Technical Standards have become a new arena of competition in the race for technological leadership since securing their control and ownership provides considerable economic and political advantages. Particularly telecommunication standards, which underpin global networks, can produce substantial economic and strategic benefits for the country and industry that largely shape their process and outcome. In light of these implications, new aspiring standard setters, such as China and South Korea, have actively increased their participation in international standards settings, challenging the predominant position of traditional standard setters such as the United States and European countries. The rise of new aspiring standard setters has provoked shifts in the power structures of international standardization regimes that had mostly reflected the preferences of traditional standard setters in the last decade, implying a redistribution of gains and costs among countries and industries. Despite this, only a few studies have focused on explaining power shifts in international standardization, drawing on IR/IPE theories. In addition, studies have only partially inquired about the political and economic of conditions that might explain such shifts. Against this background, this study aims to contribute to the literature focusing on power shifts in standardization by assessing under what conditions countries turn into leading standard setters. This is evaluated empirically by analyzing the capacity of six technological powers in shaping the three latest generations of telecommunication standards, namely 3G, 4G, and 5G. It deploys a multimethod approach to perform the analysis, combining a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with a process tracing (PT) analysis. The study found that the combination of conditions composed of a great innovator, a large economic power, and a highly complementary domestic system resulted in the most consistent sufficiency path, suggesting that when countries hold roughly the same technological and economic capabilities, a complementary system conducive to a strong government-industry partnership proves crucial to shaping standardization. This interpretation calls for further research on the role and influence of governments in securing technological leadership by providing competitive advantages to industries contributing to global standards.

Les Organisations de Développement de Standard (ODS) sont généralement perçues comme des acteurs-tiers neutres facilitant l'élaboration de norme de jure. Pourtant, la compétition entre concurrents et les manœuvres stratégiques y ont aussi leur place. Notre recherche pose la question de l'utilisation par un leader de la coopétition dans le hors-marché comme stratégie de contrôle de son marché. L'étude examine particulièrement les comportements de Microsoft pendant le processus de normalisation d'OOXML entre le mois de mai 2007 et le mois d'août 2008. La méthode utilisée est principalement qualitative et s'appuie sur l'étude exploratoire d'un cas unique. Nous analysons les interactions entre marché et hors-marché à travers l'étude des modes relationnels (compétition, coopétition et coopération) que le leader mobilise au sein de l'ODS français (Afnor). Nos résultats montrent en particulier que le recours à la coopétition dans un contexte normatif constitue une stratégie gagnante pour le leader. La nature de cette coopétition est transitoire sur le hors-marché et permet un retour à un comportement de recherche de rente monopolistique sur le marché. / Standard Development Organizations (SDO) are generally perceived as neutral third party actors facilitating the development of de jure standards. However, competitions between competitors and strategic manoeuvring also have their place. Our research questions the use by a leader of coopetition in the non-market as a strategy to control its market.This study particularly examines the behaviour of Microsoft during the standardization process of OOXML between May 2007 and August 2008. The method used is primarily qualitative and is based on the exploratory study of a unique case. We analyze the interactions between the markets and the non-markets by studies of relational methods (competition, coopetition and cooperation) that the leader engages with the French SDO (Afnor). Our results show in particular that the use of coopetition in a normative context is a winning strategy for the leader. The nature of this coopétition is transient on the non-market and allows a return to the behaviour of seeking monopolistic rent on the market.