L’instauration de la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité (QPC) conduit à repenser les rapports entre les juridictions suprêmes : Conseil constitutionnel, Cour de cassation et Conseil d’Etat. Elle met aussi en lumière les spécificités de la fonction de juger – et notamment l’exercice, par le juge, de son pouvoir d’interprétation. De fait, en créant un lien direct entre les trois juridictions suprêmes, la QPC brouille les frontières de leurs compétences respectives et les place dans une situation d’interdépendance qui impacte directement l’étendue et l’exercice de leur pouvoir herméneutique. La QPC s’avère donc être le vecteur – c’est-à-dire à la fois le support, et le révélateur – d’une concurrence très vive entre les interprètes. De ce fait, il n’est pas possible de considérer qu’un juge détient le « dernier mot » pour l’attribution d’un sens à la loi ou à la Constitution – ces deux textes étant conjointement et simultanément interprétés par l’ensemble des juges du système. Le contrôle de constitutionnalité a posteriori met ainsi en lumière l’existence d’un processus interprétatif à la fois continu et inachevé. L’étude de ce contentieux permet donc de mieux comprendre le travail herméneutique effectué par le juge – en donnant l’occasion de forger le concept d’interprétation normative. / The introduction of the The Priority Preliminary Ruling on the Issue of Constitutionality (QPC) leads to rethinking the relations between the supreme jurisdictions : Constitutional Council, Court of Cassation and Council of State. It also highlights the specificities of the judging’s function- and in particular the exercise by the judge of his interpretation’s power. In fact, by creating a direct link between the three supreme jurisdictions, the QPC blurs the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions and places them in a situation of interdependence that directly impacts the extent and the exercise of their hermeneutical power. Therefore, the QPC turns out to be the vector - that is to say, both the medium and the developer - of a very lively competition between the performers. Thereby, it is not possible to consider that a judge has the "last word" for the attribution of a meaning to the law or the Constitution - these two texts being jointly and simultaneously interpreted by the whole judges of the system. The QPC thus highlights the existence of an interpretive process that is both ongoing and uncompleted. The study of this litigation so lets understand the hermeneutical work done by the judge - by giving the opportunity to forge the concept of normative interpretation.

A supremacia da Constituição exige que a Suprema Corte tenha a última palavra sobre o sentido da Constituição? As Supremas Cortes norte-americana e brasileira afirmam que sim, respaldadas pelo conhecimento convencional. O objetivo principal da tese é demonstrar que esta assertiva é simplesmente equivocada. Será reconstruída a história da expansão do papel político do Judiciário, no âmbito da interpretação constitucional, com vistas a elucidar os seus verdadeiros pressupostos. A evolução do constitucionalismo brasileiro será analisada à luz de tais critérios, para que se possa perceber que só há no Brasil algo parecido com uma supremacia judicial após 1988. Após o exame das críticas institucionais e democráticas, será explorado o potencial da doutrina dos diálogos constitucionais para explicar a realidade das interações entre os Poderes Legislativo e Judiciário na interpretação constitucional, e para prover um suporte normativo que logre reconciliar o fenômeno da judicialização da política com a democracia no Brasil. / The supremacy clause requires that the Supreme Court shall have the last word on constitutional matters? The brazilian and north-american Supreme Courts confirms, endorsed by the traditional wisdom. The thesis aims proving that such statement is mistaken. The history of the global expansion of the judicial power, in refer to the constitutional intepretation, will be reconstructed, in order to clarify its real presuppositions. The brazilian constitutional evolution will be analyzed to prove that before 1988 there was no judicial supremacy in Brazil. After the analysis of the institutional and the democratic criticisms, the potencial of the constitutional dialogues doctrine will be explored to explain the interactions between the legislative and the judicial branches in constitutional interpretation, and its ability to provide a normative basis to reconcile the judicialization of politics with democracy in Brazil.

A supremacia da Constituição exige que a Suprema Corte tenha a última palavra sobre o sentido da Constituição? As Supremas Cortes norte-americana e brasileira afirmam que sim, respaldadas pelo conhecimento convencional. O objetivo principal da tese é demonstrar que esta assertiva é simplesmente equivocada. Será reconstruída a história da expansão do papel político do Judiciário, no âmbito da interpretação constitucional, com vistas a elucidar os seus verdadeiros pressupostos. A evolução do constitucionalismo brasileiro será analisada à luz de tais critérios, para que se possa perceber que só há no Brasil algo parecido com uma supremacia judicial após 1988. Após o exame das críticas institucionais e democráticas, será explorado o potencial da doutrina dos diálogos constitucionais para explicar a realidade das interações entre os Poderes Legislativo e Judiciário na interpretação constitucional, e para prover um suporte normativo que logre reconciliar o fenômeno da judicialização da política com a democracia no Brasil. / The supremacy clause requires that the Supreme Court shall have the last word on constitutional matters? The brazilian and north-american Supreme Courts confirms, endorsed by the traditional wisdom. The thesis aims proving that such statement is mistaken. The history of the global expansion of the judicial power, in refer to the constitutional intepretation, will be reconstructed, in order to clarify its real presuppositions. The brazilian constitutional evolution will be analyzed to prove that before 1988 there was no judicial supremacy in Brazil. After the analysis of the institutional and the democratic criticisms, the potencial of the constitutional dialogues doctrine will be explored to explain the interactions between the legislative and the judicial branches in constitutional interpretation, and its ability to provide a normative basis to reconcile the judicialization of politics with democracy in Brazil.

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.