The fundamental objective of sensor networks underpinning a variety of applications is the collection of reliable information from the surrounding environment. The correctness of the collected data is especially important in applications involving societal welfare and safety, in which the acquired information may be utilized by end-users for decision-making. The distributed nature of sensor networks and their deployment in unattended and potentially hostile environments, however, renders this collection task challenging for both scalar and visual data. In this work we propose and address the twin problem of carrying out and defending against a stealthy attack on the information gathered by a sensor network at the physical sensing layer as perpetrated by a competing hostile network. A stealthy attack in this context is an intelligent attempt to disinform a sensor network in a manner that mitigates attack discovery. In comparison with previous sensor network security studies, we explicitly model the attack scenario as an active competition between two networks where difficulties arise from the pervasive nature of the attack, the possibility of tampering during data acquisition prior to encryption, and the lack of prior knowledge regarding the characteristics of the attack. We examine the problem from the perspective of both the hostile and the legitimate network. The interaction between the networks is modeled as a game where a stealth utility is derived and shown to be consistent for both players in the case of stealthy direct attacks and stealthy cross attacks. Based on the stealth utility, the optimal attack and defense strategies are obtained for each network. For the legitimate network, minimization of the attacker’s stealth results in the possibility of attack detection through established paradigms and the ability to mitigate the power of the attack. For the hostile network, maximization of the stealth utility translates into the optimal attack avoidance. This attack avoidance does not require active communication among the hostile nodes but rather relies on a level of coordination which we quantify. We demonstrate the significance and effectiveness of the solution for sensor networks acquiring scalar and multidimensional data such as surveillance sequences and relate the results to existing image sensor networks. Finally we discuss the implications of these results for achieving secure event acquisition in unattended environments.

This dissertation is a compilation of essays highlighting the usefulness of game theory in understanding socio-economic phenomena. The second chapter tries to provide a reason for the strict codes of conduct that have been imposed on unmarried girls in almost every society at some point of time in its history using tools from classical game theory. If men prefer to marry submissive women, then parents of girls will have an incentive to signal the submissiveness of their daughters in various ways in order to attract better matches. At the same time, parents will find it costlier to signal the submissiveness of girls who are not really submissive. This line of reasoning thus helps us interpret phenomena such as veiling, footbinding, and sequestration of women in general as signals of submissiveness. The third chapter attempts to rationalize some of the ad hoc rules proposed for dividing a bankrupt estate using tools from evolutionary game theory. The ad hoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed in addition to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate be completely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires that no claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. This dissertation tries to show that an ad hoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing long run outcome of Young's [46] evolutionary bargaining model by using certain intuitive rules for the Nash demand game. In the fourth chapter I present a simple model of conflict over inputs in an economy with ill-defined property rights. Agents produce output from the land they hold, which in turn can be allocated to consumption or the production of guns. There is no agency to enforce rights over the initial land holdings, and the future holdings of land are determined using a contest success function that depends on the guns produced by both agents. I characterize the equilibria in which only one, both, and none of the agents produce guns, as a function of the total land and the inequality of initial land holdings for general forms of utility, production, cost, and contest success functions.

Beer Game developed by Slaon School of Management didn¡¦t add price variable into the game. It¡¦s reasons were : (1) As long as there is time delay, it will induce dynamic complexity. (2) If there is price variable, maybe we can¡¦t observe patterns and structure. In the research, we try to add price variable into Beer Game to verify the statement made by Slaon School of Management. Besides, we can explore whether it will influence players¡¦ decisions or not. The learning effects are also we concern about. After a few experiment, althought bullwhip effect is still existing, it¡¦s not much apparent then before. Besides, players are affected by price variables. From discussions after the game, we can find players lack systems thinking, they have misperceptions of feedback and get used to put blame on others. Those learning effects are the same as traditional beer game induced. However, beer game with price variable can conclude many behaviors made by players. To contrast with the panic buying and stock conditions, such as respirators panic buying in 2003, toilet paper price rise caused by pulp cost increased in 2004, players can simulate the real world throuth playing the game. They can reflect and learn, then bring this experience into real life.

Taiwan¡¦s computer game industry has gone through more than a decade. Yet, since the general social appraisal is not optimistic to the industry, very few contributions have been input. Without those who worked in computer game industry led by their interests at the early ages, we could hardly see the current achievements that Taiwan¡¦s computer industry gained. The low social evaluation on computer game workers in Taiwan has become the main reason that caused less success they obtained than computer game workers in the neighbor area, such as Japan and Korean, did. Neither a systemized training program to related workers for game industry nor a close observation to the human resource in the computer game companies we had ever done, and according to the rapidly growth of Taiwan¡¦s computer game industry in recent year, this study here present the poll and interview to human resource divisions of the major computer game enterprises in Taiwan, and hope we can get a better understand to this newly grown industry. All the data stated in this study are provided by computer game enterprises, we could barely see a concrete model of human resource in the field. Due to this industry is still rapidly growing; some of the data might lose its accuracy soon. The study author would like to, still based on the image we see now, here provide his opinion and some suggestions to related education groups and governmental organizations and to the game industry for modifying the current defects, then make the industry mature and better.

Abstract TAIEX Options¡]TXO¡^has been listed and traded for four years , and sttlement account total 48 expiration month contracts , in order to verificate 24 kinds of trade strategies and 502 set of combination trade positions , which can make profit good , the author select 7 Call and 7 Put strick price , which have high trade volumes of each expiration month contract first day closing price , to calculate each one¡¦s profit-loss¡FIn addition , verificate 19292 sets of¡urandom combination positions¡vtest to examine the one of best¡C We can compare and assess to count the best operation trade strategy and position by three propositions , accoding to market situation , The result of verification , the¡usell strangles¡vand ¡usell strddles¡vwere good to others , and selling in-the-money at first and second series Put also has more profit , and the parts of¡urandom combination positions¡vin 48 months , which can reach as high as 41 months profit¡C

Schlüsselseiten aus dem Exemplar der BSB München: 4 Diss. 253. / Signaturformel: A - C4.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor: Bordetsky, Alex. Second Reader: Greenshields, Brian. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Teaming and collaboration of manned and unmanned aircraft. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-61). Also available in print.

Thesis (M. Sc.(Wildlife Management))--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Summaries in English and Afrikaans.

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb 15, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. X. H. Wang Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Where Have All the Shadows Gone is an immersive, interactive, site-specific performance that exists at the intersection between game design and live performance. This performance was crafted to inhabit the architecture and culture of the F. Loren Winship Drama Building located at the University of Texas at Austin. There were four performances and two previews each lasting seventy-five minutes. Live actors began the game by presenting the audience with a problem: a mysterious figure had developed a device to steal people’s shadows. The audience used their cell phones as digital, interactive tools to find and follow clues to uncover their antagonist. The audience solved puzzles that challenged their spatial reasoning, cryptographic skills, and critical thinking. Over the course of the interactive performance the audience coalesced into an intelligent gaming collective. The primary goal of this research is to analyze and devise a methodology for developing a performance that integrates game design with live theatre, as well as to evaluate the resultant performance of Where Have All the Shadows Gone. / text