The goal of this dissertation is to test the agenda-setting theories of John Kingdon and Frank Baumgartner/Bryan Jones in terms of applicability. Universal service policy and the 1996 Telecommunications Act serve as the test case. Case study methodology guides the dissertation and employs a variety of methods including the quantitative and qualitative techniques used by John Kingdon and by Frank Baumgartner/Bryan Jones. These methods involve content analysis and the coding of media articles, an analysis of congressional hearings and government reports, and a review of scholarly literature on topics related to the policy-making in general, and telecommunications policy development, in particular. Universal service was selected for legislative action because it was bound up with telecommunications legislation, which required revision. Although some policy-makers preferred a market solution (that is the elimination of subsidized telecommunication services), universal service remained part of the telecommunications policy revision. Reasons include a new issue definition accompanied by a compelling image (information superhighway), the support of rural senators, and presidential leadership. With regard to fundamental differences between the Kingdon and Baumgartner/Jones' theories Kingdon's premise regarding the impact of cyclical events and systematic indicators has more applicability than Baumgartner and Jones' punctuated equilibria model of policy change. In addition, unlike Kingdon's research results, which indicate the media have a minor role in agenda-setting, Baumgartner and Jones' media attention indicators of policy change demonstrated a similar pattern to the universal service media indicators. The influence of interest groups is another point of difference. The universal case as with Baumgartner and Jones' research results that interest groups were major actors in setting the policy agenda. The contribution of this dissertation is to suggest elements of a new integrated model for the study of agenda-setting that incorporates aspects of the work of Kingdon and Baumgartner/Jones. / Ph. D.

This article provides an overview of Internet shutdowns in Pakistan, which have become an increasingly common phenomenon, with 41 occurring between 2012 and 2017. It argues that to understand how shutdowns became normalized in Pakistan, it is necessary to look at the specific dynamics of how the shutdowns take place. In doing so, the concept of communicative ruptures develops to better understand intentional government shutdowns of communications. The article argues that strategic prevention of mobilization is key for short-term shutdowns, whereas long-term shutdowns can be better explained by looking at disciplinary mechanisms and denying the existence of "others". The article then discusses Internet shutdowns in the wider context of authoritarian practices before concluding with the urgent need for further research on this topic, both in Pakistan and beyond.

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澳門電信管理局在2012年1月推出「全城3G」計劃，規定2012年7月8日停用所有GSM服務，16萬2G用戶要在半年內轉移到3G服務，但是外地遊客仍可繼續在澳門使用2G漫遊服務，政府希望透計劃推動3G服務的發展，讓無線電資源更具效率地利用，然而在計劃推行期間澳門出現多宗電信故障，加上澳門廉政公署就「全城3G」計劃所發表的調查報告指有關計劃過份介入市場運作，使得本地用戶失去選擇權，損害用戶及業者的權益，而且不符合公共利益，最終「全城3G」計劃無法如期實行，各業者的2G執照與其3G執照一同延長有效期至2023年6月4日。 　　本研究利用文獻分析法，透過蒐集澳門「全城3G」計劃的相關資料，分析澳門「全城3G」計劃的得失，與此同時借鏡與澳門政治體制相似的香港政府的頻譜政策，檢視兩地政府在回收2G頻譜的成效。本研究綜合分析下發現澳門與香港回收2G頻譜最大的差異在於香港回收的是兩個閒置的CDMA及TDMA系統，對業者有一定的影響，但是影響民眾的範圍卻很小，而且給予3年緩衝的時間讓業者轉移用戶，而澳門則是停用一個在世界上仍算主流的GSM服務，而且要在半年內轉移十多萬用戶到3G，加上在過渡期間出現5宗電信故障，讓民眾質疑計劃的可行性，最終把技術問題變成社會問題。因此本研究建議政府未來要避免直接介入市場，以間接的方式例如徵收階梯式的頻譜使用費來推動行動通訊業發展，回收頻譜時要以平穩適度的方式進行，以及提高電信故障的罰款。 / In January 2012, the Telecommunications Regulation Bureau of Macau (DSRT) announced its decision to scrap the city’s 2G network and rely solely on 3G capabilities. Effective on July 8, 2012, the policy change left about 160,000 local users without 2G service, primarily affecting local tourists still on the 2G roaming network. DSRT stated that the objectives of its decision were to create more investment opportunities and to facilitate the adequate diversification of economic development. However, during this time, two mobile operators failed to provide stable and adequate network services and the Commission Against Corruption (CCAC) of Macau stated that DSRT’s decision deprived consumers of their right to choose their own cellular network and their right to fair treatment. This prompted the 2G service cancellation to be further postponed until June 4, 2023. This study used literature analysis to review the termination of the 2G mobile network in Macau, and to examine the 2G spectrum reallocation in Hong Kong. This study found that Hong Kong terminated two unused mobile network services (CDMA and TDMA), while Macau is planning to scrap a GSM service which will affect about 150,000 users in Macau. Therefore, opposition to network terminations are greater in Macau than in Hong Kong. At the same time, the failure to provide adequate mobile services by two network operators in Macau led to public mistrust of the government. This study suggests that 1) the DSRT should not have used administrative means to force consumers into using a specific mobile system, and 2) the DSRT should have amended the penalties for mobile operators to closer reflect the current social situation.

Wireline telecommunications infrastructure in the customer access network or CAN is undergoing a veritable technological and commercial revolution. The paired-copper CAN is being modernised with optical fibre deployed ever closer to customers, culminating soon with fibre-to-the-home networks or some variant thereof. Although bandwidth ceases to be a scarce commodity, the underlying natural monopoly will most likely be strengthened. National competition policy desires open access to multiple service providers yet commercial pressure calls for closure. This has been the recent experience with the hybrid fibre coaxial networks delivering pay television and Internet access. This research asks the question: What are the factors that prevent open access to the broadband services of next generation wireline infrastructure? How can these obstacles be overcome? A particular focus is given to non-price considerations which come to the fore due to the unique strategic and technological characteristics of optical fibre in the access network. The methodological approach involves data gathering via three case studies - that of the Telstra/Foxtel pay television network, the TransACT broadband network and fibre-to-the-home networks in general. Although the ultimate focus is on the research question above, these cases are discussed in a holistic way with consideration of a number of contextual factors. The research also examines the relationship between the concepts of 'open access' and 'network neutrality', visiting the concept of 'common carriage' in doing so. Several findings are reached that illuminate the field of telecommunications access regulation as applied to infrastructure capable of delivering truly next generation broadband services. Since 1993, our politicians have only paid lip service to the importance of competition and have deferred to the demands of the dominant builder of telecommunications infrastructure. From the viewpoints of end-users and access seekers, the access regime is found to be incapable of dealing with the technical and commercial bottlenecks arising from optical fibre in the CAN. It is concluded that communication between users should be recognised as the prime purpose of telecommunications and that the regulatory regime should not reward discriminatory practices detracting from the development of a networked information economy. It is also concluded that dominant players should never be rewarded with access holidays which could otherwise entrench market dominance through the creation of new bottlenecks. Access regulation is ill-equipped to cope with optical fibre in the CAN until it also recognizes the strategic potential of such infrastructure.