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東突厥斯坦問題與中共對策研究 / Study of the CCP countermesaures for the East Turkistan issues康四維 Unknown Date (has links)
從歷史淵源而言,「東突厥斯坦」乙詞緣於19世紀沙俄試圖從地理名稱、宗教信仰與民族識別等深層的滲透方式,藉由「泛突厥主義」與「泛伊斯蘭主義」拉攏新疆信仰伊斯蘭教的少數民族,以東突的概念,將之納入已遭其併吞的中亞突厥斯坦地區,復以此話語的界定權,取得全世界對於俄國版地理分隔線的認同。復由於國共內戰時期,蘇聯鼓動成立「東突厥斯坦共和國」,毛澤東亦以「三區革命」稱許之,以期掀起遍地革命火種,給予現代新疆少數民族留下以語言及信仰為基礎的革命建國歷史記憶。
從中國的內政視野,政治穩定與否是東突問題載浮載沉的關鍵,清末與民國時期的內憂外患時期自不待言。中共建政之初,對少數民族採取相對溫和的社會主義改造政策,漸次形成了認同的政治文化,然而卻隨著左右傾路線發展遭到破壞;雖然1989年中共實施經濟改革後,新疆少數民族亦從中獲利,但幅度始終跟不上漢族的移入者,以致無論是民族關係、經濟關係乃至政治關係上均惡化為破碎的政治文化,即漢族始終自認是政策利多的給予者,而少數民族則自視為被剝奪者與受害者。1991年蘇聯解體之後,中亞五國獨立對新疆少數民族造成磁吸效應,成為東突議題再起的火種。然自江澤民上台之後,對於東突治理的基調仍採取軍事過硬的鎮壓手段,並未從根本解決少數民族的問題,以致民族融合更加困難,暴力衝突的數量與規模屢創新高。
從區域安全角度,新疆與其隔鄰的中亞自古以來就是伊斯蘭、儒家、斯拉夫與佛教等四大文明邊緣的交會破碎區,少數遊牧民族逐水草而居的生活型態更打破國家之間的界線,伊斯蘭宗教信仰與突厥方言的識別取代了國家認同。以致本地區所謂的認同兼具有脆弱性與包容性。因此,自古以來外在強權對於本地區並不刻意建立有形的實質統治,而是透過優勢文化或軟實力滲透,讓區域內的少數民族對強勢帝權國家產生有形與無形依賴,前者是物質與經濟力量,後者是文化與心理作用。兩相交替,造成被影響國家邊境少數民族出現認同危機。過去是沙俄與前蘇聯藉此覬覦中國的領土,現今則有美國、歐洲乃至日本加入競逐天然資源蘊藏豐富的中亞地區,以各種優厚的條件,取得天然資源開發特許權。
從治理成果評估,新疆少數民族、東突議題與中共政權之間不僅在中國大陸境內出現認同分離現象,並隨著全球資訊化的發展,使得國內問題惡化為國際議題。衝突雙方藉由印象管理、符號黏合等方式,在各自的舞台上展示政治訴求。雖然在以主權國家為主體的國際體系中,東突組織屈居下風;然而受到網際網穿透性、民族宗教關懷,或者,如中共政權所認定之「國際陰謀」作用,使得部分東突組織與成員雖然不足以影響大局,但仍透過相關議題在特定國際社會場域形成動靜觀瞻之國際影響。 / From the historical aspect, Russia mixed the concepts of geography, religion and nation to establish the title of “East-Turkistan” in 19th century, and then attracted the minorities of Xinjiang into her Center Asia provinces by the ideas of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism. By the power of discourse, Russia’s new map about the East-Turkistan got the recognitions in the world. In 1944, the eve of Chinese Civil War, Soviet Union supported the Xinjiang minorities to establish the “Republic of East-Turkistan”. Mao Zedong praised it “Three Regions Revolution” to combine the spirit of revolution in the China Mainland. All these give the modern Xinjiang minorities fresh founding memory till now.
Tracing the development of Chinese internal affairs, there are significant relations between the issues of East-Turkistan and domestic political stable. It goes without saying the worse situation during the late Qing dynasty and the early Republic of China (ROC). In the beginning of People’s Republic of China (PRC) regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) taking the warm socialism reform policies, got the Xinjiang minorities’ identity and formed the unify political culture, which been broken by following political conflicts in a short time. In 1978, the CCP promoted the economic reform policies, the Xinjiang minorities got some profit from it, but the earnings could not compare with the Han immigrations. All of those led the ethnic, economic and political relations becoming a cracked political culture. In other words, the Han thought themselves as givers of the profit, but the Xinjiang minorities felt been exploited. The independent tide of the five former Central Asia Republics after dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 produced the magnetic effect to Xinjiang minorities and stimulated the revival of East-Turkistan issues. Since Jiang Zemin, the Secretary General of CCP still compressed the problem by military means in 1992; the ethnic integration in Xinjiang becomes more difficult. The number of violence accidents hits higher and higher level.
According to the regional security, Xinjiang and Central Asia locate at the crossroad of four civilizations, including Islam, Confucius, Slavs and Buddhism. In addition to the living style of nomads breaking the boundaries in this area, the Islamic belief and Turkic dialect take place the national identity, which are full of the vulnerability and tolerance. The outside superpowers penetrate this area by excellent culture and soft power instead of creating functional institutions, causing the crisis of identity or loyalty. For example, the Russia and Soviet Union invaded the vast land of Xinjiang in the 19th; the US, Europe and Japan rapidly join the great competition of natural resources in Central Asia nowadays.
Evaluation the policy of CCP toward East-Turkistan is not easy. This is not only the identity crisis in China, but also transfers into the international field. Both sides take the strategies of impression management and exegetical bonding to show their political appeals. Although the realistic international system is composed by the sovereignty states obstructed the East Turkistan organizations, which still take advantages of internet, ethnic and religious methods to attract some specific concerns.
This study found that:
First, the proper noun “East Turkistan” does not created by the Uyghur themselves, but by the Russia in the 19th. In addition, The Republic of East Turkistan (1944-1949) organized by many minorities of Xinjiang, not by Uyghur only. Therefore, the Uyghur can’t be referred to the East Turkistan totally.
Second, the definition of East Turkistan problem is rebellion or terrorist attack is decided by the Chinese central government. The Republic of China thought it as the Soviet Union agitated the local minorities’ armed rebellion. The CCP took the same viewpoints before 1990s. While, the CCP highlights the terrorism about the East Turkistan’s issues that got few recognition from the US and UN after September 11 attack. Although the change let the CCP wins tiny interest in a short period, the foreign countries use the excuse of human rights and against radical anti-terrorism strategy to intervene the CCP domestic issues.
Third, the exile Uyghur does not get the general agreement about resistance movement and the core attitude toward the CCP. Those are the obstacles for the exile Uyghur to form the unify action and power.
Forth, the CCP always declares to the world that the Xinjiang Uyghur relates closely with the East Turkistan terrorism organizations. That enrages some Uyghur to take fierce actions against the CCP. Now the most important duty for the CCP is to find a balance between the removals of terrorism label from the Uyghur and increasing the budget for the anti-terrorism mission.
Fifth, the appeals of Rebiya Kadeer and the overseas Uyghur groups which she leads do not want to establish an independent state. Instead, she struggles to ask a higher autonomy. The idea is familiar to the Soviet republics, but refused by the CCP.
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