In 2018, the Syrian Civil War will enter into its ninth year of conflict. From an international relations perspective there are few, if any, studies on state actors in regional sub-state systems. What can an intrastate conflict teach us about future dynamics of the regional interstate hierarchy? It is worthwhile to examine The Syrian Civil War for three reasons. First, Syria lies in the heart of the Middle East lending proximity to regional actors. Second, the breakdown of order in Syria represents a microcosm of the global anarchic environment. Third, Syrian Civil War is an intrastate war that encapsulates both state and non-state actors. This paper intends to provide a clear regional hierarchical analysis with future possibilities and perspectives. For the last century realism then neorealism dominated the field of international relations, yet they are unfit theories for analyzing the Middle East's hierarchy. To address anomalies realists and neorealists incorporated preference and satisfaction, which undermined the core tenets of their theories. Power Transition Theory (PTT) incorporates satisfaction while maintaining structural organization. The addition of power and satisfaction give PTT the necessary tools to assess regional hierarchies and estimate the likelihood of conflict. This PTT theoretical framework will be used to assess the global hierarchy, the status quo set by the United States, and Syria's relation to the status quo. A synopsis of the Syrian Civil War will be provided to contextualize the actors and dyadic comparisons between actors before and after the Iranian-Russian-Syrian victory in Aleppo. The dyadic comparison indicates power and satisfaction among interested parties and if they change during the course of the conflict. Conclusions indicate that the actors and the environment in the Syrian theater are suitable for Power Transition Theory and the data acquired by researching the Syrian Civil War affirms Yeşilada and Tanrikulu's assessment that Russia tops the Middle East's hierarchy with Turkey and Iran following at near parity. The findings reveal the veracity of Lemke's claim that PTT can be utilized for intrastate conflict. The findings substantiate my claim that intrastate conflict can inform us of a region's hierarchy.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-05T12:25:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Willian Moraes Roberto.pdf: 1606271 bytes, checksum: a01bee3acb85b2ddd7430c95d210639d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-05T12:25:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Willian Moraes Roberto.pdf: 1606271 bytes, checksum: a01bee3acb85b2ddd7430c95d210639d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Turkey, located at a strategic point between Europe and the Middle East, has historically been a relevant actor on the international scene. Since 2003, with the AKP (Justice and Development Party) coming to power, the country has stood out even more. On the one hand, its political model gained prominence due to the fact that an Islamic-rooted party began to cohabit secular bureaucratic institutions, accepting democratic rules and achieving high rates of economic growth. On the other hand, the new government began a rapprochement with the Middle East through the doctrine of "Zero Problems with Neighbors" - a region that for years was little explored by the traditional Turkish elites. However, with the start of the Arab uprisings and the outbreak of the conflict in Syria in 2011, Turkey again underwent an inflection in its foreign policy. The Turkish government adopted an assertive stance, assuming a position of great influence among both the Syrian conflict and the new Islamic political movements in the region. Given this context, this dissertation has as its research question the following: why Turkey changed its foreign policy in 2011, how has it been oriented since then and what aims has it sought. We will try to argue that this inflection in 2011 occurred due to two external shocks: the Arab revolts and a new US stance towards the Middle East; nonetheless, such new stance was only possible due to AKP’s domestic reforms. In addition, we will point out that in 2011 the Turkish government adopted a more assertive foreign policy, which aimed to place the country as a new regional leader through an emphasis on its political model. Finally, we will demonstrate that, over time, due to the radicalization of the Syrian war, Turkey again changed its foreign policy in 2015, also due to new external shocks, namely the achievement of Kurdish autonomy in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State. Since then, in a scenario of greater external constraints, the Turkish government would start to pay more attention to security issues, prioritizing problems arising from Syria, especially those related to the Kurdish issue / A Turquia, localizada em um ponto estratégico entre a Europa e o Oriente Médio, historicamente um sido um ator relevante no cenário internacional. Desde 2003, com o advento ao poder do AKP (Partido da Justiça e Desenvolvimento), o país se destacou ainda mais. Por um lado, ganhou destaque seu modelo político devido ao fato de um partido de raízes islâmicas passar a coabitar instituições burocráticas seculares, aceitando as regras democráticas e conquistando altas taxas de crescimento econômico. Por outro, o novo governo iniciou uma reaproximação com o Oriente Médio através da doutrina de “Zero Problemas com Vizinhos” – região essa que há anos era pouco explorada pelas elites turcas tradicionais. Entretanto, com o início das revoltas árabes e a eclosão do conflito na Síria a partir de 2011, a Turquia novamente passou por uma inflexão em sua política externa. O governo turco passou a adotar uma postura assertiva, assumindo uma posição de grande influência tanto no conflito sírio quanto junto aos novos movimentos políticos islâmicos na região. Diante desse contexto, essa dissertação tem como pergunta de investigação por que a Turquia alterou sua política externa a partir de 2011, como foi orientada desde então e que fins buscou. Procuraremos argumentar que essa inflexão em 2011 ocorreu devido a dois choques externos: as revoltas árabes e uma nova postura dos EUA para o Oriente Médio, mas que a nova postura só foi possível devido às reformas domésticas realizadas pelo AKP. Além disso, apontaremos que, em 2011, o governo turco passou a ter uma política externa mais assertiva, objetivando colocar o país como uma espécie de liderança regional usando-se de seu modelo político. Por fim, demonstraremos que, com o passar do tempo e a radicalização da guerra na Síria, em 2015 novamente a Turquia modificou sua política externa, também devido a novos choques externos, quais sejam a autonomia curda na Síria e o surgimento do Estado Islâmico. Desde então, em um cenário de maior constrangimento e limitações externas, o governo turco passaria a enfatizar questões securitárias, priorizando problemas advindos da Síria, sobretudo aqueles ligados à questão curda