The "law versus politics" debate is central in the study of the Supreme Court's institutional role in US democracy and law making. Research has sought to determine if the Supreme Court is an unconstrained political actor or if it is constrained by precedent. This dissertation contributes to this debate by theorizing that there is not a direct tradeoff; instead, even a politically motivated Court can be constrained by precedent. Given precedent is an internally imposed norm, what incentive does a politically motivated Supreme Court have to adhere to precedent when it results in outcomes that deviate from the Court's most preferred ideological outcome? There has been a lack of theoretical development and empirical testing that would explain the Court's incentive to adhere to precedent. I argue that even a politically motivated Supreme Court has an interest in adhering to precedent as a means of control over the lower courts. The Court has a role as a principal with the Courts of Appeals acting as an agent. The Supreme Court uses precedent as a standard that guides lower court decision-making in thousands of cases that the Court will never hear. The Supreme Court is willing to sacrifice the dispositional outcome (who wins and who loses) in a given case to issue or adhere to a precedent that will better guide lower court decision-making in a given area. To test this theory, this project will construct an original data set using a new measure of precedent. Specifically, "the law" and "precedent" for a case will be coded in terms of the standard of review. The standard of review can be understood as a precise legal statement of which party has the burden of proof or justification in a given case and the nature of that burden. This is an ordinal measure (coded 0-4) based on the Court's finite legal rules in a given area of law (rational basis, heightened rational basis, intermediate, heightened intermediate and strict). This novel understanding better captures the legal content of court opinions.

This thesis aims to assess the role played by disagreement in the High Court???s constitutional law decisions. It does so firstly by considering the theoretical arguments in favour of allowing expression of dissent and those which urge judicial restraint and observance of precedential values. The tensions between change and conformity, and also the individual and institutional aspects of adjudication, intersect when the Court divides. The complex nature of disagreement on a multimember judicial body is further examined in the context of devising an empirical methodology for the quantification of dissent on the High Court. The thesis selects a period of a little over twenty years for detailed examination. Within that timeframe, it measures the prevalence and nature of disagreement amongst the Justices of the Court, with particular emphasis upon constitutional cases. From these results, various streams of opinion are examined for subsequent significance. In particular, the thesis contrasts the practice of persistent dissent from the Court???s approach to an issue, with those occasions when a minority Justice yields to the demands of stare decisis. The impact of dissent upon the development of the Court???s constitutional interpretation is evaluated. Although the study finds that direct reversals in the law in favour of an earlier dissent occur very rarely, it argues that dissents may still exercise a powerful influence on the Court???s pronouncements. The contribution which minority opinions make to judicial deliberation is to inevitably alter the context of the Court???s decision. Consideration of two specific case studies illustrates that this may result in the law taking a more moderate path or may actually lead to greater efforts by a majority to strengthen the cogency of its approach. In either scenario, dissent plays a far more subtle role than suggested by the myth of a ???Great Dissenter??? and the dramatic redemption of his or her lone opinions. To only assess the value of dissenting judgments against that standard is to fail to appreciate the true nature of their influence in many cases and their importance to the work of the High Court.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2005.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, St. Gallen, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-312) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [286]-321).

Univ., Diss.--Würzburg, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 241 - 252.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Genève, 1938. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [103]-107) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1981. / Description based on print version record. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 137-142).

Zugl.: Tübingen, Univ., Diss., 2009