In the last three decades of the 19th century small groups composed of primarily skilled, male workers in Petersburg factories developed and refined a specific form of worker identity, that of the worker-intelligent. This identity was the product of a combination of an ideal conceptualisation of proletarian man derived from readings of western socialist literature and ideas introduced into the workers’ environment by members of the radical intelligenty alongside their material experience of work in the rapidly developing industries of the capital. Seeking to appropriate the ‘intelligence’ of their radical intelligentsia mentors to create ‘Russian Bebels’, from the early 1870s small groups of workers aspired to develop their own worker organisations to give voice to the specific needs, demands and assumed aspirations of the emerging working-class within an autocratic society that maintained the fiction that a specific industrial working-class did not exist. Whilst workers enthusiastically welcomed the intelligentsia as bearers of the knowledge essential to construct their own specific identity, the process of identity creation frequently led to power struggles with the intelligentsia over the latter’s role and control of knowledge. It is in the often contested relationships between workers and intelligentsia that vital clues emerge as to how workers perceived themselves and others within the worker-class. Within this contested arena the radical worker-intelligenty frequently articulated their independence from the intelligentsia who they frequently regarded as a temporary ally, essential to satisfy their initial thirst for knowledge and to fulfil certain technical tasks, but who eventually should be subordinate to the workers’ movement that workers alone were capable of leading. Although workers eagerly embraced the revolutionary ideals received from the intelligenty, these were processed and reconstructed in terms of a worker-hegemony in the revolutionary process, taking entirely literally the dictum that ‘the liberation of the workers must be a cause for the workers themselves.’ This represented the essence of the worker-intelligenty belief system and, when taken in conjunction with their conviction that the mass of workers remained ‘backward,’ incapable of effecting their own liberation, produced a strongly held belief that it was incumbent on enlightened workers to act as advocates of the whole class, irrespective of the degree to which the mass of workers conformed to their vision of the ideal revolutionary worker. These early Petersburg workers’ organisations are of historical importance as from their inception they articulated a specific ‘worker’ ideology opposed to both the political regime and emerging Russian industrial capitalism, an opposition that would subsequently be transformed in Soviet Russia into an historical narrative that presented them as a vanguard for the working-class and the precursors of the Soviet ‘new man.’ In the process of fusing of the mind of the intelligenty within the body of a worker, the first generations of worker- intelligenty consistently sought to demonstrate in practice their own revolutionary primacy. Painfully aware of the disparity between their ideal proletarian man and the reality of the ‘backwardness’ of the mass of their fellow workers, the early worker-intelligenty developed and nurtured their own particular institution - the workers’ circle, kruzhok, an institution which simultaneously reinforced their own sense of identity and worth whilst providing a space in which they could receive their necessary enlightenment from the radical intelligentsia. Rather than viewing workers as passive objects, the Petersburg worker-intelligenty was instrumental in its own creation, throughout the period under discussion acting as a revolutionary subject in its own right, to a significant extent determining the nature and content of study involving the intelligenty, establishing clear organisational frameworks to govern relationships with intelligenty groups, and, critically, seeking opportune moments to enter the public sphere and declare their presence as workers, revealing themselves as a social force to be recognised. In the historiography of the revolutionary working-class in Russia these worker-led organisations have been largely ignored or subsumed under the rubric of the name of a leading member of the radical intelligenty associated with workers’ circles, as for example in the so-called Brusnev organisation. For a long period Soviet and western historians privileged the role of the radical intelligentsia, reflecting competing ideological biases that in the case of the Soviet interpretation viewed workers as a dependent category requiring enlightenment from an external Marxist party, whilst much western research focused on ideological debates amongst intelligenty ‘leaders’ and/or incipient reformist and non- revolutionary tendencies amongst worker activists. Although in more recent time a number of historians have explored the autonomous nature of worker activism in 1905 and 1917, whilst others have explored the cultural attitudes and beliefs of workers, the first specifically worker-led organisations created by worker-intelligenty have been largely ignored. What remains missing is a study that addresses the actual historical practice of the worker-intelligenty during its formative years and how it sought to give form to its self- realisation and express its received knowledge as the advanced representative of its class. The discourse of class not only gave life to the worker-intelligenty but critically guided its first at times uncertain footsteps towards fulfilling what it had come to believe was its ‘historic’ role.

The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921 was a direct consequence of the ideological objectives pursued by the belligerents. Ideology shaped the political agenda and the diametrically opposed war aims of both states, and was implemented through the foreign policy, diplomatic negotiation and military engagements pursued. This proved to be the principal obstacle to the establishment of cordial relations. As western democracy and Russian Marxism battled it out, war was inevitable. Externally, the Paris Peace Conference provided the necessary conditions for the resumption of traditional Russian-Polish hostilities, whilst the Allied States consistently demonstrated their absolute inability to directly influence either the development, or outcome, of the conflict. Redressing the balance of historiography, this thesis includes a greater examination of the conflict from the perspective of the Soviet regime. This firmly controlled the Russian decision-making process. By charting the war, it becomes clear that both states deliberately pursued a dual offensive: traditional diplomatic negotiation and military campaign as conditions dictated. However, in addition, Soviet Russia developed a unique and innovative, revolutionary, agit-prop, diplomatic medium. This enabled adept Soviet diplomats to win the majority of diplomatic battles during the conflict, although often negotiating from a militarily weak position. Nevertheless, the regime ultimately failed in its objective: to ignite socialist revolution in western Europe. The mistaken Soviet decision in July 1920 to cross the ethnographic border to forcefully sovietise Poland, in opposition to Marxist doctrine, irreversibly altered the complexion of the war and proved its pivotal turning point. This culminated politically with the short-lived establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee in Białystok, and militarily, with the decisive defeat of the Red Army at the Battle of Warsaw. It is now certain that the Red Army offensive into Poland in July 1920 aimed not only at the sovietisation of Poland, but at spreading the socialist revolution to Western Europe and overthrowing the Versailles settlement. The European revolutionary upsurge had largely extinguished during the previous year and in August 1920, Communist ideology ultimately failed to inspire the vast majority of the Polish population. Thus, by utilising the Soviet military to secure its war aims, Lenin and the Politburo inadvertently signed the death-warrant of socialist revolution in Poland at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Across East Central Europe, postcommunist transformation is being effected through the discourses of gender. It is in this context that debate around abortion has surfaced repeatedly in Poland. This is an empirical case study of Polish postcommunist transformation centred on gender and in particular, on abortion debate. It focuses on the connection between discourses of Polish nationhood, democracy and gender, contributing to the fields of gender and postcommunism, gender and nation, and comparative reproductive politics. Using a discourse analysis methodology, this thesis analyses Polish abortion debate centred around the 1996 liberalisation of abortion amendment, a ‘moment’ previously neglected in scholarly research. It considers three sites at which abortion debate surfaces, Parliament, press reportage and opinion polls, and analyses how each constructs its role as mechanism and instrument of democracy through its participation in abortion debate. Abortion is a symbolic issue used to create, sustain and contest political identities, a site through which nationalist pasts and futures are imagined, and through which democratic political projects are articulated. Thus abortion is a key symbolic stand-in issue that represents competing democratic and nation-building projects, a site where politics is ‘made’: abortion thus comes to emblematise psotcommunist Polish transformation. Through their participation in Polish abortion debate, Sejm, media and opinion polls legitimate their claims to be primary definers of the ‘new’ Poland, claiming key rolls as mediators between ‘politics’ and the ‘people’. Gender is crucial to the nation-building projects constructed through abortion at all three sites, however this dimension is often suppressed. The thesis further argues that there are grounds for a limited and partial feminist recuperation of the liberalisation ‘moment’. However, it concludes, whilst abortion is fundamentally about women’s equal citizenship rights, having very real and material consequences for Polish women, debate around the liberalisation amendment does not principally revolve around gender.

The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to the debate on the reasons behind Russia's poor economic performance in its first decade after the fall of communism, by examining the role of IMF economic programs in the reform process.In particular, we are interested in the failure of neo-classical models of the market economy, upon which economic reform programs were based, to predict the outcomes in Russia. The purpose of the work is to offer a number of theoretical models which incorporate certain characteristics, such as political and economic motivations of both the IMF and Russian government, large-scale public sector corruption, a substantial underground economy, and a weak tax base, and which are capable predicting the resulting failings in the IMF-Russia economic reform program. In chapter 2, we present a theory of conditionality in which the recipient, aware that the lender faces political and economic motivations in the conditional development lending process, undertakes a game with the lender in which the recipient attempts to undertake the least amount of compliance that guarantees it future loans. There is an exogenous conflict between economics and politics within the lending agency that determines its degree of tolerance for policy (non-) compliance. We then analyse how the donor, in an attempt to regulate its internal conflict, may adopt "rules of thumb" in the lending process which pre-define the actions it will take in response to the lender's level of compliance. The recipient's strategy depends on the payoffs it obtains from the actions available to the lender under each "rule of thumb". We examine how the IMF-Russia relationship from 1992-2002 has elements of the games we model. In chapter 3, we model corruption a proportional tax on labour income in a three-sector economy with a corrupt bureaucracy, a legitimate private sector, and a shadow economy, and examine how tighter fiscal policies may result in a rise in corruption. The rise in corruption negatively affects legitimate private sector employment and output. We suggest that the Russian economy has a similar three sector structure and analyse the impact of reduced spending and increased taxation on corruption and employment. In chapter 4, we modify Alesina and Tabellini's (1987) model of time inconsistency to allow for a weak tax base and then apply it to post-communist Russia. In particular we examine two non-consecutive time periods in which, for different reasons, public debt could not be used to finance the government's budget deficit: 1992-94 and post August 17 1998. We suggest that Russia did in fact move from one sub-optimal position to another, and we raise questions about the optimality of Russia's current monetary policies. In chapter 5, we examine the optimality of monetary policy in the presence of bureaucratic corruption. We model corruption as a proportional tax on firm revenue and a positive function of the official tax rate. The higher the official tax, the higher the corruption tax levied by public bureaucrats in order to supplement their decreasing official net wage, and the lower is output. We find that under both discretion and commitment, inflation is higher, and output and taxation are lower, than when there is no corruption.

This study compares German memory of life in the German Democratic Republic with Russian memory of life in the Soviet Union, as represented and created within fictional and autobiographical narratives of childhood, published since the collapse of each regime. The chosen texts are, to varying degrees, fictionalized and/or autobiographical. A comparison between German and Russian narratives is particularly interesting because the socialist past is remembered very differently in each country’s public discourse and culture. An examination of narratives about childhood allows for a complex relationship between the post-socialist present and the socialist past to emerge. I study the texts and their reception, in conjunction with an analysis of the dominant ways of remembering the socialist past circulating within German and Russian society and culture. This allows the analysis to go beyond a straightforward comparison between the representations of the socialist past in the two groups of texts, to also explore how those representations are interpreted and received. It also demonstrates how the surrounding memory cultures appear to be producing quite different approaches to representing memories of broadly similar socialist childhood experiences. Chapter 1 explores the role of literary texts in revealing and shaping both individual and collective memory with a review of relevant research in the field of memory studies. Chapter 2 draws on existing scholarship on post-socialist memory in German and Russian society and culture in order to identify dominant trends in the way the socialist past has been remembered and represented in the two countries since 1990/1. The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 reveals a more detailed picture of the complexities and ambiguities inherent in looking back at childhood under socialist rule through the example of the chosen texts, and in the ways they are received by critics and by readers (in reviews posted online). I demonstrate that, in line with the surrounding memory cultures, questions of how the socialist past should be remembered are a more central concern in the German texts and their reception than in the Russian texts and reception. I show, however, that the nature of the Soviet past is often portrayed indirectly in the Russian texts and I explore how critics and readers respond to these portrayals.

Prof. LWF Grundlingh

Citizens who lived in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s did so amid a changing political atmosphere. For their extreme patience, they were rewarded with new policies (after 1985) that promised less censorship and more openness from the government to the people. The Soviet woman received special attention and promises in the shape of new reforms in the social spheres of education and employment. As often happens with political change, there were unintended results. As the policy of glasnost' or "openness" attempted to create and provide new possibilities for women, the unforeseen byproduct of the change was that a non-idyllic and even subversive female emerged in literature and society. This thesis will explore the prevailing cultural attitudes surrounding women before glasnost', as well as glasnost' itself and its policies affected the cultural attitudes as they related to the traditional woman's role in society. The thesis will also examine how glasnost' enabled the literary debut of the subversive female character, and foster this previously forbidden type and other prohibited topics. Finally, the discussion will turn to the immediate aftermath of glasnost' with some observations about the stunted position of the Russian woman in literature, and in society, after the breakup of the Soviet Union.This thesis will include brief studies of published shorter works-all by contemporary female Soviet writers of the 1980s-and their fictional characters. As the gender specific deep-seated beliefs, proverbs, laws and anecdotes connected to the "suggested" ideal life of the virtuous Soviet females are analyzed, the thesis will show how these fictional characters' behaviors directly and indirectly allowed Russian contemporary female writers to challenge taboo subjects within Russia through a new literary category of alternative women's prose.

Domestic, not foreign affairs drove Soviet policy on Jewish emigration during the period of 1968-1989. This study challenges the prevailing view that fluctuating levels of exit from the USSR were correlated to the climate of relations between the USA and the USSR. The analysis also considers Soviet-German emigration for comparative perspective. Extensive historical background, with special emphasis on Soviet nationality policy is provided.

Between 1957 and 1964 the Soviet Union sought to export to West Africa a model of economic and social development. Moscow’s policy was driven by the conviction that socialism was a superior economic system, and could be replicated in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. However, Soviet confidence in the project was undermined by the unreliability of local leaders, and then by the Congo crisis. The setback in West Africa taught the Soviet leadership crucial lessons, including the importance of supporting ideologically reliable leaders, and the necessity of building military strength to bolster intervention. Combining Soviet and Ghanaian sources with those more readily available in the UK and the US, this thesis shows the importance of modernisation of the Third World for Moscow’s foreign policy during the Khrushchev era, and contributes to the new sets of literature on the cold war in the third world, and on the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.

This thesis contributes primarily to answering two broad questions within the current scholarship on ‘everyday life’ in the Soviet Union: (1) How did Soviet citizens perceive, understand, and adapt to the 1930s? And (2) What were the principal associational structures of Soviet society in these years? These issues are not easily separated, with the second constituting a vital element of the first. They are therefore explored simultaneously in the first three chapters, which examine, respectively, the nature and possibilities of joke-telling in the 1930s; the principal targets of that humour; and, thirdly, its implicit assumptions, values and thematic proclivities. The fourth chapter concentrates on the structure and nature of sociability in the 1930s, and the final chapter incorporates those conclusions in order to address the larger question of how Soviet citizens came to understand and adapt to life in these years – for they did so together, rather than alone as old totalitarian theories of ‘atomisation’ proposed. The thesis makes two principal arguments. Firstly, all unofficial associational ties in this decade were necessarily underlaid by (and hence reliant upon) trust; therefore, the fundamental social unit in the 1930s was the trust group (small groups of citizens bound together by trust). Secondly, citizens adapted to the 1930s via an intricate blend of acceptance and criticism or, rather, of acceptance through the process of criticism. By criticising that which could not be changed, ‘ordinary’ Soviet citizens could retain some agency of their own and shared these interpretive acts with those whom they trusted. Rather than forming a critical ‘resistance’ or ‘dissent’, these processes created a pathway to adaptation without becoming simply crushed or brainwashed by ideology, and simultaneously shaped a complex, mutually affective interaction between popular values and official ideology.