Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 464250.pdf: 443912 bytes, checksum: 5aa71f054c86ca739b56e8d32700b345 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-05 / Most if not all arguments that purport to demonstrate that God does not exist or that the probability of His existence is low depend, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea that there are gratuitous evils or that, if God existed, He would have created a better world. The goal of this MA thesis is to evaluate the difficulties that the consequential complexity of history could pose to the formulation of this type of arguments. Additionally, I seek to briefly investigate how the molinist model of divine providence, which postulates God s knowledge of what became known in the literature as counterfactuals of freedom, incorporates or should incorporate the question of the causal complexity of the world. / A maioria ou talvez mesmo todos os argumentos que procuram demonstrar a n?o exist?ncia ou a baixa probabilidade da exist?ncia de Deus a partir do mal existente no mundo dependem, explicita ou implicitamente, da ideia de que h? males gratuitos no mundo ou da ideia de que, se Deus existisse, Ele teria criado um mundo melhor que este. O objetivo desta disserta??o ? avaliar as dificuldades que a complexidade consequencial da hist?ria coloca para a formula??o desses tipos de argumentos. Adicionalmente, procuro investigar brevemente como o modelo providencial molinista, que pressup?e o conhecimento por Deus dos chamados contrafatuais da liberdade, incorpora ou deveria incorporar a quest?o da complexidade causal do mundo.