In addition to the lonely battles fought by Bomber Command crews in the night skies over Germany from February 1942 to May 1945 there was an equally intense if much less bloody struggle in the halls of power between the Air Staff and the AOC Bomber Command, concerning the best employment of the strategic bomber forces. The argument of this study is that the Royal Air Force s contribution to the strategic air offensive was badly mismanaged: that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, from 22 February 1942 to the end of the war, by ignoring, or often over-riding the Air Staff, affected not only the course but also the duration of the Second World War. Most histories of the bomber war provide the result of the disagreements between the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and Harris, but rarely are the problems discussed in detail. This thesis examines the arguments that were raised by the various authorities, together with the refutations presented not only by the major participants, but also by the advisers to those authorities. The significant feature of the disagreements was that while Harris acted unilaterally, the Air Staff reached consensus decisions. Unfortunately, the decisions reached by the Air Staff on major issues were all too frequently either ignored or subverted by the AOC Bomber Command. One significant feature of the refutations presented to Harris was their dependence on the operational experience gained earlier in the bomber war by junior members of the Air Staff. For too long the direction of the war had been left in the hands of senior officers whose previous service had become irrelevant to war requirements in the 1940s. By 1942, comparatively junior officers were thus tendering advice to senior officers who, in the case of AOC Bomber Command, resented the authority which, Harris argued, had apparently been accorded these juniors. Harris was unable to accept that they were advisers and were never in a position to issue orders: orders could only come from Portal. Finally, this thesis provides an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the major participants and argues that, had the war been conducted as the Air Staff required, victory would have been achieved earlier than May 1945.

La Seconde Guerre mondiale occupe une place centrale dans la mémoire collective britannique. Érigée en véritable mythe national, la guerre a une telle prégnance dans l’espace public en Grande-Bretagne que certains commentateurs n’hésitent pas à parler d’une obsession nationale pour le conflit. Elle en vient à constituer l’une des facettes de la « Britishness », de l’identité nationale britannique, à une heure où celle-ci est plus que jamais débattue et soumise au questionnement. Afin de déterminer si la Seconde Guerre mondiale est un mythe britannique ou un mythe anglais, ses représentations dans les pays constitutifs du Royaume-Uni et en Irlande sont ici étudiées. Les aspirations nationalistes écossaises semblent en effet avoir une influence sur les représentations de la guerre en Écosse ; quant à l’Irlande, bien qu’elle soit restée neutre pendant le conflit, cette neutralité est aujourd’hui remise en question au profit d’une interprétation selon laquelle le pays aurait soutenu sans réserve – quoique tacitement – les Alliés. Alors que le visage de la Grande-Bretagne est résolument multi-ethnique, cette étude cherche à déterminer dans quelle mesure les anciens peuples coloniaux et du Commonwealth se reconnaissent dans les représentations traditionnelles dominantes. Au coeur d’une vague de commémoration de la Seconde Guerre mondiale sans précédent, un exemple fait figure d’exception : celui des équipages du Bomber Command. Longtemps critiqués et mis à l’écart des pratiques commémoratives et de la mémoire collective britannique de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en raison de leur participation à la très controversée campagne aérienne stratégique (dont les bombardements firent des dizaines de milliers de victimes parmi les populations civiles allemandes), les équipages du Bomber Command sont aujourd’hui élevés au rang de héros en Grande-Bretagne. Le tout nouveau statut héroïque du Bomber Command marque un tournant dans l’historiographie de la campagne aérienne stratégique et dans le débat public britannique. / The Second World War occupies a central place in British collective memory. The war, which is considered to be a national myth in Britain, remains pervasive in the British public debate to the point that some commentators call it a national obsession. The war constitutes one of the facets of Britishness at a time when British national identity is much debated and open to question. The representations of the Second World War in Scotland, Wales and Ireland are examined in order to determine whether the war is a British myth or an English myth. Scottish nationalist aspirations, for instance, seem to have an influence on the way the conflict is represented in Scotland. At a time when Britain is more than ever ethnically diverse, this study seeks to determine the extent to which former colonial peoples are able to recognise themselves in the traditional representations of the war which dominate the public debate in Britain. In the midst of an unprecedented boom in remembrance, the Bomber Command crews are an exception. Although their role in the combined bomber offensive (which caused thousands of victims among the German civilian population) had been subjected to much criticism and excluded bomber crews from the myth of the war, they are now hailed as heroes in Britain. Bomber Command’s newly-found heroic status is a turning point in the historiography of the air offensive and the British public debate.

This thesis charts the development of area bombing in British theory and practice before its formal adoption in the Second World War, and seeks to discover where its earliest origins can be located. Area bombing was the official policy of Royal Air Force Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 in its strategic air offensive against Germany, and involved the bombing of industrial cities with the purpose of breaking down civilian morale and disrupting the German war economy. Most historical accounts present area bombing as a gradual development in bombing policy during 1940 and 1941, forced by a lack of success in destroying precise industrial targets from the air. This was the Air Force’s stated policy during the previous two decades, but it proved impossible to implement under wartime conditions. Area bombing was thus gradually adopted by progressively broadening the definition of targets from individual installations to entire towns and cities. This thesis rejects the traditional view, arguing instead that area bombing was at the heart of British bombing policy as early as the First World War. The legacy of this saw an ‘area bombing mentality’ cemented in the strategy of the Royal Air Force during the interwar period. As it was not possible to openly advocate the bombing of civilians during the 1920s and 1930s, this was shrouded in ambiguous language and kept hidden. However, the roots of area bombing come to the surface several times between the wars, and the speed with which area bombing was adopted in 1940 and 1941 shows that they were never deeply buried. While many historians have uncovered individual details that collectively support this contention, none have traced the development of this thought across the period 1917-42. Using a selection of contemporary documents and a thorough review of the secondary literature, this work shows that far from being an improvisation forced by necessity, the adoption of area bombing was unsurprising and can be traced back to 1917.