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本研究之目的在於了解全球聯貸案利率如何受到供需模型之影響；本研究樣本包含1982至2009年來自63個國家超過二萬三仟筆聯貸案。研究結果顯示，供給方力量將導致聯貸案利率偏低，然而於機構投資者參與比率越高之國家存在價格偏離模型預測之情況；而上述之負向效果於財務受限愈嚴重或未來投資機會愈低之借款公司將愈加顯著。 / Using a sample of more than 23,000 syndicated tranches to borrowers from 63 countries for the 1982-2009 period, we test the influence of the supply and demand side effects on loan spread. Our results show that supply side effect leads to a significant lower spread, but in some countries with higher appetite of institutional investors, such as U.S. and Spain, these results do not hold. We find that the negative effect above mentioned on spread will be significant for firms whose original loan spread is much higher; i.e., firms with serious financial constraint or low investment opportunity.

The syndicated loan is become more and more important for firm's financing. We study three important aspects of loan syndication: the lead arranger's reputation effect on syndicated loan pricing, the switching behavior for repeat syndicate loans and the effect of country-specific bank-firm ownership structure on syndicated loan pricing and bank-firm relationship of repeat loans. The first chapter analyzes the reputation effect of the lead arranger on syndicated loan pricing, based on a sample of loan facilities to non-financial U.S. firms over the 1994-2006 period. Theory suggests that the reputation/spread relationship should generally be positive because more reputable lenders usually employ more costly loan screening and monitoring techniques and therefore must be compensated with a higher spread. After controlling for endogeneity in lender-borrower matching, the empirical results show that the reputable arrangers charge a "reputation premium" for monitoring and due diligence, and the commitment against extracting the information rent from borrowers. The results also show that the less-reputable arrangers offer a "reputation discount", since the market competition from both the loan market and bond market makes it more difficult for less reputable arrangers to sustain the reputation mechanism. In addition, the reputation effect on pricing becomes less significant when the borrower enters a repeat loan relationship with a prior or existing lender. Finally, the study finds that the arranger's reputation can reduce the lead share retained by the lead arranger in its loan portfolio, which serves as evidence that reputation also mitigates the information asymmetry between the lead arranger and participant banks. The second chapter analyzes the switching behavior for two types of repeat loans: migrating loans that remain within the same bank reputation class and loans migrating to a different reputation class. The theoretical literature argues that banks (lenders) and firms (borrowers) benefit from entering into a relationship-lending arrangement. In the syndicated loan market, however, it is very common for repeat loans to switch from one bank to another. We present a model that establishes conditions for implementing empirical investigations relating to relationship lending and the characteristics of the separating equilibrium in the loan market. Using explanatory variables describing firms, loans, and loan syndicates, we find that lending within the high quality bank sector reveals evidence that is consistent with relationship lending. That is, some firms forego longer maturity loans and less oversight to remain with their original lender. A similar finding does not hold for repeat lending in the lower quality bank sector. Regarding loans that migrate in either direction between the high and low quality banking sectors, firm risk is the most important determinant. Relatively riskier firms move down to lower quality lenders while relatively safer firms move up to higher quality lenders. The third chapter investigates the determinants of loan pricing and repeat loan relationship for a sample of 6,180 non-U.S.. firm-loan observations for the period 1998-2007. This paper focuses on the relation between a country-specific governance indicator and country-specific bank-firm ownership structures on loan pricing and the management of a lending relationship between the syndicate bank and firm. We evaluate the relationship between country-specific bank ownership structure and the main characteristics of loan, which are mainly measured by loan pricing and loan switching decision. The paper examines three interrelated questions: 1.How is loan pricing affected by country-specific bank-firm ownership structure? 2. Does country-specific bank-firm ownership structure influence the decision to switch lenders in the repeat loan market? 3. Is country-specific bank-firm ownership structure more important for a borrower to migrate to a higher reputation lender than to a lower reputation lender? We use loan-characteristic, bank-characteristic, and firm-characteristic variables as well as country-specific corruption and country-specific bank-firm ownership structure variables to explore the effect on loan pricing and loan-switching decisions. Using logistic regression analysis, we find that loan switching is less likely for firms when the bank controls the firm, especially in the case of a bank-controlled firm borrows from a low reputation syndicated loan lender. However, when the firm controls a local bank, there is no impact on the firm's switching decision in the syndicated loan market. The bank-controlling firm is as likely to switch as a firm that does not control a bank even though the firm is more opaque to the financial market. Our results suggest that in the international syndicated loan market, the bank-firm relationship is partly shaped by country-specific characteristics and information asymmetry of firms to the financial market. These chapters explores the bank and firm behavior in the syndicated loan market and make the contribution to the literature by offering further knowledge and deeper understanding about the bank-firm relationship and behavior in the loan syndication structure. / Business Administration

本篇論文的研究動機。由於許多文獻提到債權人在公司治理上從過去的被動位置轉變為主動利用聯合貸款合約中的限制性條款(covenant) 來規範公司營業活動。小至限制公司資本支出、股利發放，大則影響董事會決定公司 CEO 的去留。限制性條款扮演越來越重要的角色。本文探討從 SEC EDGAR filings 中搜尋公司是否面臨限制性條款的違約(in violation of covenants)。本篇論文能降低未來研究在資料建立上需要人工處理的時間，藉由降低錯誤標記的筆數來達成。 / Covenant violations in syndicated loan agreements are a key factor which demonstrates a shift in control rights to debt holders before a company enters into events of default. This paper focuses on the methodology of identifying incidents of covenant violations using both programming codes and manual searches. We dedicate to minimize the time in hand-collecting while pursue high hitting rates of true covenant violations in SEC EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) database. Our findings provide a way to access the U.S. firms’ public financial statements reported to SEC and extends the list of companies provided by Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012).

This thesis analyses the legal regime of in rem security interests, in particular pledges and security assignments of rights, in the context of syndicated loan finance. The thesis draws mainly from the Act No. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code, and the Act No. 90/2012 Coll., on Commercial Companies and Cooperatives (the Corporations Act), and related legal acts, case law and jurisprudence. In the first chapter, the author describes the main elements of a facilities agreement and the typology of loans. The term syndicated loan is defined as a bank loan provided by two or more creditors, who are not joint and severe creditors among themselves, and which is usually secured by in rem security interests. The second chapter of the thesis introduces the area of securing debts and describes the security and reimbursement functions of security interests. In the third and fourth chapter, the author details the main attributes of in rem security interests. The thesis focuses on the secured party, the security provider and the secured debt whereas emphasis is given on the security agent, whose position can be structured using the institutes of joint and severe creditorship, administration of security, trust and parallel debt. The thesis deals with the ranking of security interests and negative pledges. The author states...

本研究主要探討主貸行和參貸行之間的資訊不對稱如何影響聯貸案的定價。利用模型推導出在有資訊訊號和較低債權人保護的體制下，最適的聯貸案利率會較高；利用1982年到2009年的全球聯貸案資料進行實證，發現實證結果與理論預期一致。 / This paper explores how information asymmetry between lead arrangers and participant lenders affects syndicated loan pricing. The model shows that the optimal loan spread is higher in regimes with informative signal and lower creditor rights protection. Using global syndicated loan data from 1982 to 2009, I show that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.

本文主要目的是在探討，當企業決定其融資方式，改變資本結構後，究竟是否會造成投資人對該企業經營獲利前景的改變，而反應在企業的股票價格上，尤其在「不同聯貸資金用途」上，是否會改變投資人、股東對於該企業風險程度的認定。本文利用事件研究法(Event Study Method)進行分析，研究期間自2005年至2007年止，針對台灣上市(櫃)公司完成聯貸簽約資料，刪除估計期未滿160天者後，有效樣本共140筆，其中營運週轉金(Working Capital)資金用途者有36筆；借新還舊(Refinancing)資金用途者有71筆；資本支出(Capital Expenditure)資金用途者有33筆。 本研究之實證結果發現，若資金用途為營運週轉金者，於聯合貸款宣告後，並沒有顯著異常報酬差異；若資金用途為借新還舊者，於聯合貸款宣告後，具有顯著的正向異常報酬差異；若資金用途為資本支出用途者，於聯合貸款宣告後，具有顯著負向異常報酬差異。 關鍵詞：聯合貸款、事件研究法、異常報酬 / The main purpose of this study is to discuss whether investors will change their anticipation on the perspective of a company, which is reflected on its stock price when the company decides on its financing method and thus changes its capital structure, and especially whether investors and shareholders will change their recognition on risk-taken levels of the company in light of different purposes of syndicated loans. This study employs Event Study Method and focuses on the listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan dated from Year 2005 through Year 2007. The valid sample size amounts to 140 companies after removing those companies whose estimation period is less than 160 days. Of the 140 sample companies, 36 are working capital related, 71 are refinancing related, and 33 are capital expenditure related. The empirical results of this study indicate that, upon announcement of syndicated loans, there are no significant positive abnormal returns if the loans are used as working capital, there are significant positive abnormal returns if the loans are used as refinancing, and there are significant negative abnormal returns if the loans are used as capital expenditure.

本文研究主要在探討以銀行團聯貸宣告下，對台灣地區上市的參貸銀行和借款公司之股東財富有何影響？本研究以事件研究法（Event Study）對標準化異常報酬做檢定，同時由於過去對殘差項估計多是以古典最小平方法來估計，但是實際股票報酬率通常具有尖峰態的胖尾分配，因此本文同時採Bollerslev(1986)的GARCH估計法及傳統古典最小平方法估計，並對結果做一比較；實証結果如下： 本研究得到下列結論： 1、在股價報酬時間數列特性上：對放款銀行之股價報酬而言，呈現異質變異性質者佔近四成，而對借款公司之股價報酬而言，呈現異質變異性質者佔四成，因此在考慮報酬率的特性時需將此考慮各國模型中，但就事件觀察期的顯著性而言，以古典最小平方法估計以異質條件變異數分析法估計的結論上，無論在放款銀行或在借款公司上皆無顯著之差異，可能因為時間數列的時間較短所致。 2、就放款銀行而言，銀行團聯貸之宣告日前一天，即有整個事件期中最強烈的正向反應，但未達顯著水準，而在宣告日前一天至宣告日當天的事件窗口有顯著水準的正向反應，顯示銀行團聯貸宣告所傳達給放款銀行之股東是正面資訊內涵。 3、就借款公司而言，銀行團聯貸之宣告前二天即有強烈的正向反應（但未達顯著水準），但隔天（宣告日前一天）即以整個事件期中最強烈的負向反應（但未達顯著水準）逆轉，而在宣告日前一天至宣告日當天的事件窗口卻有顯著水準的負向反應，顯示銀行團聯貸宣告所傳達給借款公司之股東是負面的資訊內涵。 4、放款銀行在累積異常報酬方面，在宣告日前十八天左右即有資訊揭露的現象，但持續4天之後，隨即有下跌趨勢，至宣告日前二天更跌至谷底，最後在宣告日後二天才轉回來，此現象可能代表投資人對銀行團聯貸之推動，時間拖愈久，對聯貸之成功與否持較悲觀的市場反應，乃至聯貸宣告後二天，才明確的正向反應出來。 5、借款公司在累積異常報酬方面，在宣告日之前即有上漲的趨勢，此現象顯示借款公司之股東對借款公司持較樂觀的市場反應，然宣告日前一天負面反應最強烈，可能顯示聯貸案成功與否會響到借款公司聲譽及資金的調度等方面，但聯貸案成功宣告後，則以更大幅度的正向股價反價，因此聯貸宣告整體而言，對借款公司之股東應為正面的資訊內涵。 6、以橫斷面分析法複迴歸的方式分別探討對放款銀行與對借款公司之異常報酬影響原因，實証結果顯示在放款銀行而言有99..........9%以上的顯著性，表示異常報酬與新銀行是否加入競爭有負向的關係，此現象表示81年新銀行的成立，使得舊有銀行聯貸的利潤受到很大衝擊。而在借款公司而言，銀行團參貸家數，與借款公司之異常報酬無顯著相關性，無法証實「契約彈性假說」，而借款公司之資產規模與舉債能力與異常報酬無顯著水準相關。

本論文之研究目的係驗證公允價值資訊是否會影響聯合貸款的借款條件。實證結果顯示公司採用更多公允價值，尤其是第1等級輸入值，可在聯合貸款市場中可取得較有利的聯合貸款條件，例如可取得更低的利率及更高額的貸款金額。然而實證結果也顯示，若公司採用更多公允價值，尤其是第1等級輸入值，會有更高的機會被債權人要求提供債務擔保。由此可知，公司採用更多公允價值可有助於取得更有利的聯合貸款借款條件，同時第1等級輸入值可獲得更顯著的結果。