Tenant representation är som bransch befinner sig i sin expansionsfas och har funnits på den svenska marknaden sedan tidigt 90-talet. Tjänsten tenant representation kommer ifrån den engelska och amerikanska marknaden och således ligger dessa marknader i framkant. Arbetet behandlar utbudet, utvecklingen och framtidsutsikterna på Stockholms tenant represantationmarknad. Arbetet stödjer sig till stor del på intervjuer av representanter från aktörer på Stockholms tenant representationmarknad. Arbetet hämtar även inspiration från tidigare arbeten och till viss del litteratur. Olika trender på marknaden som märks av är att medvetenheten och efterfrågan på tenant representation ökar samt att rekryteringsmöjligheterna har ökat. Svaren i intervjuerna har inte visat orsaken till de ökade rekryteringsmöjligheterna, men ett antagande är att utbildningar har anpassat sig till marknadernas behov. Tjänsterna inom tenant representation utvecklas även i en sådan riktning att TR företaget binder sig under kunden under en längre tid. Detta samtidigt som företagen har olika överlämningspunkter så att kunden inte upplever samarbetet som onödigt. De intervjuade företagen har en tydlig bild av sina konkurrenter och upplever att marknaden räcker för alla. Konkurrens efterfrågas då det skulle underlätta spridningen av TR tjänsterna och förbättra kvaliteten på dessa. Aktörerna på marknaden verkar även ha blivit bättre på att följa upp sina kundkontakter. Detta kan ha en positiv påverkan på förtroendet för TR marknadens aktörer.

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Real estate firms operating in the field of tenant representation may represent both tenants and landlords. As such their interests might be in conflict with those of the tenants they represent. A questionnaire was created and sent to 800 individuals. 78% of respondents indicated that they are aware of such conflicts. Meanwhile, only 40% of the respondents perceived such conflicts to be positive rather than negative. A game theoretical model showing how a tenant hires a tenant representative was created with three different scenarios, all using data from the questionnaire to mimic reality as closely as possible. In the first scenario, a tenant hires a representative at one occasion only. In the second scenario a tenant is considering to hire the representative for two sequential transactions. In the third scenario, a contract is introduced to ensure alignment of incentives between the representative and the tenant. The questionnaire and the modelling shows that if no incentivized contract is written the representative always benefits from engaging in conflicting business and, regardless of the conflict of interest and extra benefit to the representative, the tenant always benefits from hiring the representative. However, introducing a contract to align incentives it is shown that there exists a break even point at which the representative starts to benefit from not engaging in business with conflicting interests. Moreover, there exists little correlation between awareness and perceived effect, involvement, or premises size. / Real estate firms operating in the field of tenant representation may represent both tenants and landlords. As such their interests might be in conflict with those of the tenants they represent. A questionnaire was created and sent to 800 individuals. 78% of respondents indicated that they are aware of such conflicts. Meanwhile, only 40% of the respondents perceived such conflicts to be positive rather than negative. A game theoretical model showing how a tenant hires a tenant representative was created with three different scenarios, all using data from the questionnaire to mimic reality as closely as possible. In the first scenario, a tenant hires a representative at one occasion only. In the second scenario a tenant is considering to hire the representative for two sequential transactions. In the third scenario, a contract is introduced to ensure alignment of incentives between the representative and the tenant. The questionnaire and the modelling shows that if no incentivized contract is written the representative always benefits from engaging in conflicting business and, regardless of the conflict of interest and extra benefit to the representative, the tenant always benefits from hiring the representative. However, introducing a contract to align incentives it is shown that there exists a break even point at which the representative starts to benefit from not engaging in business with conflicting interests. Moreover, there exists little correlation between awareness and perceived effect, involvement, or premises size.