Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 1999. Graduate Programme in Political Science. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [479]-489). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ56242.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2003. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 204-215).

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Since Plato's time, there have been attempts to show that the generally altruistic way of life is superior to the totally selfish way of life. Drawing upon the conclusions of philosophers and social psychologists, I argue that it is better to have a fairly moral character than a totally selfish one. I first argue that it is possible to have genuinely altruistic motivations (rather than disguised selfish motivations). I then show that both the altruistic and the selfish way of life are genuine choices for rational beings. Next I argue that the nature of values is such that they require reinforcement from others in order for us to verify that what we believe to be values are indeed values. I further argue that values are unattainable for the totally selfish person. Subsequently, I point out that values are necessary for an agent to have a meaningful life, and very likely necessary for a human to be able to have a sense of self. Since most people desire to have a meaningful life and a sense of self, I argue that the benefits possible to the fairly moral person outweigh the benefits possible to the totally selfish one, even if the latter can disguise her selfishness completely.

This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

Many of Plautus' extant plays contain identity problems, the results of comic confusions in identity. The confusion may arise from deliberate deceit through impersonation, or from mistaken identity through ignorance. While mistaken identity features in many Plautine plays, these identity problems are usually brief comical complications arising from the machinations of a crafty slave or from a twist of fate. However, the Captiui, Menaechmi and Amphitruo all contain pervasive identity problems which are complicated and extend throughout the play. Further, all three plays present an unusual identity problem which provides strong contrast to the conventional Plautine problems including the ineligible girl later being found to be of free birth and now available for marriage, or the son and his slave successfully obtaining money from the son's father by trickery and impersonation. On closer examination, it is apparent that in each of these three plays Plautus has explored these identity issues and used them as a vehicle to highlight other significant social and moral issues. In Captiui, the young man who should be eligible for marriage is instead found to be the slave of his own father who has unwittingly mistreated him. In Menaechmi, two identical twin brothers, separated as young boys, who are coincidentally in the same foreign town at the same time and are repeatedly mistaken for one another, with far-reaching consequences. In Amphitruo, two mortals are impersonated by two gods, with identity theft and depersonalisation occurring. In all three plays, the identity problems form an integral part of the play and are explored extensively by Plautus. This dissertation examines the concepts of personal identity as exploited by Plautus in these three plays in the light of concepts of personal identity and the self as found in the works of ancient and modern philosophers, and of contemporary psychologists and sociologists. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2007.

Part One examines the general structure of Kant's System. Chapter I argues that his System cannot be fully understood without appreciating its radically theological orientation. Chapter II introduces the 'principle of perspective', and defines perspective as the 'context of or 'way of considering' a philosophical question and standpoint as the subject-matter which is under consideration. Chapter III suggests that a fixed, architectonic pattern gives Kant's System its 'Gopernican' character. Part Two investigates the epistemological underpinnings of Kant's System. Chapter IV defines his four main perspectives (the transcendental, empirical, logical, and practical) as dealing with the synthetic a priori, the synthetic a posteriori, the analytic a priori, and the analytic a posteriori, respectively. Chapter V applies this perspectival framework to Kant's six primary 'object-terms': 'thing in itself, 'transcendental object', and 'appearance' denote the object as viewed from the transcendental perspective; 'phenomenon', 'negative noumenon', and 'positive noumenon' denote the object as viewed from the empirical perspective. Chapter VT argues that faith in the thing in itself is the necessary starting point for Kant's System. Part Three uses the formal principles established in Parts One and Two to interpret the Critical System itself. Chapters VII-IX regard the three Critiques as systems based, respectively, on theoretical, practical, and empirical standpoints. Part Four discusses the theological implications of Kant's System. Chapter X portrays his theology as he himself regarded it: as a theism which urges a right respect for God by denying the possibility of human knowledge of His existence, yet allows for an adequately certain belief through moral and teleological arguments. Chapter XI interprets Kant's philosophy of religion as an experiment designed to prove that Christianity can serve as the universal religion of mankind. Chapter XII demonstrates Kant's deep concern for religious experience, and argues that the Critical System as a whole was intended to pave the way for a Critical mysticism.

Little is known about Julius Haast's life prior to his arrival in New Zealand in 1858 at the age of 36. Without knowing something about his background, it is difficult to explain his life in New Zealand. This work pursues a historical context that can more fully explain Haast's remarkably active career in New Zealand. The geological survey of the Canterbury Province, the Philosophical Institute of Canterbury and the Canterbury Museum represent Haast's major contributions to science and culture in New Zealand. Julius Haast carefully engineered his own transition from geologist to museum director within the social and political climate of Canterbury in order to remain in Christchurch where he raised his family. Heinrich von Haast's book about his father has been the accepted source of information about his father since its publication in 1948. Until recently, scholars have failed to explore beyond the scope of von Haast's biography. There is now a trend toward recognising Julius Haast as having made significant contributions to many aspects of science and society.

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