Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kadhim, Abbas ; Russell, James. "June 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on August 29, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-101). Also available in print.

Yes / Title in attached file differs from final published title.

This thesis is intended to enhance our knowledge of the processes behind the relinquishing of Canada's nuclear roles. As such, the underlying factors which helped bring about this change in Canadian defence policy are to be isolated and assessed. The process of retiring Canada's nuclear roles was long and complex, involving many actors and influences. The factors examined in this thesis are looked upon in the greater context of the 1960s and 1970s. The global and domestic political climates, the strategic environment and Canada's power within the global community as a whole during this time period, are considered. This study has revealed several interesting conclusions which one may draw concerning the relinquishing of Canada's nuclear roles. First of all, the Trudeau government's position on nuclear weapons coincided with growing opposition to nuclear weapons within the Canadian public. Furthermore, it is evident that public opinion on the nuclear issue was closely related to an individual's perception of the United States and his or her position on defence spending. Secondly, the process of retiring the nuclear weapon systems was led largely by Pierre Trudeau and some of his close associates, in particular Ivan Head and Donald MacDonald. This was done in the face of intense bureaucratic resistance. Thirdly, abandoning the nuclear roles was strongly related to Canada's declining position in the global community and also to the growth of detente. In addition, it was also partly the result of a rapidly changing strategic environemnt in which weapon systems were quickly made obsolete. Perhaps most importantly, this thesis shows that relinquishing Canada's nuclear roles was an extremely important part of the 1971 defence review. The issue of nuclear weapons is one which has been largely overlooked by defence and foreign policy analysts in the past, such as Thordarson as well as Granatstein and Bothwell, and therefore merits our attention. For this thesis, telephone interviews had to be conducted because very little written material is available to the public. Regrettably, these interviews must remain confidential for the time-being. Several books, articles and public opinion surveys also were very helpful in conducting this analysis. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

India and Pakistan are two of the world's poorest countries, yet each devotes a substantial portion of its resources to defend itself against the other. What drives these expenditures? Are they internally or externally driven? If externally, how do the countries interact with each other? To try to answer these questions, we apply five models widely used in defense spending studies. If the model performs well, we will assume that the underlying driver of defense expenditure or change in defense expenditure is present. If the model does not perform well, we will assume the driver is absent. Our goal is not to find the single "best" model, but to see if a consistent pattern of behavior emerges for each country through the combination of the models. We conclude that existing models do shed light on the defense spending behaviors of the two countries, although they are by no means the final word and have only limited value for forecasting. The patterns that emerge from empirical testing of the models indicate that: India is far more sensitive to Pakistan's spending than Pakistan is to India's. India is concerned with maintaining a certain level of superiority over its rival, but shows little inclination to spend Pakistan into the ground. Pakistan has run up against its resource constraint and Pakistani leaders have opted to spend what they feel they prudently can on defense rather than try to engage India in an arms race that they would assuredly lose. On the other hand, Pakistan' defense spending bureaucracy is stronger than India's, so that Pakistan finds it more difficult to cut defense spending than does India. / Master of Arts

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 438-450). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 438-450). Also available on the Internet.

No description available.

After having confronted for fifty years, arms race across the Taiwan Strait does not come to an end but rather deteriorate sharply in recent years. This directly puts national security of Taiwan and China in danger. Therefore, this study is to explore the development of cross-strait arms race with four phases: the US Defending ROC Era, the Post Era of Determination of ROC-US Diplomatic Relations, the Post Cold-War Era, and the Post 911 Era. In addition, this study will predict how arms race across the Taiwan Strait will develop in the future. After all, international society stresses national power, of which military forces are one of the most critical factors. Moreover, this study will bring in those Asian-Pacific countries for discussion. By focusing on different historical backgrounds of north-eastern and south-eastern Asia and by viewing with perspectives of Triangle Strategy and Neo-Realism, this study will examine the diplomatic development in the way each Asian-Pacific country interacts with China and Taiwan respectively. Ever since Taiwan withdrew from the United Nations, she has adopted diplomatic strategies such as ¡§Realistic Diplomacy,¡¨ ¡§Elastic Diplomacy,¡¨ or ¡§Double Recognition.¡¨ Nevertheless, this way is never easy but full of challenges and predicaments. If considering Taiwan¡¦s diplomatic process with those Asian-Pacific countries, we may wonder and doubt whether such diplomatic strategy as ¡§Double Recognition¡¨ can be feasible, for ¡§Double Recognition¡¨ exists only when the to-recognize country and the two recognized countries unanimously accept one another. Besides, ¡§Double Recognition¡¨ works on the premise that the two recognized countries must be countries. But whenever Taiwan utilizes ¡§Double Recognition¡¨ policy, China strongly and unyieldingly opposes this move, putting Taiwan into a predicament that she is not recognized as a country by China. It may be understandable that Taiwan embraces the ¡§Two Nations¡¨ theory, but it is no better than froth unless China concedes. In other words, Taiwan hardly gets away from being denied by China and international society, no matter how enthusiastically she raises the policies such as ¡§Two China¡¨ or ¡§One China, One Taiwan.¡¨ Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine how Asian-Pacific countries react with one another in terms of politics, military, and economy and how these interactions affect each country, given the premise that arms race across the Taiwan Strait has been deteriorating. This study also provides some useful research findings and suggestions for Taiwan to deal with Asian-Pacific diplomatic policies.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed Aug. 4, 2004). "December 2003." Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Harold Trinkunas, Robert Looney. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-66). Also available online.