Esta tese versa sobre assimilações, no Brasil, de linhagens germânicas de pensamento econômico, entre 1889 e 1945. A Parte I discute questões teóricas e historiográficas que orientaram a pesquisa. Situa-se a história do pensamento econômico no âmbito de alguns marcos teóricos e, dentro dessa área, esboçam-se algumas reflexões sobre a temática da difusão internacional como campo de pesquisa histórica. Na Parte II, aborda-se o pensamento econômico alemão: a formação da Nationalökonomie, as correntes oitocentistas mais influentes no Brasil e, por fim, três trajetórias pessoais de Friedrich List, Adolph Wagner e Carl Landauer que dão corpo à história de ideias feita inicialmente. A Parte III volta o olhar para os trópicos e examina as apropriações germânicas de Rui Barbosa, dos industrialistas na transição republicana, do gaúcho Francisco Simch e de Roberto Simonsen. A principal conclusão do trabalho é que houve apropriação efetiva do pensamento econômico alemão no Brasil, embora os temas não tenham sido incorporados de maneira uniforme. / This thesis deals with Brazilian assimilations of German lineages of economic thought, between 1889 and 1945. In Part I I discuss the theoretical and historiographic issues involved in the research. The study of history of economic thought is placed into a theoretical framework and, within this area, I sketch some considerations on the nature of the international diffusion as a field of historical research. In Part II I approach German nineteenth-century economic thought: the formation of Nationalökonomie, the lineages most influent in Brazil and, finally, three personal cases Friedrich List, Adolph Wagner and Carl Landauer which give concrete substance to the history of ideas presented before. Part III focuses on the tropics and examines German influences on: Rui Barbosa, the industrialists of the beginning of the Brazilian Republic, Francisco Simch and Roberto Simonsen. The main conclusion of this study is that there was an effective appropriation of German economic thought in Brazil, although topics were not incorporated in a uniform manner.

Depuis sa création en 1838, le mouvement New Thought poursuit son chemin à la tête de la mouvance religieuse métaphysique aux Etats-Unis. Considéré comme un croisement d’idées politiques et religieuses, le mouvement constitue un élément incontournable de la construction de l’identité américaine. Se présentant comme un métissage de théologies occidentales et orientales, ce mouvement thérapeutique s’impose comme un phénomène culturel pertinent dans l’étude du champ religieux. Evoluant de la substantialité vers le procès, le mouvement s’est engagé tout récemment vers une transformation idéologique, à la recherche d’un renouveau spirituel et d’une ré-activation de son pluralisme religieux et de son dynamisme sous la forme du Process New Thought. / Since its creation in 1838, the New Thought Movement has led the metaphysical religious movement in America. It is a landmark in the construction of the American identity since it has always been at the crossroads of spiritual and political ideas. As a blend of Western and Eastern theologies, this therapeutic movement stands out as a cultural landmark in religious studies. Moving from Substance New Thought to Process New Thought, it has recently engaged in an ideological transformation leading to both a spiritual renewal and a re-activation of its dynamic religious pluralism.

Esta tese versa sobre assimilações, no Brasil, de linhagens germânicas de pensamento econômico, entre 1889 e 1945. A Parte I discute questões teóricas e historiográficas que orientaram a pesquisa. Situa-se a história do pensamento econômico no âmbito de alguns marcos teóricos e, dentro dessa área, esboçam-se algumas reflexões sobre a temática da difusão internacional como campo de pesquisa histórica. Na Parte II, aborda-se o pensamento econômico alemão: a formação da Nationalökonomie, as correntes oitocentistas mais influentes no Brasil e, por fim, três trajetórias pessoais de Friedrich List, Adolph Wagner e Carl Landauer que dão corpo à história de ideias feita inicialmente. A Parte III volta o olhar para os trópicos e examina as apropriações germânicas de Rui Barbosa, dos industrialistas na transição republicana, do gaúcho Francisco Simch e de Roberto Simonsen. A principal conclusão do trabalho é que houve apropriação efetiva do pensamento econômico alemão no Brasil, embora os temas não tenham sido incorporados de maneira uniforme. / This thesis deals with Brazilian assimilations of German lineages of economic thought, between 1889 and 1945. In Part I I discuss the theoretical and historiographic issues involved in the research. The study of history of economic thought is placed into a theoretical framework and, within this area, I sketch some considerations on the nature of the international diffusion as a field of historical research. In Part II I approach German nineteenth-century economic thought: the formation of Nationalökonomie, the lineages most influent in Brazil and, finally, three personal cases Friedrich List, Adolph Wagner and Carl Landauer which give concrete substance to the history of ideas presented before. Part III focuses on the tropics and examines German influences on: Rui Barbosa, the industrialists of the beginning of the Brazilian Republic, Francisco Simch and Roberto Simonsen. The main conclusion of this study is that there was an effective appropriation of German economic thought in Brazil, although topics were not incorporated in a uniform manner.

The overarching aim of this research was to understand factors implicated in the maintenance of rumination and worry, conceptualised as a transdiagnostic process of repetitive negative thought (RNT), through the use of cross-sectional, prospective, and experimental research designs. Rumination and worry have been repeatedly implicated in the development and maintenance of various forms of psychopathology, in particular, depression and anxiety disorders. Given the negative outcomes for mood and psychopathology, there is a need for a better understanding of vulnerability factors that maintain this unconstructive thinking. Based on a review of the literature, an integrative theoretical model was developed and tested using structural equation modelling. Using cross-sectional data, the model was tested in a large sample of adults (n = 506). Of the broad range of proximal and distal vulnerability factors examined, only neuroticism and beliefs about the function of repetitive thought remained significantly associated with RNT once current symptoms were statistically controlled. Emotional abuse and abstract processing were indirectly associated with RNT. Following on from this, a prospective study examined which of these vulnerability factors prospectively predicted change in RNT over six to eight weeks. Only neuroticism and the specific belief that repetitive thought aids instrumental understanding predicted change in RNT, after controlling for depression and anxiety symptoms. Next, two experimental studies were conducted to explore the causal relationship between RNT and the belief that RNT aids insight and understanding, by experimentally manipulating this appraisal and measuring the impact on state RNT. Whilst methodological issues with the first experimental study precluded clear conclusions being drawn about the nature of the relationship, the second experimental study demonstrated that participants manipulated to believe that RNT is helpful for increasing insight and understanding had greater levels of state RNT after exposure to a stressor, relative to participants manipulated to believe that RNT is unhelpful. Finally, in order to see whether rumination has any consequences that may potentially reinforce its further use, an experimental study was conducted to manipulate processing mode (abstract rumination versus concrete thinking) and examine the effect on a range of outcomes relating to insightfulness and avoidance. Whilst rumination did not lead to increased insight, it did afford more justification for avoidance, relative to concrete thinking. The clinical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed with respect to existing theories of repetitive negative thought.

Background and Objectives: Rumination may contribute to depression by impairing the most effective allocation of time across activities. An experiment tested the role of rumination in time allocation across tasks. Methods: State rumination was manipulated by cueing an unresolved goal in one condition (32 participants) and cueing a resolved goal in another condition (32 participants). Trait rumination and depressive symptoms were also measured. All participants completed two word generation tasks and allocated a fixed overall time budget between the tasks by interleaving between them. Results: No difference was found in task performance or time allocation following the manipulation of state rumination. Self-reported rumination did not differ between conditions throughout the experimental task. Differences in time allocation behaviour were associated with trait rumination. Limitations: Use of a non-clinical population and tasks that are unrepresentative of everyday problem solving limited the generalisability of the results and may have limited the effect of the state rumination manipulation on task performance. Conclusions: The absence of a difference in self-reported rumination throughout the task suggests that either the word generation task reduced levels of rumination or that the level of rumination induced did not have a large effect on the cognitive processes required to complete the word generation task.

Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it's different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.

published_or_final_version / Mental Health / Master / Master of Social Sciences

American educators in large numbers now believe that school curricula must include direct instruction in thinking skills. At issue for many, however, is the question of what effect that instruction has on young people. This study was developed to provide an answer to that question within a particular high school setting and to suggest a model for assessing the effect of thinking skill programs in other settings. The inquiry was naturalistic in design, responding to current criticisms of traditional quantitative methods being applied to the complex processes of acquiring thinking strategies. Stimulating recall by means of videotape, this research used interviews of students and teachers from eight different classes to investigate perceptions and cognitive processes resulting from lessons in thinking skills. Results of the study indicate that most students were aware of teachers' purposes in the lessons. Further, they were able to articulate their perceptions, which frequently coincided with teacher intentions, as well as their thought processes while instruction was in progress. Some older high school students were also able to describe ways they have applied or might apply the thinking skills outside of the classroom setting. Data collected in this project were sufficiently detailed and convincing so that they were taken by the teacher participants as valid assessments of the teaching/learning situation they had created. They can use the information to adjust instructional strategies. Additionally, the fact that this research was successful in revealing in-depth information about the effects of instruction in thinking skills argues for the inclusion of such an assessment model within any program being developed to include those skills in a curriculum.

Though artificial intelligence scientists frequently use words such as "belief" and "desire" when describing the computational capacities of their programs and computers, they have completely ignored the philosophical and psychological theories of belief and desire. Hence, their explanations of computational capacities which use these terms are frequently little better than folk-psychological explanations. Conversely, though philosophers and psychologists attempt to couch their theories of belief and desire in computational terms, they have consistently misunderstood the notions of computation and computational semantics. Hence, their theories of such attitudes are frequently inadequate. A computational theory of propositional attitudes (belief and desire) is presented here. It is argued that the theory of propositional attitudes put forth by philosophers and psychologists entails that propositional attitudes are a kind of abstract data type. This refined computational view of propositional attitudes bridges the gap between artificial intelligence, philosophy and psychology. Lastly, it is argued that this theory of propositional attitudes has consequences for meta-processing and consciousness in computers.

This thesis is about consciousness and representation. More specifically, the big picture issue in the background throughout is the relationship between consciousness (or "phenomenology") and representation (or "intentionality") in the life of the mind. Phenomenology and intentionality are inarguably the two central topics in philosophy of mind of the last half-century. The question of phenomenology is, "how can there be something it feels like, from a subjective viewpoint, for a physical being to experience the world?" The question of intentionality is, "how can something physical, such as a brain state, be about, or represent, some other thing out in the world?" Not too long ago, the majority opinion was that these two questions addressed two essentially independent domains. However, in recent years the views of many philosophers have swung dramatically in the opposite direction. An important theme of analytic philosophy of mind in the last decade or two has been the exploration of the groundbreaking idea that these two domains might be fundamentally linked in previously unrecognized ways. Perhaps phenomenal properties are reducible to certain kinds of intentional properties. Perhaps the mind's non-derivative intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. Perhaps we should think of phenomenology and intentionality as "intertwined, all the way down to the ground" (Chalmers 2004, 32). This thesis addresses one crucial question within this larger framework: whether, and how, thoughts are phenomenally conscious. Thoughts are an important test case for theories about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, because they have long been considered paradigmatic intentional states, in contrast to perceptual and sensory experiences, which are paradigmatic phenomenal states. While there is something it is like, from the inside, for an individual to undergo a perceptual experience such as an olfactory experience of roasted coffee beans, by contrast entertaining a thought might seem to lack such a distinctive qualitative "feel". The thought is clearly intentional: it involves carrying informational content about objects and properties in the world. But is there also something it is like for a subject to experience thinking itself? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept the existence of a phenomenology of thought, so-called "cognitive phenomenology" (CP). The literature on this topic so far has focused primarily on the question of whether CP exists. Here I will focus on the subtly different, and largely neglected, question of whether a kind of CP exists that is able to determine thought's intentional content. Many proponents of CP seem to be motivated by the hope that it can, since they believe that in the case of other conscious states, the phenomenology accounts for the intentionality. However, in what follows I argue that this ambitious project is doomed to fail, because CP is not suited to determine the intentional content of thought.