Within the civil war literature, state-rebel relationships are traditionally understood as strictly contentious. However, empirical observations suggest that the two contending parties are not always in a state of total war and their collaboration is possible. Conceived in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, this study contributes to a greater understanding of state-rebel interactions during crises and seeks to explain why some rebel groups cooperate with state-led crisis response operations while the others obstruct. I propose that the nature of rebels’ political goals determine their behaviour vis-à-vis the state. The period of time after a disaster presents a window for rebels to strategically calculate and balance the costs and benefits of collaboration with the state. More specifically, I argue that the more transformative the rebel group’s goals are, the less likely the group will collaborate with the state for crisis relief. A structured comparative case study of the Taliban and Boko Haram lends preliminary support to the hypothesis. As one of the first to examine state-rebel relationships during the Covid-19 pandemic, the study invites future research to rethink how to accurately conceptualise and explain the diverse and puzzling interactions between states and rebels.