Is support for democracy decreasing among the young? Attitudes among the young tell us about the future of democracy. Today, support is declining in the USA and researchers disagree about whether the same is true for Western Europe. Some researchers believe that there is cause for concern while others argue that the young generation is more tolerant and have higher aspirations for democracy, which means that we do not need to worry. According to the theory of generational replacement and its scarcity and socialization hypotheses, diffuse support for democracy as well as tolerance should be stable or even increasing in the young cohorts. Using a quantitative method and data from the European Values Study, these parameters along with specific support will be measured in the countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, which are most-likely cases to have strong support for democracy among citizens. The main findings are that diffuse support seems to be stable in the young cohort in all countries except Denmark, where there is a slight decline. Specific support fluctuates over time and tolerance is highest among the young cohort but declining over time in the older cohorts in Denmark and Norway. The results predict that support for democracy will remain although there are some signs of challenges ahead.

The influence of right-wing political conservatism on support for democracy and the criminalization of social protest is analyzed in a sample of university students from the city of Lima (N = 201). As indicators of the right-wing political conservatism, measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing political orientation were used. Two path diagrams were proposed: the second diagram showed a proper degree of fit and proposes a positive covariance between RWA, SDO and right-wing political orientation. The diagram also suggests that RWA, SDO and right-wing political orientation exert a direct influence on the criminalization of social protest, while SDO and RWA exert an indirect influence on support for democracy. Finally, support for democracy present an inverse correlation with the criminalization of social protest. / Se analiza la influencia del conservadurismo político de derecha sobre el apoyo a la democracia y la criminalización de la protesta social en una muestra de estudiantes universitarios de Lima (N = 201). El conservadurismo político de derecha fue evaluado utilizando medidas de autoritarismo (RWA), orientación hacia la dominancia social (SDO) y orientación política de derecha. Dos diagramas de sendero (Path Analysis) fueron propuestos: el segundo diagrama presentó un ajuste adecuado y propone, en primer lugar, una covarianza positiva entre el RWA, la SDO y la orientación política de derecha. Asimismo, tanto el RWA, como la SDO y la orientación política de derecha ejercen una influencia directa sobre la criminalización de la protesta social, mientras solo la SDO y el RWA ejercen una influencia inversa sobre el apoyo a la democracia. Finalmente, se observa una correlación inversa entre el apoyo a la democracia y la criminalización de la protesta social.

Traditional models of tax evasion cannot explain why most people comply with their taxes. It has been proposed that taxpayers may have an intrinsic motivation (or willingness) to comply with taxes - Tax Morale. Empirical studies found that trusting government, upholding religious beliefs, and supporting democratic regimes, increase individual Tax Morale. Based on those results and drawing from related literature in Political Science, this study tests the role of trusting government institutions delivering public goods to taxpayers, ideological beliefs, individual support for political regimes, and upholding post-materialist values, on Tax Morale. Results for individuals living in democratic countries show a positive relationship between trust in government institutions and upholding democratic values on Tax Morale; a negative relationship between upholding ideological (conservative) beliefs and Tax Morale, and no relationship between upholding post-materialist values and Tax Morale. Results for individuals living under non-democratic regimes differ in some respects; whereas support for democracy is related with higher Tax Morale, other results - trust in government and ideological beliefs - differ from theoretical expectations. Overall, higher trust in government increases willingness to comply with taxes, and support for democracy elicits higher Tax Morale.

Empirical findings about political behaviour cast doubt on prevailing theories of democracy. The overwhelming majority of democratic theories either implicitly or explicitly imply the necessity of widespread public participation. However, this involvement is more frequently referred to as public participation in the democratic process than as popular support. This paper questions if democracy can even be discussed without considering how popular support affects democracy. According to research, a healthy democracy system will give people a bigger say in deciding on the important issues that affect their lives. To react to the needs and views of their populace, democracies all over the world need a more robust democratic theoretic model of democracy measurement, which includes a normative criterion of popular support for democracy. Democracy should be viewed as requiring widespread support in order to be defined as democratic.

Cette thèse se compose de trois essais sur le rôle des institutions dans le processus de développement. Le chapitre 2 examine dans quelle mesure l'existence de régimes multiples est associée à la qualité des institutions d'un pays, et analyse la différence de rôle joué par les institutions politiques et économiques dans le processus de croissance. Les résultats indiquent que les institutions économiques sont les causes immédiates et ont un impact direct sur le taux de croissance. Les institutions politiques sont les causes profondes, et sont donc les éléments qui déterminent dans quel régime de croissance se trouve un pays.Le chapitre 3 réétudie la problématique de la malédiction des ressources naturelles. Il teste l'hypothèse que l'effet de l'abondance en ressources naturelles sur le taux de croissance dépend du régime de croissance dans lequel le pays est inclus. Les résultats montrent un régime de bénédiction où les ressources naturelles favorisent la croissance et un régime de malédiction où les ressources naturelles ne stimulent pas la croissance. En outre plus de démocratie augmente la probabilité pour qu'un pays donné appartienne au premier régime. Le chapitre 4 teste si les différences de priorités politiques entre les hommes et les femmes, ou si les caractéristiques à l'échelle du pays telles que la qualité des institutions expliquent l'écart au soutien à la démocratie entre ces deux groupes d'individus. L'étude a montré que le contexte institutionnel du pays dans lequel les femmes vivent joue un rôle primordial. / This dissertation consists of three essays on institutions in the process of development. Chapter 2 considers to what extent the existence of multiple regimes is associated to the quality of institutions in a country, and analyses the difference of the role played by political and economic institutions in the growth process. The results indicate that economic institutions are proximate causes and have a direct impact on the growth rate. On the other hand political institutions are deep causes, and thus are the key determinant for which growth regime a country belongs to. In chapter 3, I re-examine the question of the resource curse. I test to which extent the impact of natural resources on the growth rate depends truly on the growth regime to which a country belongs. I find two different growth regimes. One is a resource-blessed regime in which natural resources increase signicantly the growth rate. The second one is a resource-cursed regime in which natural resources do not stimulate the growth rate. The analysis of the determinants of whether a country belongs or not to the blessed resource regime indicates that high level of democracy increases the probability for a given country to belong to this regime. Chapter 4 tries to understand and to provide potential explanations to why women are less supportive of democracy than men in Sub-sahara Africa. We test whether this gap is due to individual differences in policy priorities or to country-wide characteristics. The results support that in Sub-sahara Africa the gender gap in support for democracy disappears in countries with high level of the Human Development Indicator and of political rights.