O sistema partidário-eleitoral brasileiro é tido como um dos mais fragmentados do mundo. As inferências para esse diagnóstico são extraídas do padrão de competição nas eleições proporcionais. O propósito da tese é estudar o sistema partidário brasileiro a partir das eleições majoritárias de 1989-2006. A tese tem como foco entender a dinâmica da competição política nessas disputas a partir da ação estratégica das elites partidárias. Do ponto de vista substantivo, o trabalho busca contribuir para o entendimento dos mecanismos que garantiram a dominância de PT e PSDB nas eleições presidenciais a partir de 1994. A tese busca demonstrar, ainda, a existência de estabilidade das clivagens políticas se tomarmos os Estados individualmente. O ponto de partida é que as eleições executivas são as mais importantes, tanto para as elites políticas como para os eleitores. Partidos políticos hierarquizam os diferentes pleitos. O argumento do trabalho é que o mecanismo central que garantiu a estabilidade da clivagem PT-PSDB foi a articulação nacional das candidaturas por meio das eleições para o governo do Estado. Esses dois partidos foram capazes de reproduzir essa clivagem nas diferentes disputas estaduais. A evidência empírica utilizada na análise é a frequência do lançamento de candidaturas dos nove maiores partidos nas eleições executivas. O custo de entrada das eleições majoritárias leva à criação de mercados eleitorais distintos no interior do sistema partidário brasileiro. O alto custo decorrente da baixa magnitude das eleições executivas torna esse mercado bastante concentrado. Assim, o padrão da competição política nas eleições majoritárias não apenas se encontra de acordo com a literatura institucionalista mas também apresenta uma estabilidade na identidade dos competidores tanto nas eleições presidenciais como, em menor medida, nas eleições para o governo estadual. / The brazilian electoral-party system is considered one of the most fragmented in the world. That diagnosis is based on the pattern of competition in proportional elections. The purpose of this thesis is to study the brazilian party system from the perspective of executive elections from 1989 to 2006. This thesis focuses on understanding the dynamics of political competition in these disputes from the strategic action of the party elites. Our central aim is to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms that ensured the dominance of PT and PSDB in the presidential elections since 1994. This thesis seeks to demonstrate also the existence of stability of political divisions if the states are taken individually. The starting point of this work is that the executive elections are the most important for both political elites and voters. Political parties rank the different types of competition. The argument of this paper is that the central mechanism which ensured the stability of the PT-PSDB cleavage was the articulation of national contest through the elections to the government of the state. These two parties were able to reproduce the various disputes in the states. The empirical evidence used in the analysis is the frequency of the launch of applications of the nine major parties in the executive elections. The cost of entering the elections majority takes the creation of separate markets within the electoral party system in Brazil. The high costs of low executive elections make this market highly concentrated. Thus, the pattern of the executive elections is not only according to the institutionalist literature, but also shows stability in the identity of competitors both in the presidential elections and, to a lesser extent, in elections to the states governments.

O sistema partidário-eleitoral brasileiro é tido como um dos mais fragmentados do mundo. As inferências para esse diagnóstico são extraídas do padrão de competição nas eleições proporcionais. O propósito da tese é estudar o sistema partidário brasileiro a partir das eleições majoritárias de 1989-2006. A tese tem como foco entender a dinâmica da competição política nessas disputas a partir da ação estratégica das elites partidárias. Do ponto de vista substantivo, o trabalho busca contribuir para o entendimento dos mecanismos que garantiram a dominância de PT e PSDB nas eleições presidenciais a partir de 1994. A tese busca demonstrar, ainda, a existência de estabilidade das clivagens políticas se tomarmos os Estados individualmente. O ponto de partida é que as eleições executivas são as mais importantes, tanto para as elites políticas como para os eleitores. Partidos políticos hierarquizam os diferentes pleitos. O argumento do trabalho é que o mecanismo central que garantiu a estabilidade da clivagem PT-PSDB foi a articulação nacional das candidaturas por meio das eleições para o governo do Estado. Esses dois partidos foram capazes de reproduzir essa clivagem nas diferentes disputas estaduais. A evidência empírica utilizada na análise é a frequência do lançamento de candidaturas dos nove maiores partidos nas eleições executivas. O custo de entrada das eleições majoritárias leva à criação de mercados eleitorais distintos no interior do sistema partidário brasileiro. O alto custo decorrente da baixa magnitude das eleições executivas torna esse mercado bastante concentrado. Assim, o padrão da competição política nas eleições majoritárias não apenas se encontra de acordo com a literatura institucionalista mas também apresenta uma estabilidade na identidade dos competidores tanto nas eleições presidenciais como, em menor medida, nas eleições para o governo estadual. / The brazilian electoral-party system is considered one of the most fragmented in the world. That diagnosis is based on the pattern of competition in proportional elections. The purpose of this thesis is to study the brazilian party system from the perspective of executive elections from 1989 to 2006. This thesis focuses on understanding the dynamics of political competition in these disputes from the strategic action of the party elites. Our central aim is to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms that ensured the dominance of PT and PSDB in the presidential elections since 1994. This thesis seeks to demonstrate also the existence of stability of political divisions if the states are taken individually. The starting point of this work is that the executive elections are the most important for both political elites and voters. Political parties rank the different types of competition. The argument of this paper is that the central mechanism which ensured the stability of the PT-PSDB cleavage was the articulation of national contest through the elections to the government of the state. These two parties were able to reproduce the various disputes in the states. The empirical evidence used in the analysis is the frequency of the launch of applications of the nine major parties in the executive elections. The cost of entering the elections majority takes the creation of separate markets within the electoral party system in Brazil. The high costs of low executive elections make this market highly concentrated. Thus, the pattern of the executive elections is not only according to the institutionalist literature, but also shows stability in the identity of competitors both in the presidential elections and, to a lesser extent, in elections to the states governments.

The central objective of this dissertation is to gain an understanding of the effect by the market within the household on a specific developmental initiative whose aim was poverty reduction. This dissertation analyses how individuals gain access to resources, and how they enforce their entitlements during the on-going implicit and explicit negotiations inherent in daily rural life. The research tested the suitability of several concepts previously untested in the southern African context. The concept of hearth-holds, proved valuable as a unit of analysis which recognizes the importance of female-directed social units. The relevance of the fall-back position in terms of locality of kin, as well as perceptions of legitimacy, were crucial in affecting how far they were willing to go and what they felt they could demand in everyday household bargaining situations. The deficiency of using romantic ideas of conjugal relations and equal opportunities to explain practice was apparent. Spouses strategise within the terms of their conjugal contracts, at times adhering to the dominant patriarchal bargain, at times covertly defying or overtly challenging it, and following another bargain. Placing women as the custodians of morality, works to the relative advantage of men by isolating women from accessing certain opportunities. Female heads of households, manage to legitimise their access to resources by virtue of being custodians of their children. Custodianship of cash funds, and the dominant decision making model used for resource related decisions in the household, clearly impacted on the relevance of different strategies in the bargaining process. The strategic entry points in this process of reduced transparency and violence were relevant in most households studied. The latter was effective in reinforcing and shaping the conjugal contract, despite in effect breaking it. Drinking facilitated this process by creating a temporary suspension of the rules. Concrete recommendations for developmental practitioners involve incorporating the hearth-hold concept and promoting the communal planning, budgeting and monitoring approach, as well as to specifically target individuals who need their intra-household bargaining power boosted. A clear policy on affirmative action in gate keeper roles, as well as gender disaggregated documentation of beneficiaries, should be institutionalised. / Development Studies / M.A. (Development Studies)

The central objective of this dissertation is to gain an understanding of the effect by the market within the household on a specific developmental initiative whose aim was poverty reduction. This dissertation analyses how individuals gain access to resources, and how they enforce their entitlements during the on-going implicit and explicit negotiations inherent in daily rural life. The research tested the suitability of several concepts previously untested in the southern African context. The concept of hearth-holds, proved valuable as a unit of analysis which recognizes the importance of female-directed social units. The relevance of the fall-back position in terms of locality of kin, as well as perceptions of legitimacy, were crucial in affecting how far they were willing to go and what they felt they could demand in everyday household bargaining situations. The deficiency of using romantic ideas of conjugal relations and equal opportunities to explain practice was apparent. Spouses strategise within the terms of their conjugal contracts, at times adhering to the dominant patriarchal bargain, at times covertly defying or overtly challenging it, and following another bargain. Placing women as the custodians of morality, works to the relative advantage of men by isolating women from accessing certain opportunities. Female heads of households, manage to legitimise their access to resources by virtue of being custodians of their children. Custodianship of cash funds, and the dominant decision making model used for resource related decisions in the household, clearly impacted on the relevance of different strategies in the bargaining process. The strategic entry points in this process of reduced transparency and violence were relevant in most households studied. The latter was effective in reinforcing and shaping the conjugal contract, despite in effect breaking it. Drinking facilitated this process by creating a temporary suspension of the rules. Concrete recommendations for developmental practitioners involve incorporating the hearth-hold concept and promoting the communal planning, budgeting and monitoring approach, as well as to specifically target individuals who need their intra-household bargaining power boosted. A clear policy on affirmative action in gate keeper roles, as well as gender disaggregated documentation of beneficiaries, should be institutionalised. / Development Studies / M.A. (Development Studies)