This study assesses the U.S. bargaining chip approach in strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The study's theoretical framework is based upon several concepts inherent in the theory of compellence as conceptualized by Schelling (1966) and Craig and George (1983). Furthermore, several key elements of domestic politics are incorporated into the framework to add richness to this traditional conception of inter-state bargaining. The empirical validity of the hypotheses rests on the findings generated by four case studies, including the use of the Strategic Defense Initiative as a bargaining chip. This study's findings show that there is, in fact, no basis for traditional criticisms levelled at the use of bargaining chips in arms control. However, the study strongly suggests that policy-makers should be prepared to escalate the operation of a negative leverage from the threat to deploy a weapon system through actual deployment to the exercise of positive leverage to fully exploit the bargaining chip's potential.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems Technology) Naval Postgraduate School, June 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Lacer, Donald. Second Reader: Luqi. "June 1990." Description based on title screeen viewed on October 15, 2009. DTIC Descriptor(s): Computer programs, military strategy, space technology, defense systems, management, antimissile defense systems, reliability, communication and radio systems, engineers, strategic defense initiative, battles, space warfare, computer personnel, scientists, nuclear weapons DTIC Indicator(s): Computer program reliability, strategic defense initiative, problem solving, theses. Author(s) subject terms: Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), reliability, error free, Balistic Missile Defense (BMD) (BM/C3) Includes bibliographical references (p. 86-88).

No description available.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific))--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Twomey, Christopher P. "September 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on 5 November 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Deterrence, Japan, China, Nuclear Missile Defense. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-66). Also available in print.

Survivability and reliability have become important factors in the design of a mission effective Strategic Defense System (SDS) that protects the United States against a ballistic missile attack by the Soviet Union. The SDS must be reliable and responsive in providing this defense. It must also be survivable to counter the Soviet tactics of negating the defense. To ensure an effective, responsive and affordable system, survivability and reliability features must be incorporated in the earliest phases of conceptual design and must be maintained throughout the SDS life cycle. The Engagement Timeline Analysis (ETA) model provides a tool for exploring survivability, reliability and other design trade-offs in the conceptual and preliminary design phases of the system engineering process. This paper presents a unique methodology for the derivation of system survivability and reliability requirements in an SDS design. Evaluations are at the engineering estimate level and are structured to allow sensitivity analyses of pertinent constellation design parameters and operational characteristics. / Master of Science

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 26-29, 1992 / Town and Country Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / An orbiting sensor module, designed by The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), performed a number of significant Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Delta 181 program experiments. These experiments required on-orbit command and monitor operations involving a worldwide network of ground facilities. A major component was the sensor module command center (SMCC), which was designed and integrated by JHU/APL. The SMCC, located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), connected to a network of Eastern Test Range, Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), Kennedy Space Center, and Western Test Range assets. The complex nature of the mission presented numerous challenges to the design, integration, and operation of the SMCC. This paper presents a functional overview of SMCC design as well as unique aspects of supporting ground network telemetry and command operation.

Thesis (M.A.)--Brandeis University, 2008. / Title from IR (viewed on May 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

In master thesis "U.S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan: Strategic Defense Initiative and disarmament process" is analysed development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and consequent disarmament process in the second half of 1980's. At the beginning of the thesis it is mentioned a stadium of disarmament by the end of 1970's, but the main attention focuses on the Ronald Reagan's presidential administration, when the development of the SDI started. Master thesis also analyses disarmament dialogue among representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, which started in Geneva in 1985, and continued in Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow.

No description available.

My doctoral project investigates the impact of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative on transatlantic relations during the period 1983-86. The dissertation focuses on the three main European powers, namely Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and examines their reaction to SDI both individually and comparatively. The study exploits SDI’s position at the intersection of nuclear strategy, political ideology, Cold War diplomacy, and industrial politics to offer a multifaceted, multi-national, and primary source-based analysis of US-European relations during the Reagan Presidency. The picture of the transatlantic relationship which emerges from the dissertation is a complex and nuanced one. On the one hand, the analysis argues that relations across the Atlantic during the Reagan era cannot be reduced to a scenario of accelerating ‘drift’ between the United States and Western Europe. Instead, on SDI as well as on other matters, moments of acute friction alternated with a constantly renewed search for dialogue, cooperation, and compromise on the part of the Europeans and also, if to a lesser degree, of the Americans. On the other hand, the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology and worldview underpinning SDI, the prevailing indifference in Washington to its implications for NATO, and most importantly the persistent anti-nuclear rhetoric and ambitions associated with the initiative revealed a distinct lack of sensitivity to European interest by the Reagan administration. As the dissertation shows, the anti-nuclear drive inherent in SDI, which both reflected and reinforced Reagan’s deep-seated interest in nuclear abolition, constituted the most disruptive aspect of the initiative from the viewpoint of European leaders. In these respects, the SDI controversy epitomises the unilateral tendencies and increasingly divergent priorities from those of the European allies which characterised much of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy – making the 1980s a decade of recurrent tensions in transatlantic relations.