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This paper explores ways in which civil conflict can be simulated using numerical methods. A general two-party model of conflict is developed by extending an approach proposed by [Christia, F., (2012), Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, Cambridge University Press, New York], which is based on a metric of the 'relative power' that exists between the state and a rebel group. Various definitions of relative power are considered and one of these is chosen to illustrate different types of two-sided armed conflict, namely direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare. The additional suggestion of Christia that random or stochastic events can lead to unexpected conflict outcomes is also further extended in this paper. The inclusion in the model of terms describing concurrent rebel recruitment of civilians and state deployment of troops are then described. Examples are presented for various hypothetical cases. It is demonstrated that numerical simulation techniques have great potential for modelling civil war. The Christia approach is shown to provide an excellent basis from which numerical models of civil conflict can be built and from which the progress of a conflict can usefully be visualised graphically.

Targeted sanctions’ impact over rebel groups has not been examined by scholars, making it unclear whether the policy mechanism has the capacity to peacefully resolve intrastate armed conflicts and cease hostilities by weakening rebel groups. Considering the mentioned, the paper explores how targeted sanctions impact rebel groups, and suggests that properly monitored and effectively enforced targeted sanctions have the capacity to weaken rebel groups, via shortening rebels’ economic, military and political resources. Using the method of structured, focused comparison, the suggested hypothesis is empirically tested on the rebel groups of Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in Angola. The findings of the study revealed that effectively monitored and enforced targeted sanctions are capable of lessening rebels’ military and political resources, however, observing sanctions impact on economic resources proved difficult. Based on the analyses and findings the paper suggests that imposition of targeted sanctions should be initiated at the early warning phase of a conflict, rather at the point when the intensity of conflict has reached its peak.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies / Sam R. Bell / This project examines the choices that rebel groups make between different types of sub-state political violence campaigns. I argue that rebels will choose a specific campaign type based on variations in the levels of state actions that cause grievances (referred to as coercion), and the capacity of both the state and the rebel group. This project develops a framework to explain the rebel decision-making process. The rebels seek to change the political behavior of the state by undertaking some form of violent campaign. Rebel campaigns are the ways in which rebels seek to obtain their ends; this project delineates between terrorist, insurgent, and civil war campaigns. However, rebels’ choice of campaign is affected by several factors: coercion, state administrative capacity, state military capacity, rebel administrative capacity, and rebel military capacity. I hypothesize that the different types of campaigns are affected differently by these factors. Additionally, I hypothesize that levels of coercion are more strongly related to the initial year of the campaign than subsequent years, regardless of campaign type. These hypotheses are analyzed via quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, this includes the development of novel latent variables for coercion and capacity prior to empirical testing of the hypotheses. Qualitatively, two case studies of rebel groups are examined; the Mau Mau in Kenya and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The research finds limited support for the hypotheses regarding the relationships between coercion and capacity, and the rebels’ choice of campaign.

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This comparative study analyzes two rebel groups that ended their respective civil wars through negotiations and came to power in the first post-war elections. The two cases being the African National Congress in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe. Specifically the thesis examines rebel institutions and behaviors during armed conflict to assess in what ways they were tolerant or intolerant. The reason for the focus on tolerance and intolerance is that it is viewed as an important factor in how these two parties have related to political opposition after the war. This study shows that there are several similarities in terms of the presence of intolerance in the two cases, which leads to the conclusion that levels of tolerance during the armed conflict can not, on its own, explain the diverging paths of the two cases in the post-war period.

Civil wars are inherently complex and often feature a myriad of actors, whose interactions influence the intensity, duration and outcome of the conflict. The larger the number of actors involved in a conflict, the more complex it gets. While civil wars are often portrayed as a dyadic interaction between the government and a single rebel group, this is far from the reality. Between 1946 and 2015, more than half of those countries that experienced civil wars saw two or more active rebel groups. Understanding multiparty conflicts better is important, as they are deadlier, more difficult to solve and more dangerous for civilians. This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of multiparty civil wars. It suggests that all actors in a conflict system with several actors influence each other, which impacts conflict dynamics. Four essays shed light on different aspects of these civil wars. Essay I studies the differences in formation rates of rebel groups across the states of Northeast India. It finds that potential rebel groups will only form when rebellion is perceived as a legitimate way to address grievances and when competition from already existing groups is not too high. Essay II looks at rebel group splintering: It focusses on relationships within rebel groups and finds that both vertical and horizontal relations affect the likelihood of splintering. Essay III studies violent interactions between rebel groups and investigates how different conflict dynamics influence interrebel fighting. It demonstrates that interrebel fighting is more likely when one of the rebel groups is more successful against the government and when negotiations are ongoing. Finally, Essay IV widens the scope of conflict actors by studying why rebels decide to fight against UN peacekeeping operations. It shows that only relatively strong rebel groups are likely to attack blue helmets. Taken together, this dissertation furthers our understanding of the causes and consequences of multiparty civil wars. It highlights the intricate web of relations that form between actors and that influence civil war dynamics. These relations matter not only for studying civil wars, but also for preparing negotiations or planning a peacekeeping mission.

This dissertation addresses the puzzle of whether rebel group origins have an effect on rebel wartime behavior and the broader dynamics of civil conflict. Using a quantitative approach over three empirical chapters I study the relationship between rebel origins and conflict onset, duration and intensity, and wartime group capacity. Two qualitative cases examine the relationship between rebel origins, wartime group capacity, and adaptation during war, further unpacking the theoretical mechanisms linking group origins and conflict dynamics. I posit that rebel groups emerge from pre-existing organizations and networks that vary along military and civilian dimensions and condition the development of military and mobilization capacity of their successor insurgent groups. Groups with more developed militarization and mobilization mechanisms prior to conflict are likely to enter into civil conflict earlier in their existence and fight in longer and bloodier conflicts. I also find a strong relationship between origins characteristics and the development of military and civilian wartime capacity. Origins exert a strong legacy effect on the type and strength of intra-war capability, indicating that significant rebel adaptation is difficult.

Within the civil war literature, state-rebel relationships are traditionally understood as strictly contentious. However, empirical observations suggest that the two contending parties are not always in a state of total war and their collaboration is possible. Conceived in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, this study contributes to a greater understanding of state-rebel interactions during crises and seeks to explain why some rebel groups cooperate with state-led crisis response operations while the others obstruct. I propose that the nature of rebels’ political goals determine their behaviour vis-à-vis the state. The period of time after a disaster presents a window for rebels to strategically calculate and balance the costs and benefits of collaboration with the state. More specifically, I argue that the more transformative the rebel group’s goals are, the less likely the group will collaborate with the state for crisis relief. A structured comparative case study of the Taliban and Boko Haram lends preliminary support to the hypothesis. As one of the first to examine state-rebel relationships during the Covid-19 pandemic, the study invites future research to rethink how to accurately conceptualise and explain the diverse and puzzling interactions between states and rebels.

Rebel governance and rebel violence against civilians are two closely related fields within peace and conflict research that have gained increased interest amongst scholars during recent years. Still, there is a gap within current research that concerns how variation in one field may influence variation in the other. This paper aims to fill this gap by applying a theory on rebel violence in the context of rebel governance to hypothesize that a high level of rebel governance will decrease the intensity of rebel violence against civilians. The hypothesis is tested through linear regression, using data from the UCDP One-Sided Violence dataset, Rebel Governance Dataset and a replication dataset by Huang and Sullivan (2021). The findings from the regression analysis suggest a negative relationship between a high level of rebel governance and decreased intensity of rebel violence against civilians which supports the hypothesis. However, these results are not statistically significant and therefore only provides indications of a relationship. Yet, this thesis contributes by interlinking two fields that are highly relevant in modern civil wars and thereby provides a small but important building block for future research.