Analysing documents produced by the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon, the thesis examines the role of intelligence assessment in U.S. Vietnam policy during the period between December 1961 and February 1965. It investigates intelligence on the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, on the intentions and capabilities of North Vietnam, and on the probable consequences of policy options. The first half of the thesis examines the Vietnam intelligence during the Kennedy administration, following the rise of optimism in 1962 and the intelligence dispute in 1963. The second half of the study explores intelligence developments from the fall of the Diem regime in November 1963 to President Johnson’s decision to take military action against North Vietnam in February 1965. The study suggests that intelligence deficiencies played a significant role in both the failure of counterinsurgency in the first half of the 1960s and in the decision for direct military intervention in 1965. The thesis also demonstrates that, rather than simply being a result of technical weaknesses, the lack of robust intelligence reflected wider problems of Vietnam policy, including political pressures, ideological contexts and the absence of strategic consensus.

The purpose of this study was to determine if there is a relationship between dogmatism, anxiety, and attitudes toward the Vietnam War, and, in the process of doing so, to test Rokeach's hypothesis of independence of belief structure and content in the contextual atmosphere of recent attitudes toward the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War Scale, Form E of the Dogmatism Scale, and a five-situation version of the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness were administered to 104 male students who were enrolled in introductory psychology classes at North Texas State University. It was hypothesized I. That there would be a significant positive relationship between dogmatism (as measured by the Dogmatism Scale) and anxiety (as measured by a five-situation version of the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness). II. That there would be a significant positive relationship between closed-mindedness (as measured by the Dogmatism Scale) and attitudes toward the Vietnam War (as measured by the Vietnam War Scale). III. That the Hawks would show a significantly higher level of dogmatism than the Doves. IV. That the Hawks would show a significantly higher level of anxiety than the Doves. Hypotheses one, two, and three were supported. Hypothesis number four was in the predicted direction, but was not statistically significant. The conclusion of the study was that a relationship exists between dogmatism, anxiety, and attitudes toward the Vietnam War. It was also concluded that Rokeach's hypothesis of independence of belief structure and content does not apply to the contextual atmosphere of recent attitudes toward the Vietnam War.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. Release of full electronic text on OhioLINK has been delayed until June 30, 2012. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-161)

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of History, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. [31-36]).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2006. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-205).

Thesis advisor: Seth Jacobs / Counterinsurgency doctrine, as an intellectual project, began as a response on the part of liberal world powers to the dual crises of decolonization and the Cold War. Unlike earlier means of suppressing rebellions, counterinsurgency sought not to quash, but to channel the revolutionary energies of decolonization into a liberal, developmentalist direction. Counterinsurgency would simultaneously defeat communists and build a new and better society. As early efforts at developmentalist counterinsurgency failed in Vietnam in the early 1960s, the counterinsurgent’s methods and goals changed. The CORDS Project, starting in 1967, replaced the emphasis on building a new society with altering present societies in such a way as to prioritize surveillance and the removal of subversive elements. From its inception, the political visions that counterinsurgency seeks to implement have shifted alongside – and at times prefigured – changes in liberal governance more broadly. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: History.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - James Cook University, 2004. / Typescript (photocopy). Bibliography: leaves [327]-362.

The American South’s cultural distinctiveness has been a central historiographical issue debated by scholars since the first decades of the country’s inception. Implicitly or explicitly, this debate centres largely on one question – why has the South retained its distinct identity for cultural, social, political and economic exclusivity? This thesis examines southern distinctiveness with specific reference to America’s military involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, providing new insights upon an old question. Although a national effort, which encompassed the service over three million men, America’s 16 year involvement in their war against the communist-backed North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Minh/Vietcong (VC) forces was shaped by distinct southern influences attributed to the region’s history and culture. This thesis demonstrates that the southern influence over America’s political, economic and military theatres profoundly shaped the direction and administration of the Vietnam War. Southerners occupied crucial leadership roles throughout the Vietnam war era, including the presidency and Secretary of State, while both the Senate and the House of Representatives were led by men from South of the Mason-Dixon Line.