Doctor of Philosophy / History / Michael Krysko / David R. Stone / This dissertation examines the shifting patterns of naval reform and the implementation of foreign technology in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union from Alexander III’s ascension to the Imperial throne in 1881 up to the outset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. During this period, neither the Russian Imperial Fleet nor the Red Navy had a coherent, overall strategic plan. Instead, the expansion and modernization of the fleet was left largely to the whims of the ruler or his chosen representative. The Russian Imperial period, prior to the Russo-Japanese War, was characterized by the overbearing influence of General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who haphazardly directed acquisition efforts and systematically opposed efforts to deal with the potential threat that Japan posed. The Russo-Japanese War and subsequent downfall of the Grand Duke forced Emperor Nicholas II to assert his own opinions, which vacillated between a coastal defense navy and a powerful battleship-centered navy superior to the one at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. In the Soviet era, the dominant trend was benign neglect, as the Red Navy enjoyed relative autonomy for most of the 1920s, even as the Kronstadt Rebellion of 1921 ended the Red Navy’s independence from the Red Army. M. V. Frunze, the People’s Commissar of the Army of Navy for eighteen months in 1925 and 1926, shifted the navy from the vaguely Mahanian theoretical traditions of the past to a modern, proletarian vision of a navy devoted to joint actions with the army and a fleet composed mainly of submarines and light surface vessels. As in the Imperial period, these were general guidelines rather than an all-encompassing policy. The pattern of benign neglect was shattered only in 1935, when Stalin unilaterally imposed his own designs for a mighty offensive fleet on the Soviet military, a plan that was only interrupted by the outbreak of World War II.

M.A. (History) / In 1985 the world took renewed interest in the Soviet Union with the ascendency of its dynamic new leader Mikhail Gorbachev. His policies of glasnost and perestroika made an unprecedented impact within the Soviet Union and the Western world. As a result of all the attention Gorbachev's restructuring received, and the subsequent drama and disintegration of the Yeltsin "take-over", interest in the two leaders who preceded Gorbachev, i.e. Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, waned considerably. Andropov and Chernenko, together with Brezhnev, were often perceived as a trio of ineffectual old men, endeavouring to keep together a tottering Soviet system. While this perception may be appropriate to Brezhnev in the latter decade of his rule, and to a lesser extent to Chernenko, it is not a justified evaluation of Yuri Andropov's leadership. While he came from the same dispensation and was a contemporary of theirs, he set out with determination and dedication to bring new life into the fossilized system he inherited from Brezhnev. Andropov was a highly intelligent and competent person who had a long and varied political career behind him when he became Secretary General. He had been a member of the CPSU for more than four decades and during this time he served as Komosomol leader, Ambassador, Secretary, Chief Ideologist and headed the KGB for 15 years. In each of these capacities he strived for excellence and conducted himself with integrity. (Dissidents who had dealings with him during his period in the KGB may be of a different opinion, however.) When Andropov took over from Brezhnev, the Soviet system did not correspond to his ideals of Socialism. Over the decades and especially during the last stagnant years of Brezhnev's rule, corruption had become rife in the Soviet Union and it appeared to be entrenched in every aspect of Soviet life. The situation was aggravated by the gigantic bureaucracy which was not in favour of change as it was well-entrenched and elitist. Resistance to change had had a paralyzing effect on all previous endeavours. However daunting the task seemed to be, Andropov set about fighting corruption on every level. Corruption went against the grain of his puritan personality and even more importantly, against his perception of the ideal Socialist system. It was often alleged that Andropov's anti-corruption campaign was merely a mechanism with which to eliminate opponents and attain power. There is some truth in this, but it was not his primary reason for trying to eradicate corruption. He did achieve power through eliminating corrupt officials, but even when he had reached the ultimate position, a sound administration remained a priority for him. Indeed, the fact that he was not selective in this process reflects his determination in this regard. Even very high officials, persons within the Kremlin and members of the Brezhnev family itself were not spared. He not only fought corruption but strived to upgrade social, and labour discipline in the Soviet system. A strict disciplinarian himself, he saw many of the negative aspects within the system reflected in the lives and attitudes of the Soviet citizens. This led him to try to install discipline as a way of life and he stressed a high work ethic. However,Andropov must not be perceived one-dimensionally as the ex-KGB chief using police methods on a civilian population. His chief priority in his internal policy was to rectify and improve the declining Soviet economy. The gross corruption that existed had a negative effect on the economy, so eradicating corruption was a prerequisite for economic recovery. As a staunch Marxist-Leninist, he believed that any economic reforms had to be brought about within the strict framework of Socialist principles. He never queried the validity or superiority of the Socialist system and he ascribed the economic ills not to the system itself but to the way it was functioning. He never deviated from Socialist principles and indeed repeatedly warned against the dangers of bringing about changes alien to the nature of Socialism. He was in favour of the centrally planned system but not of the rigidity and corruption that had become part of it. His ideal was for greater flexibility and greater participation with more input from worker, manager and minister. He believed each individual should take full responsibility for the aspect of production or service he was involved in. Only if the total creative force of the masses could be released could the system function as it was originally intended to. The pillars on which this could be achieved were greater democratization and decentralization.

The goal of this research is to discover Shostakovich's inspiration and motivation for writing the Twenty-Four Preludes and Fugues. Through the in-depth research of the cycle, this thesis will discuss the different aspects of the unique harmonic ambiguity of both the preludes and the fugue subjects so that readers understand Shostakovich's language of musical communication. Shostakovich lived during a transitional period in the history of Russia when totalitarianism was being challenged. The research will also explore how the political environment influenced his composition during those years. / by Jihong Park. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2012. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2012. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

This thesis addresses the question of how and why the function of regional organisations varies in different areas of the world. It contributes with insights from the post-Soviet space. A theoretically informed empirical study examines how two former Soviet republics conceptualise the function of two regional organisations: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (GUAM). The literature agrees that the two like other organisations in the post-Soviet space do not produce integration or other forms of regional governance. Nevertheless, the member states continue to actively participate in these organisations. The thesis inquires to which end the states continue their membership. The analytical perspective examines how the member states’ conceptualisations of an organisation’s function depend on the domestic political regimes. The thesis considers two members of the CIS and GUAM. One, Azerbaijan, has a hybrid regime with an authoritarian shape. The other, Ukraine, has a hybrid regime with stronger affinity towards democracy. It is argued that policy-makers conceptualise the function of a regional organisation according to the patterns of rule in their domestic political regimes. The ruling elite’s conceptualisation may diverge from the stated function of the organisation, if the stated function is not compatible with the domestic political regime.

Structure, organisation, an idea of esprit de corps, and hierarchy characterised the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Throughout the history of the Soviet Union only the Soviet Armed Forces had the potential to rival the CPSU in those qualities and were able to be an organised locus for potential opposition. A sense of professionalism was instilled in the Soviet Armed Forces, not only from those ‘Red Commanders’ of the Revolution and Civil War, but also from those junior, noncommissioned officers who were holdovers from the tsarist regime. The primary focus of this study is on the immediate post-Stalinist era while Nikita Khrushchev was First Secretary of the CPSU. Bridled by Stalin’s hold over strategic and armed forces policy, after his death, the Soviet Armed Forces became an institution that illustrated a strong sense of military professionalism, while at the same time serving the Soviet regime. With a focus on five case studies that occurred during the Khrushchev era 1953-1964, this thesis argues that the military attempted to remain apolitical throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Previous studies of Soviet civil-military relations have focused on the levels of cooperation or competition between the CPSU and the Soviet armed forces. This study argues however, that the ebb and flow of that relationship can be explained by the selection of personalities, or agents, by Khrushchev to posts of military command. Officers were promoted based on several factors. However, Khrushchev increasingly promoted officers to positions of command who he deemed were more personally loyal to him and were willing to put that loyalty above their duty to the Soviet armed forces. Khrushchev chose personal loyalty over an officer’s military professionalism and expertise when appointing them to posts at the Ministry of Defence, the Soviet General Staff, and to the command posts in the branches of the Soviet military and key military districts around the Soviet Union.

In January 1912, the Bolsheviks became a separate Party, as opposed to being merely a faction of the RSDLP. Lenin's initial problem was to convince both the leaders of the Second International and his own middle echelon leaders inside Russia that Bolshevism was distinct from Menshevism. This proved difficult before August 1914. The War made the distinction clearer, but also gave rise to an international tendency, with support inside the Bolshevik Party, to the Left even of Lenin. Inside Russia too, joint work with SR Maximalists fostered a kind of Left Populist Bolshevism among some of the Party rank and file. After the February Revolution, the Right Bolsheviks were pushing for a reunification with the Mensheviks, the Left Populist Bolsheviks began to organise nationally and, as the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee lacked authority, the Party was on the verge of a split. Lenin was urgently recalled from abroad. His intervention in the faction fight marked the end of one period of Party history and the beginning of the next. For the first time, the Party leadership was on the spot, and this contact with the rank and file enabled Lenin to clarify and develop ideas he had been formulating in his disputes abroad. The result was a new policy for the Party, quite unmistakeably distinct from Menshevism.

The thesis examines the influence of external advice on domestic reform in a post-communist state following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As an example of this, the research analyses the role of international assistance in the reform of public administration in Ukraine in the period 2000 to 2012, with particular reference to the relationship between the national and sub-national tiers of government. Two empirical case studies, on fiscal decentralisation and regional policy, are employed to provide an in-depth analysis of reform programmes introduced by the Government of Ukraine and an examination of the contribution of external advice to each. The thesis draws on concepts from Institutional Theory, Comparative Politics and Development Studies to explain the interaction between external donors and the domestic recipients of their advice. It is argued that international assistance to public administrative reform in Ukraine is a form of normative institutional isomorphism involving the deliberate transfer of models of state institutions from donor countries where they are regarded as good practice. The findings of the case studies indicate the narrow circumstances in which this transaction may lead to short-term progress with reform, through the establishment of a policy transfer network linking domestic and external actors. However the case studies also demonstrate that in the longer term both these attempts at reform, and the international advice which contributed to them, failed to achieve a sustained outcome. Employing the political economy analysis of development aid the thesis argues that the international community bears a large share of the responsibility for this owing to the technocratic nature of assistance programmes and their limited engagement with the political realities of reform processes.

The purpose of this thesis is to establish the contribution of the Soviet weekly, Literaturnaya gazeta, to the debunking of official dogmas during the Brezhnev years. Launched in 1967, the second section of Literaturnaya gazeta has frequently been dismissed as a mere safety valve, highly controlled by the authorities, to placate the educated middle classes demoralized by the conservative backlash. It is argued in this study that, although the paper accepted the political parameters of the post-Thaw conservative leadership, as evinced, in particular, by the extreme limitations of the economic debates and the absence of any material investigating the country’s Stalinist past, it nevertheless succeeded in promoting values which ran counter to the official ideology. The paper reflected the demoralization of Soviet society and its inability to change within the existing structures. Soviet society emerged as being morally corrupt, riddled with individualism, suspicion and petty authoritarianism. Individuals were shown at the mercy of faceless bureaucracies and overpowered by a judiciary system dominated by the state procuracy. The paper actively promoted a more individual-centred type of society by overtly challenging the collectivist ethos, campaigning for the recognition of consumer rights and arguing the case for a fairer judiciary system.

This thesis is concerned with analysing the available data on grain production and its utilisation from the time when the earliest grain statistics became available in pre-revolutionary Russia until the eve of mass transformation of Soviet agriculture that was associated with mass collectivisation in 1929. The pre-revolutionary period and post revolutionary period are treated separately in two separate parts of the thesis. In each part I describe the methods of collecting and organising statistics related to the production and utilisation of grain. I discuss the circumstances in which these statistics were gathered and I attempt to assess the reliability of these data and place them in a more meaningful and more comparative form. I then present an account of the available works that have attempted to analyse the balance of grain production and its utilisation. I conclude by making my own assessment of the balance and compare it with the general conceptions held on the nature of the grain problem. I conclude that the balance of grain production and utilisation was a highly complex phenomenon dependent upon the inter-relationship of demographic, economic and agronomic factors that differed from region to region and from time to time. The full complexity of these inter-relationships was little understood by the political leadership of the time.

This thesis explores dissident theatre in East Central Europe during the second half of the Cold War (1964-1989). Contextualised within the discussion of individual theatrical and performance cultures and practices in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and The German Democratic Republic, it examines how theatre was used to subvert the dominant ideologies and dissent from the status quos in these countries. It establishes a framework that addresses the divergences between Anglo-American political theatre and Eastern Bloc dissident theatre, and discusses the necessity of considering the work of subcultural and subversive artists when analysing work of this kind. The core chapters discuss the theatrical and dramatic techniques, and the intention of the artists with regards to the work itself and to audience interpretation and response in the plays and performances of Václav Havel (Czechoslovakia), Theatre of the Eighth Day (Poland) and Autoperforationsartisten (East Germany). Further, these chapters demonstrate the significant differences in the ways dissident theatre and performance was conceptualised and staged. This thesis also analyses similarities in the theoretical and philosophical motivations for the work of the artists, and the development of ‘second’ or ‘parallel’ societies as a result of the performances.