Sun Qi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [83-85]). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter SECTION ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter SECTION TWO --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.6 / BENEFIT OF DIVERSIFICATION --- p.6 / COST OF DIVERSIFICATION --- p.9 / EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE --- p.12 / Chapter SECTION THREE --- CLINIC STUDY OF THE BANKRUPTCY OF GITIC --- p.15 / Chapter I. --- BACKGROUND OF GITIC --- p.16 / Chapter II. --- FACTORS BEHIND THE FAILURE --- p.19 / Chapter III. --- NEGATIVE INFLUENCE --- p.34 / Chapter IV. --- OVERVIEW OF THE RED CHIPS --- p.40 / Chapter SECTION FOUR --- GENERAL ANALYSIS ONE: CORPORATE COST OF CAPITAL AND THE RETURN ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT --- p.52 / Chapter I. --- SAMPLE DESCRIPTION --- p.54 / Chapter II. --- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION --- p.55 / Chapter III. --- INVESTIGATION OVER THE RESULTS --- p.61 / CAPITAL STRUCTURES --- p.61 / CASHFLOWS AND FINANCING DECISIONS --- p.64 / INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN ON VALUE AND COST --- p.68 / Chapter SECTION FIVE --- GENERAL ANALYSIS TWO: DIVERSIFICATION AND CORPORATE STOCK RETURN --- p.72 / Chapter I. --- MEASURE OF FOCUS --- p.72 / Chapter II. --- REGRESSION DESCRIPTION --- p.73 / Chapter III. --- REGRESSION REPORT --- p.74 / Chapter SECTION SIX --- CONCLUSION --- p.78 / TABLES / Chapter 1. --- NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATE STRUCURES / Chapter 2. --- "AGGREGATE ANNUAL CASH INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS AS PERCENTS OF AGGEGATE BEGINNING OF YEAR BOOK CAPITAL,1992-1998" / Chapter 3. --- "AGGREGATE INVESTMENT AND FORMS OF FINANCING AS PERCENTS OF AGGREGATE BEGINNING OF YEAR BOOK CAPITAL,1992-1998" / Chapter 4. --- "BASIC DATA OF THE ENTERING FIRMS YEAR BY YEAR,1992-1997" / Chapter 5. --- "RATES OF RETURN ON VALUE AND COST (IN PERCENT) FOR NON-FINANCIAL RED CHIPS,1992-1998" / Chapter 6. --- CORPORATE FOCUS AND STOCK RETURNS / APPENDIX / Chapter 1. --- RED CHIPS BY THE END OF1998 / Chapter 2. --- THE COLLAPS OF GITIC (SUMMARY) / Chapter 3. --- SOME SYDICATED LOANS OF RED CHIPS MATURING IN1999 / Chapter 4. --- GROWTH RATE OF ASSETS (GRA) AND RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) / Chapter 5. --- RETURN ON ASSETS FOR NON-FINANCIAL RED CHIPS (PERCENT) / Chapter 6. --- RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY FOR NON-FINANCIAL RED CHIPS (PERCENT) / Chapter 7. --- DEBT TO EQUITY RATIOS OF RED CHIPS (PERCENTAGE) / Chapter 8. --- CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION REPORT / Chapter 9. --- CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION OUTPUTS (CONTROLLING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES)

by Wong Kar Shun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-164). / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.i / PREFACE --- p.ii / Chapter chapter i --- introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Questions and Objectives --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Background of Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The Importance of Corporate Disclosures --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- The Nature of Corporate Disclosures in Hong Kong --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- A Brief Review of Previous Empirical Voluntary Disclosure Studies --- p.9 / Chapter 1.2.3.1 --- Agency-Theory Based Studies --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosures --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Model and Hypotheses --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4 --- Research Approach and Design --- p.23 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Annual Reports --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Variables Measurement --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.1 --- The Measurement of Dependent Variables --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.2 --- The Measurement of Independent Variables --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- Data Analysis --- p.30 / Chapter 1.5 --- Justifications of the Study --- p.30 / Chapter 1.6 --- Significance and Potential Contributions of the Study --- p.32 / Chapter 1.7 --- Organization of the Thesis --- p.35 / Chapter chapter ii --- literature review on corporate disclosure / Chapter 2.1 --- Scope of Review --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Overview --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Agency theory of Disclosure --- p.39 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Signaling Theory --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Contingency Theory --- p.45 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- Capital Need Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- Proprietary Cost Theory --- p.47 / Chapter 2.2.7 --- Other Theories or Justifications for Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.48 / Chapter 2.2.8 --- Conclusion of Disclosure Theories --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Disclosure --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Corporate Disclosure Surveys --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1.1 --- The Usefulness and Information Value of Annual Reports as Perceived by External Users --- p.51 / Chapter 2.3.1.2 --- External Users' Information Requirements --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.1.3 --- Corporate Preparers' Attitudes to Disclosure / Comparison of the Perceptions between Preparers and Users --- p.55 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- The Independent Variables Used in Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1 --- "Agency Theory, Signaling Theory and Political Cost Related Variables" --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.1 --- Firm Size --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.2 --- Listing Status --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.3 --- Raising Capital --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.4 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.63 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.5 --- Leverage --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.6 --- Size of Auditor --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.7 --- Industry Type --- p.65 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.8 --- Ownership Structure --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.9 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.2 --- Proprietary Cost Variables --- p.67 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.3 --- Contingency Variables --- p.68 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- The Dependent Variables Used in Disclosure Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.1 --- Disclosure Index Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.2 --- Specific Disclosure Choice Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.79 / Chapter chapter iii --- literature review on corporate governance / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Definition and Scope of Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Theoretical Context of Corporate Governance --- p.83 / Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- Agency Theory of Corporate Governance --- p.84 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Evolution and Functions of Various Corporate Governance Structures --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.1 --- The Board of Directors --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.2 --- Independent Non-Executive Directors --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3 --- Board Committees --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.1 --- Audit Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.2 --- Remuneration Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.3 --- Non-executive Chairman --- p.91 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Corporate Governance Movement in Various Parts of the World --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in U.K --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.2 --- Corporate Governance in the USA --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Continental Europe --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.4 --- Corporate Governance in the Far East --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in China --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.2 --- Other Asian Countries --- p.96 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Governance --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Corporate Governance Surveys --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.1 --- Price Waterhouse Survey in 1995 --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.2 --- HKSA's surveys in 1995 and 1997 --- p.102 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance --- p.104 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.105 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Ownership structure --- p.106 / Chapter 3.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.106 / Chapter chapter iv --- hypotheses development / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.108 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Research Model I: The Relationship between Corporate Governance / Specific Firm Attributes and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosures --- p.109 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Corporate Governance Structures Variables --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.1 --- The Ratio of Independent Non-executive Directors to Total Directors on Board (INDs) --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.2 --- The Existence of Audit Committee --- p.113 / Chapter 4.2.1.3 --- The Existence of Dominant Personality --- p.114 / Chapter 4.2.1.4 --- The Percentage of Family Members on Board --- p.115 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Corporate Ownership Structures --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.1 --- Family's Share Ownership --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.2 --- Concentration of Share Ownership / The Existence of a Non-director Dominant Shareholder (s) --- p.117 / Chapter 4.2.2.3 --- Directors' Personal Share Ownership --- p.119 / Chapter 4.2.2.4 --- Independent Non-executive Directors' Personal Share / Chapter 4.2.2.5 --- Ownership --- p.120 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Controlling Variables --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.1 --- Firm Size --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.2 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.122 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Financial Leverage --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.4 --- Profitability --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Industry Type --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2.3.6 --- Excluded Variables --- p.125 / Chapter 4.3 --- Research Model II (The Relationship between Disclosure Strategy adopted by firms and Corporate Governance/Specific Firm Attributes) --- p.126 / Chapter 4.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.126 / Chapter chapter v --- research methodology and design / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Research Approach --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.130 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The Empirical Testing of Hypotheses --- p.130 / Chapter 5.3 --- Survey Design and Data Collection --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- The Development of the Survey Instrument --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Pilot Study --- p.132 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Questionnaire Contents --- p.133 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- Sample of Main Survey --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.5 --- Questionnaire Distribution and Response Rate --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.6 --- Testing for Non-Response Bias --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.7 --- Characteristics of Sample Preparer Firms --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.8 --- Respondent Titles --- p.141 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Measurement of the Research Models --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- The Measurement of Variables in the First Research Model --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variable --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variables --- p.144 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- The Measurement of Variables in the Second Research Model --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variables --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variable --- p.146 / Chapter 5.5 --- Data Analysis Tools --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Survey Data --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Multivariate Analysis --- p.148 / Chapter 5.6 --- Summary --- p.156 / Chapter chapter vi --- field survey findings / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.151 / Chapter 6.2 --- "Analysts Users' Perceived Importance, Attributes and Usage Behaviour of Annual Reports" --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Major Sources of Corporate Communication --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Attributes of Annual Reports (vs Other Source of Information) --- p.154 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Preparers' Perceived Importance of Different Types of Annual Report Users --- p.155 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Number and Time Spent on Reading Annual Reports by Users --- p.157 / Chapter 6.2.5 --- Extent of Usage of Various Types of Information in the Annual Reports by Users --- p.158 / Chapter 6.3 --- Disclosure Process and Strategy --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- The Extent that Users' Information Needs are Considered as a Top Priority in the Disclosure Process --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Disclosure Strategy/Process of Firms --- p.161 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- External Factors Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.164 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Internal Participants Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.166 / Chapter 6.3.5 --- Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on Corporate Disclosures Strategy --- p.167 / Chapter 6.4 --- Costs/Benefits and Importance of Different Voluntary Disclosure Items Perceived by Preparers and Users --- p.169 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.171 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.172 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- Net Benefits and Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.173 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Perceived Importance of Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure Items by Users --- p.176 / Chapter 6.5 --- Preparers' and Users' Perceptions of Capital Market Functioning and the Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- The Short Term/Long Term Efficiency of Hong Kong Capital Market --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- The Impression of Share Values --- p.179 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- The Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Reportingin Hong Kong --- p.180 / Chapter 6.5.4 --- The Existence of Communication Gap and its Impact on Share Values --- p.182 / Chapter 6.5.5 --- Adequacy and Effectiveness of Current Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.183 / Chapter 6.5.6 --- The Need of More Disclosure Requirements and Types of Information Disclosures --- p.185 / Chapter 6.6 --- Summary --- p.188 / Chapter chapter vii --- hypothesis testing / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.190 / Chapter 7.2 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Variables in the Research Model --- p.190 / Chapter 7.3 --- Test for the First Research Model (Extent of Voluntary Disclosures as the Dependent Variable) --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Bivariate Analysis --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Multiple Regression Models and Assumption Testings --- p.198 / Chapter 7.2.3 --- Test of Violation of Multiple Regression Assumptions --- p.199 / Chapter 7.2.4.1 --- Linearity --- p.200 / Chapter 7.2.4.2 --- Normality --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.3 --- Constant Variance of Residuals --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.4 --- Non-Multicollinearity --- p.202 / Chapter 7.2.4.5 --- Log Transformation of the Model --- p.203 / Chapter 7.2.4.6 --- Multivariate Empirical Results --- p.204 / Chapter 7.2.4.7 --- Extent of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.205 / Chapter 7.4 --- Testing of the Second Research Model --- p.207 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Testing of Assumptions of the Second Research Model --- p.208 / ANOVA Results --- p.208 / Chapter 7.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.212 / Chapter CHAPTER VIII --- "SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION" / Chapter 8.1 --- Overview of the Study --- p.214 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Current State and Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.217 / Chapter 8.3 --- Discussion of the Current State of Annual Report Disclosure and the Corporate Governance --- p.220 / Chapter 8.4 --- Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Hypothesis Related to Corporate Governance --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Hypothesis Related to Other Specific Firm Attributes --- p.226 / Chapter 8.5 --- Limitations of the Study --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Limitations of the Survey Questionnaires --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Credibility of Disclosures --- p.229 / Chapter 8.6 --- Contributions of the Study --- p.230 / Chapter 8.1 --- Recommendations for Further Study --- p.231 / Chapter 8.2 --- Conclusions --- p.233 / appendix --- p.235 / Chapter 1. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Corporate Report Preparers' Version) --- p.235 / Chapter 2. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Financial Analysts' Version) --- p.244 / REFERENCE --- p.252

by Lan Yat Si, Wong Tai Chun, Mark. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-37). / ABSTRACT --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.vii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Problem --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Overview --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- Different Perspectives Explanation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.4 --- Earnings Management Explanation --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Big-bath Hypothesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Blaming Hypothesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.5 --- Difference between Big-bath and Blaming Hypotheses --- p.4 / Chapter 1.6 --- Motivation and Potential Contributions of Study --- p.4 / Chapter 1.7 --- Chapter Summary --- p.5 / Chapter II. --- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK / Chapter 2.1 --- Earnings Management --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Definition --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Overview --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Motivations --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Patterns of Earnings Management --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Executive Succession --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Accounting Change --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Definition --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Accounting Policies --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Accounting Bases --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Accounting Estimates --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- Disclosure Requirements --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.6 --- Discretionary Changes --- p.12 / Chapter 2.4 --- Summary of Related Empirical Research --- p.12 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Copeland and Moore (1972) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Moore (1973) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Strong and Meyer (1987) --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- DeAngelo(1988) --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Elliot and Shaw (1988) --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4.6 --- Lilien et al (1988) --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4.7 --- Chen and Lee (1990) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.8 --- La Salle (1990) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.9 --- Walsh et al (1991) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.10 --- La Salle et al. (1993) --- p.17 / Chapter 2.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.17 / Chapter III. --- RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY / Chapter 3.1 --- Development of Hypothesis --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2 --- Sample --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3 --- CEO Change and the Likelihood of Accounting Change --- p.21 / Chapter 3.4 --- CEO Change and the Directional Effect on Earnings --- p.22 / Chapter 3.5 --- Statistical Test and Employed --- p.22 / Chapter 3.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.22 / Chapter IV. --- RESEARCH FINDINGS / Chapter 4.1 --- Officer Titles for CEOs --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Accounting Changes --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Income Effect on Accounting Changes --- p.24 / Chapter 4.4 --- CEO Change and Accounting Change --- p.25 / Chapter 4.5 --- CEO Change with Positive and Negative Accounting Changes --- p.27 / Chapter 4.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.28 / Chapter V. --- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION / Chapter 5.1 --- Summary of Key Findings --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2 --- Implications and Discussion --- p.30 / Chapter 5.3 --- Concluding Summary --- p.31 / APPENDIX --- p.32 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.35

Lau Yuen-ke. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-123). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abstract in Chinese --- p.iii / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / List of Tables --- p.vi / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Hypothesis --- p.24 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Methodology --- p.43 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Sample Description --- p.53 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results --- p.61 / Chapter Chapter 7. --- Conclusion --- p.72 / Appendix 1. Definitions and calculations of variables --- p.75 / Appendix 2. Piecewise linear regression model suggested by Morck et al(1988) --- p.82 / Appendix 3. Tables --- p.87 / Bibliography --- p.122

Tam Wai-man Grace. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-77). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 序言 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Dividend Irrelevance Theory --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Bird-in-the-hand Theory --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Clientele Effect Theory --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Signaling Theory --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5 --- Agency Cost Theory / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Theoretical Models --- p.15 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- The Latest Agency Cost Model --- p.19 / Chapter 2.6 --- Residual Theory --- p.24 / Chapter 2.7 --- Other Studies on Dividend Policy / Chapter 2.7.1 --- Low-Regular-Dividend-Plus-Extras Policy --- p.26 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms --- p.27 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Methodology / Chapter 3.1 --- Model --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2 --- Anti-Signaling Hypothesis --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4 --- Residual Hypothesis --- p.31 / Chapter 3.5 --- Investment Opportunities Hypothesis --- p.32 / Chapter 3.6 --- Industry Control --- p.33 / Chapter 3.7 --- The Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Sample and Data Description / Chapter 4.1 --- Sample Description --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2 --- Variable Description --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Limitations --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 5 / Chapter 5.1 --- Regression Results and Implications --- p.42 / Chapter 5.2 --- Alternative measurement for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Hong Kong and the World --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Tables / Table 1 Summary of the Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.50 / Table 2 Construction of Variables --- p.51 / Table 3 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.52 / Table 4 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996to 1999 --- p.54 / Table 5 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.55 / Table 6 Regression Results for Raw Data --- p.55 / Table 7 Regression Results using Substantial Shareholders Concentration as Proxy for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.57 / Table 8 Summary of Regression Results --- p.58 / Charts / Chart 1 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.59 / Chart 2 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Chart 3 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Appendices / Appendix 1 The Complete Dataset --- p.61 / Appendix 2 Definition of Variables in Different Sectors --- p.63 / Appendix 3 Non-Nested Tests --- p.54 / Table A3.1 Non-Nested Tests Results --- p.65 / Table A3.2 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.66 / Table A3.3 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.67 / Table A3.4 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.68 / Table A3.5 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.69 / Table A3.6 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.70 / Table A3.7 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.71 / Table A3.8 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.72 / Table A3.9 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.73 / Table A3.10 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.74 / Table A3.11 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Technology Industry Phenomenon vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.75 / Bibliography --- p.76