The thesis analyses how telecommunications unions in Australia and Taiwan struggled for their members ' interests in response to privatisation during 1996 - 2004. The thesis makes an argument that union effectiveness is based on its responses rather than external environments ; and although unions ' strategic choices are influenced by institutions, what is significant is to trace out the reciprocal interconnections between the two. The thesis highlights the significance of union leaders ' decisions and membership participation during privatisation. In its early chapters the thesis explores the historical background, and relevant theory about union strategies and effectiveness. In addition the early chapters explore the state of Australian and Taiwan public sector unions, to set the context for a discussion of contemporary Australian and Taiwan telecommunications unions ' responses during privatisation. In later chapters the concept of effective trade unionism ( defined as the capacity of a union to reproduce itself as a collective organization ) is explored in terms of the union responses to privatisation in both countries. Whether the CPSU, the CEPU, and the CTWU protected members ' interests centres around two main questions : ( 1 ) did union strategies delay or stop the progress of privatisation ? ( 2 ) did union leadership improve job security, public servant status, wages and working conditions for their members while partial privatisation was underway ? In order to evaluate effective trade unionism in a comparative perspective, there are two levels of analysis in this thesis. Firstly, there is a comparison of the CPSU, the CEPU, and the CTWU in terms of three aspects ( membership density, financial strength, and the overall structure of the union ). Secondly, there is a comparative analysis of the CPSU, the CEPU, and the CTWU in terms of seven union strategic choices during privatisation. In summary, the responses of two telecommunications unions in Australia and Taiwan to privatisation illustrate the old Chinese old adage : ' If you don ' t fight, you lose ! ' But the way in which unions fought privatisation were many and had to be suited to their circumstances. Importantly, unions in Australia and Taiwan can learn from each other ' s successful experiences in a restructuring environment, such as privatisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--School of Social Sciences, 2006.

In the late 1980s, governments in New Zealand and Australia began to deregulate their telecommunications markets. This process included the corporatisation and privatisation of former state owned telecommunications monopolies and the introduction of competition. The Telecom Corporation of New Zealand (TCNZ) was corporatised in 1987 and privatised in 1990. Its Australian counterpart, Telstra, was corporatised in 1989 and partially privatised in 1997. This thesis examines and compares TCNZ and Telstra's changing organisational and workforce restructuring strategies, as they responded to these changes. It further examines how these strategies influenced the firms' employment relations (ER) policies. Strategic human resource management (SHRM) and transaction costs economics (TCE) theories assist in this analyse. TCE links organisational restructuring to the make/buy decisions of firms and the asset-specificity of their employees. It suggests that firms will retain workers that have developed a high degree of firm-specific skills, and outsource more generic and semi-skilled work. Firm strategies are also influenced by national, contextual, factors. From a TCE perspective, these external factors alter relative transaction costs. Hence, different ownership structures, ER legislation and union power help to explain differences in TCNZ and Telstra's organisational restructuring and ER strategies. During the decade from 1990 to 2000, TCNZ and Telstra cut labour costs through large-scale downsizing programs. Job cuts were supported by outsourcing, work intensification and the introduction of new technologies. These initial downsizing programs were carried out through voluntary redundancies, across most sections of the firms. In many instances workers simply self-selected themselves for redundancies. TCNZ and Telstra's downsizing strategies then became more strategic, as they targeted generic and semi-skilled work for outsourcing. These strategies accorded with a TCE analysis. But TCNZ and Telstra engaged in other practices that did not accord with a TCE analysis. For example, both firms outsourced higher skilled technical work. TCNZ and Telstra's continued market domination and the emphasis that modern markets place on short term profits, provided possible reasons for these latter strategies. This thesis suggests, therefore, that while TCE may help to predict broad trends in 'rational organisations', it may be less effective in predicting the behaviour of more politically and ideologically driven organisations aiming for short term profit maximisation. Some TCNZ and Telstra workers were shifted to subsidiaries and strategic alliances, which now assumed responsibility for work that had previously been performed in-house. Many of these external firms re-employed these workers under more 'flexible' employment conditions. TCNZ and Telstra shifted to more unitarist ER strategies with their core workers and reduced union influence in the workplace. Unions at Telstra were relatively more successful in retaining members than their counterparts at TCNZ. By 2002, TCNZ and Telstra had changed from stand-alone public sector organisations, into 'leaner' commercially driven firms, linked to subsidiaries, subcontractors and strategic alliances.

Wireline telecommunications infrastructure in the customer access network or CAN is undergoing a veritable technological and commercial revolution. The paired-copper CAN is being modernised with optical fibre deployed ever closer to customers, culminating soon with fibre-to-the-home networks or some variant thereof. Although bandwidth ceases to be a scarce commodity, the underlying natural monopoly will most likely be strengthened. National competition policy desires open access to multiple service providers yet commercial pressure calls for closure. This has been the recent experience with the hybrid fibre coaxial networks delivering pay television and Internet access. This research asks the question: What are the factors that prevent open access to the broadband services of next generation wireline infrastructure? How can these obstacles be overcome? A particular focus is given to non-price considerations which come to the fore due to the unique strategic and technological characteristics of optical fibre in the access network. The methodological approach involves data gathering via three case studies - that of the Telstra/Foxtel pay television network, the TransACT broadband network and fibre-to-the-home networks in general. Although the ultimate focus is on the research question above, these cases are discussed in a holistic way with consideration of a number of contextual factors. The research also examines the relationship between the concepts of 'open access' and 'network neutrality', visiting the concept of 'common carriage' in doing so. Several findings are reached that illuminate the field of telecommunications access regulation as applied to infrastructure capable of delivering truly next generation broadband services. Since 1993, our politicians have only paid lip service to the importance of competition and have deferred to the demands of the dominant builder of telecommunications infrastructure. From the viewpoints of end-users and access seekers, the access regime is found to be incapable of dealing with the technical and commercial bottlenecks arising from optical fibre in the CAN. It is concluded that communication between users should be recognised as the prime purpose of telecommunications and that the regulatory regime should not reward discriminatory practices detracting from the development of a networked information economy. It is also concluded that dominant players should never be rewarded with access holidays which could otherwise entrench market dominance through the creation of new bottlenecks. Access regulation is ill-equipped to cope with optical fibre in the CAN until it also recognizes the strategic potential of such infrastructure.