Zugl.: Hildesheim, Universiẗat, Diss., 2005.

Diss. Univ. Freiburg im Breisgau, 2007.

O estudo aborda o problema da forma de exposição do pensamento filosófico a partir da defesa da forma do ensaio na obra de Theodor W. Adorno. O que se põe em questão é o quanto a forma ensaística, em seu esforço de elaborar conceitualmente os dados da experiência particular, é capaz de dar conta da atividade filosófica - uma atividade universalista e interessada na determinação dos fundamentos últimos do real - em um momento histórico no qual não parece ser mais possível a ela erguer pretensões de sistema. Em seu desenvolvimento este trabalho se volta para a própria ensaística adorniana e procura mostrar se e em que medida ela escapa do espírito próprio dos sistemas fechados. / The work addresses the problem of exposition in the philosophical thought based on the defense of the essay form in the philosophy of Theodor W. Adorno. What is interrogated is how much the essay form, in its effort to develop conceptually the particular experience, is able to carry out the philosophical activity - a universalistic activity e interested in depict the ultimate foundations of the real - in a historical moment in which is it no more possible to raise any pretense of systematic philosophy. In its development this study turns to Adorno's own essays and attempts to show if the exposition form of his thought escapes from the especific spirit of closed systems.

O estudo aborda o problema da forma de exposição do pensamento filosófico a partir da defesa da forma do ensaio na obra de Theodor W. Adorno. O que se põe em questão é o quanto a forma ensaística, em seu esforço de elaborar conceitualmente os dados da experiência particular, é capaz de dar conta da atividade filosófica - uma atividade universalista e interessada na determinação dos fundamentos últimos do real - em um momento histórico no qual não parece ser mais possível a ela erguer pretensões de sistema. Em seu desenvolvimento este trabalho se volta para a própria ensaística adorniana e procura mostrar se e em que medida ela escapa do espírito próprio dos sistemas fechados. / The work addresses the problem of exposition in the philosophical thought based on the defense of the essay form in the philosophy of Theodor W. Adorno. What is interrogated is how much the essay form, in its effort to develop conceptually the particular experience, is able to carry out the philosophical activity - a universalistic activity e interested in depict the ultimate foundations of the real - in a historical moment in which is it no more possible to raise any pretense of systematic philosophy. In its development this study turns to Adorno's own essays and attempts to show if the exposition form of his thought escapes from the especific spirit of closed systems.

No description available.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de présenter la conception de la subjectivité telle qu’elle est définie dans la philosophie de Theodor W. Adorno. Il s’agira de montrer que cette conception cherche à la fois à maintenir et dépasser la tradition idéaliste qui est à son origine. Cette tradition pense la subjectivité comme raison, autonomie et spontanéité, fondées sur la pure relation à soi de la conscience. Sans abandonner l’horizon d’une philosophie de la conscience, la conception adornienne du sujet insiste sur le rôle constitutif de la figure d’autrui, comprise à la fois comme nature, non-identité et différence. La subjectivité chez Adorno ne doit donc plus être exclusivement comprise comme raison et comme capacité d’autodétermination, mais également comme potentialité d’être librement affectée par ce qui lui est autre. Adorno nomme cette potentialité la réconciliation et la thématise sous le signe de la « communication du différent » : un rapport libéré de la peur et de la souffrance entre les individus. Dans un tel rapport, la nature n’est ni aveugle ni opprimée, laissant place à une harmonie entre la raison et ce qui lui est autre. C’est ainsi que la philosophie d’Adorno formule l’exigence morale d’une résistance critique de la pensée ouverte à la différence. / The purpose of this study is to present the conception of the subject found in the philosophy of T.W. Adorno. We will show that Adorno thinks subjectivity both with and against the German idealist tradition that gave it birth. This tradition poses that the essence of the subject is reason, spontaneity and autonomy, founded in the relationship of self to its consciousness. Adorno maintains the importance of a philosophy of consciousness, but also insists on the constitutive role of the other in the formation of the subject. As such, subjectivity for Adorno is no longer exclusively understood as reason or the power of self-determination, but must also as the potentiality of being freely affected by what is different. He thus insists on reconciliation, a non-dominating and non-submitting relationship to nature, to build his moral philosophy. Reconciliation must be understood as the “communication of differences”: a relationship between individuals in which they no longer need to fear or suffer needlessly. Moral thought must for Adorno attempt to think a state where a harmony would be possible between reason and nature, the critical resistance of thought and the openness to what is different.

Le but de ce mémoire est de présenter la position de Theodor W. Adomo sur la métaphysique. Après avoir exposé l’idée philosophique centrale de la pensée d’Adomo, la dialectique négative, nous présentons d’une part la critique qu’adresse Adomo à la tradition métaphysique, et d’autre part sa tentative de sauvetage de la métaphysique. La thèse centrale d’Adomo sur la métaphysique est la suivante : la métaphysique doit être sauvée dans une perspective micrologique, une perspective qui est centrée sur la particularité plutôt que sur l’universalité.

Jurgen Habermas argues for a paradigm change in critical theory from Theodor W. Adorno's philosophy of consciousness to his own linguistically-turned theory. Habermas claims that Adorno's conception of reason sets up an antagonistic relationship between subject and object that can only be overcome by a non-rational mimesis with nature. This thesis defends Adorno against Habermas, and argues that the linguistic turn is a mistake. Chapter 1 outlines Habermas's critique, and corrects some of his specific misunderstandings of Adorno. Chapter 2 offers a positive defense of Adorno. By means of an expanded notion of nature, Adorno shows how the relation between subject and object need not be the antagonistic one characteristic of so much of modern philosophy. Chapter 3 argues that it is not Adorno's dialectical thought, but Habermas's linguistically-turned critical theory that suffers from an inability properly to articulate the relation between subject and object.

This paper was revised and later published in The Other Journal, Issue 14 (January 27, 2009) http://theotherjournal.com/2009/01/27/earths-lament-suffering-hope-and-wisdom/ Accessed: June 25, 2013

This is a revised version of Lambert Zuidervaart's inaugural address presented on November 21, 2003, on the occasion of the author's taking up the position as professor at the Institute.