideration of how the oversight process in states operates on the ground. The interviews uncover that many measures of professionalism often perform in unforeseen ways than what might expected. For instance, a lengthy legislative session can prohibit oversight actors from performing oversight functions. Conversely, long legislative interim periods provide actors with the space to conduct meaningful reviews of administrative action. This research also advances understandings of state legislative research organizations – like the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission and Texas Sunset Commission – which play a vital role in performing meaningful legislative oversight. To catalyze these ideas a new concept, the oversight entrepreneur, is used to describe how stakeholders use the oversight process to achieve their preferences and enhance their reputations. The interviews contained here also expose the importance of each state’s individual context – including Constitutional, institutional, normed and historical factors. The dissimilarities that play out across states (and their secondary effects) demonstrate that future scholars would be well served to adopt caution in the application of concepts across contexts. / Ph. D.

O trabalho testa, no plano da política subnacional brasileira, a hipótese de que a judicialização da política está associada à competição política. Na primeira parte, após constatar que muitos autores relacionam a judicialização à vontade dos magistrados ou a mecanismos institucionais, apresentam-se abordagens que associam o fenômeno a fatores exógenos às instâncias judiciais, como por exemplo a competição entre os atores políticos relevantes. Filiando-se a esta última corrente, a pesquisa analisa dados empíricos referentes à intervenção do Supremo Tribunal Federal nas políticas estaduais do Rio Grande do Sul e do Ceará, unidades federativas que apresentam elevado e reduzido níveis de competição, respectivamente. Verificou-se que os índices de judicialização são mais elevados no Rio Grande do Sul. Isso ocorre porque as forças políticas neste estado estão em constante conflito, o que faz com que a competição extrapole ô âmbito do Executivo e do Legislativo, estendendo-se em direção ao Poder Judiciário. Já no Ceará, uma pequena elite hegemônica restringe a competição política, inviabilizando a participação de grupos de oposição no policy-making, seja nos tradicionais órgãos representativos, seja nos tribunais. / This paper tests the hypothesis, in terms of Brazilian subnational politics, that the judicialization of politics is associated with political competition. After noting that several authors relate judicialization to the volition of magistrates or institutional mechanisms, the first section presents approaches that associate the phenomenon with factors exogenous to judicial courts, such as competition between the relevant political players. In line with this last concept, the research analyzes empirical data regarding the intervention of the Federal Supreme Court in the state policies of Rio Grande do Sul (RS) and Ceará (CE), federative units that exhibit high and low levels of competition, respectively. Judicialization rates were found to be higher in Rio Grande do Sul. This is because the political forces in the state are in constant conflict, causing competition to move beyond the scope of the Executive and Legislative branches, extending towards the Judiciary. In Ceará, however, a small hegemonic elite restricts political competition, precluding the participation of opposition groups in policy-making, whether in traditional representative bodies or in the courts.