The strategic air offensive against Germany during World War II formed a major part of Britain�s wartime military effort and it has subsequently attracted the attention of historians. Despite the attention, historians have paid little attention to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain. This thesis attempts to redress this situation by providing an examination of the economic impact on Britain of the offensive. The work puts the economic cost of the offensive into its historical context by describing the strategic air offensive and its intellectual underpinnings. Following this preliminary step, the economic costs are described and quantified across a range of activities using accrual accounting methods. The areas of activity examined include the expansion of the aircraft industry, the cost of individual aircraft types, the cost of constructing airfields, the manufacture and delivery of armaments, petrol and oil, and the recruitment, training and maintenance of the necessary manpower. The findings are that the strategic air offensive cost Britain �2.78 billion, equating to an average cost of �2,911.00 for every operational sortie flown by Bomber Command or �5,914.00 for every Germany civilian killed by aerial bombing. The conclusion reached is the damage inflicted upon Germany by the strategic air offensive imposed a very heavy financial burden on Britain that she could not afford and this burden was a major contributor to Britain�s post-war impoverishment.

The strategic air offensive against Germany during World War II formed a major part of Britain�s wartime military effort and it has subsequently attracted the attention of historians. Despite the attention, historians have paid little attention to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain. This thesis attempts to redress this situation by providing an examination of the economic impact on Britain of the offensive. The work puts the economic cost of the offensive into its historical context by describing the strategic air offensive and its intellectual underpinnings. Following this preliminary step, the economic costs are described and quantified across a range of activities using accrual accounting methods. The areas of activity examined include the expansion of the aircraft industry, the cost of individual aircraft types, the cost of constructing airfields, the manufacture and delivery of armaments, petrol and oil, and the recruitment, training and maintenance of the necessary manpower. The findings are that the strategic air offensive cost Britain �2.78 billion, equating to an average cost of �2,911.00 for every operational sortie flown by Bomber Command or �5,914.00 for every Germany civilian killed by aerial bombing. The conclusion reached is the damage inflicted upon Germany by the strategic air offensive imposed a very heavy financial burden on Britain that she could not afford and this burden was a major contributor to Britain�s post-war impoverishment.

Advances in airpower and bombing capabilities have brought airpower to the forefront of military strategy. Four cases are examined to explain the historical uses and goals of strategic and morale bombing of enemy civilian populations: Germany, Japan, Vietnam and Iraq. This historical data is complemented by psychological theory that helps to predict the effectiveness of these bombing campaigns on the civilian will to resist. This paper argues that strategic and morale bombing on civilian populations does not decrease the enemy will to resist.

In addition to the lonely battles fought by Bomber Command crews in the night skies over Germany from February 1942 to May 1945 there was an equally intense if much less bloody struggle in the halls of power between the Air Staff and the AOC Bomber Command, concerning the best employment of the strategic bomber forces. The argument of this study is that the Royal Air Force s contribution to the strategic air offensive was badly mismanaged: that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, from 22 February 1942 to the end of the war, by ignoring, or often over-riding the Air Staff, affected not only the course but also the duration of the Second World War. Most histories of the bomber war provide the result of the disagreements between the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and Harris, but rarely are the problems discussed in detail. This thesis examines the arguments that were raised by the various authorities, together with the refutations presented not only by the major participants, but also by the advisers to those authorities. The significant feature of the disagreements was that while Harris acted unilaterally, the Air Staff reached consensus decisions. Unfortunately, the decisions reached by the Air Staff on major issues were all too frequently either ignored or subverted by the AOC Bomber Command. One significant feature of the refutations presented to Harris was their dependence on the operational experience gained earlier in the bomber war by junior members of the Air Staff. For too long the direction of the war had been left in the hands of senior officers whose previous service had become irrelevant to war requirements in the 1940s. By 1942, comparatively junior officers were thus tendering advice to senior officers who, in the case of AOC Bomber Command, resented the authority which, Harris argued, had apparently been accorded these juniors. Harris was unable to accept that they were advisers and were never in a position to issue orders: orders could only come from Portal. Finally, this thesis provides an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the major participants and argues that, had the war been conducted as the Air Staff required, victory would have been achieved earlier than May 1945.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis charts the development of area bombing in British theory and practice before its formal adoption in the Second World War, and seeks to discover where its earliest origins can be located. Area bombing was the official policy of Royal Air Force Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 in its strategic air offensive against Germany, and involved the bombing of industrial cities with the purpose of breaking down civilian morale and disrupting the German war economy. Most historical accounts present area bombing as a gradual development in bombing policy during 1940 and 1941, forced by a lack of success in destroying precise industrial targets from the air. This was the Air Force’s stated policy during the previous two decades, but it proved impossible to implement under wartime conditions. Area bombing was thus gradually adopted by progressively broadening the definition of targets from individual installations to entire towns and cities. This thesis rejects the traditional view, arguing instead that area bombing was at the heart of British bombing policy as early as the First World War. The legacy of this saw an ‘area bombing mentality’ cemented in the strategy of the Royal Air Force during the interwar period. As it was not possible to openly advocate the bombing of civilians during the 1920s and 1930s, this was shrouded in ambiguous language and kept hidden. However, the roots of area bombing come to the surface several times between the wars, and the speed with which area bombing was adopted in 1940 and 1941 shows that they were never deeply buried. While many historians have uncovered individual details that collectively support this contention, none have traced the development of this thought across the period 1917-42. Using a selection of contemporary documents and a thorough review of the secondary literature, this work shows that far from being an improvisation forced by necessity, the adoption of area bombing was unsurprising and can be traced back to 1917.

Au printemps 1944, les bombardements aériens alliés sur la France atteignent leur intensité maximale depuis le début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Près de deux années après les grands tournants de l’année 1942, la situation militaire est à présent largement en faveur des Alliés. La défaite finale du Troisième Reich semble désormais inéluctable. La préparation d’Overlord, le retour en force à grande échelle sur le continent européen, se heurte à des difficultés stratégiques et techniques inédites. Un scientifique peu connu, Solly Zuckerman, brillant zoologiste mais aussi civil inconnu des cercles militaires, réussit à persuader le haut-commandement allié de l’intérêt de son plan aérien. Son Transportation Plan se propose de frapper décisivement le système ferroviaire français, de manière à bouleverser le flux de renforts ennemis vers la tête de pont alliée lors de l’exécution du débarquement. Audacieux par son innovation stratégique, risqué par la menace évidente pesant sur les civils français, le plan de Zuckerman se heurte immédiatement à la susceptibilité des grands chefs du bombardement stratégique, engagés dans une campagne aérienne presque « privée » sur l’Allemagne. La question des pertes civiles secoue brutalement les milieux politiques avec notamment Winston Churchill, et remonte in fine jusqu’à Franklin Roosevelt. Méconnu de l’historiographie, le Transportation Plan représente pourtant une histoire fascinante de la préparation du débarquement de Normandie. / In spring 1944, Allied bombing of France was to reach its maximum intensity since the beginning of World War II. Nearly two years after the great turning points in 1942, the military situation was now largely in favour of the Allies. The final defeat of the Third Reich now appeared inevitable. The preparation of OVERLORD, the renewed application of large-scale power on the European continent, faced strategic challenges and required novel techniques. A little-known scientist, Solly Zuckerman, a brilliant zoologist but also a civilian unknown in military circles, persuaded the Allied high command of the validity of his air plan. This “Transportation Plan” proposed to strike decisively at the French railway system in order to disrupt the flow of enemy reinforcements to the Allied beachhead during the landings. Daring by strategic innovation, risky by the obvious threat to French civilians, Zuckerman's plan ran immediately into the hostile scrutiny of the great chiefs of strategic bombing, who were engaged in their almost "private" air campaign against Germany. The issue of civilian casualties brutally shook politicians including Winston Churchill, and ultimately went back to Franklin Roosevelt. Unknown in historiography, the “Transportation Plan” represents a fascinating history of the preparation of the Normandy landings.