We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how the human brain processes information about social groups in three domains. Study 1: Semantic knowledge. Participants were scanned while they answered questions about their knowledge of both social categories and non-social categories like object groups and species of nonhuman animals. Brain regions previously identified in processing semantic information are more robustly engaged by nonsocial semantics than stereotypes. In contrast, stereotypes elicit greater activity in brain regions implicated in social cognition. These results suggest that stereotypes should be considered distinct from other forms of semantic knowledge. Study 2: Theory of mind. Participants were scanned while they answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities. Study 3: Social categorization. Participants were scanned while they categorized the sex and race of unfamiliar Black men, Black women, White men, and White women. Multivariate pattern analysis revealed that multivoxel patterns in FFA--but not other face-selective brain regions, other category-selective brain regions, or early visual cortex--differentiated faces by sex and race. Specifically, patterns of voxel-based responses were more similar between individuals of the same sex than between men and women, and between individuals of the same race than between Black and White individuals. These results suggest that FFA represents the sex and race of faces. Together, these three studies contribute to a growing cognitive neuroscience of social groups. / Psychology

In zwischenmenschlichen Interaktionen sind die Wahrnehmung und das Verstehen von sozialen Äußerungen, zu denen Gesichtsausdrücke, Körpersprache und Lautgebung gehören, unentbehrlich. Die Fähigkeit den mentalen Zustand anderer Personen identifizieren zu können, auch als soziale Kognition bekannt, ist notwendig um das Verhalten anderer verstehen und interpretieren zu können. Diese Identifikation des mentalen Zustandes durch die Kombination von Reizinformation und eigener Erfahrung ist als "Theory of Mind" (ToM) bekannt. ToM ist die Fähigkeit anderen Personen bestimmte mentale Zustände (Wünsche, Glauben, Absichten und Emotionen) zuzuschreiben. Emotionale Ausdrücke stellen dabei besonders wichtige Reize in sozialen Interaktionen dar, wobei sich diese Arbeit spezifisch auf vokale emotionale Ausdrücke beschränkt. Das Erkennen von Emotionen in der Stimme geschieht durch nicht-verbale Komponenten, die bei der Lautproduktion entstehen und u.a. als Intonation oder Prosodie bekannt sind. Allerdings wird die Erkennung von emotionaler Prosodie stark von anderen Faktoren beeinflusst, so wie Kontext oder Kultur des Sprechers und Zuhörers.  Um die Interaktion zwischen emotionalem Ausdruck und Kontext weiter aufzuklären, habe ich die Erkennung von Ausdrücken in der Stimme in Zusammenhang mit der Authentizität untersucht. Der Unterschied zwischen authentischen und gespielten emotionalen Ausdrücken bietet eine ideale Grundlage für die Erforschung dieser Interaktion. Beide Stimulus-Arten unterscheiden sich im Kontext der Produktion durch die unterschiedliche Intention des jeweiligen Sprechers. Die in diesem Projekt verwendeten authentischen Tonaufnahmen stammen aus Radiointerviews und waren intern initiiert, während die gespielten Tonaufnahmen von Schauspielern produziert wurden, die den Text, den Kontext der Aufnahme und die jeweilige Emotion zugewiesen bekamen, und daher extern initiiert waren. Meine Erwartung war, dass die Erkennung der Authentizität durch eine ToM Verarbeitung geschehen würde, da die unterschiedlichen Tonaufnahmen durch einen Unterschied im mentalen Zustand des Sprechers charakterisiert sind.  Ich wollte feststellen, ob die Erkennung der emotionalen Ausdrücke und die damit einhergehende Gehirnaktivierung von der Authentizität des Stimulus Materials beeinflusst werden. Experimentell sollten Individuen, die in einem Magnetresonanztomographen lagen, entweder die Authentizität oder die Emotion (Wut, Angst, Freude, Trauer) der Tonaufnahmen identifizieren. Authentizität hatte einen deutlichen Einfluss auf die Erkennung von Emotionen, wobei Wut bei gespielten Aufnahmen besser erkannt wurde, Trauer hingegen bei authentischen. Im Gehirn wurde dabei das ToM Netzwerk für die explizite Bewertung der Authentizität rekrutiert. Zusätzlich wiesen die Versuchspersonen bei authentischen Aufnahmen, anders als bei gespielten, eine erhöhte Aktivierung im medialen prefrontalen Cortex auf. Dies weist auf die Notwendigkeit von ToM bei der Erkennung von Authentizität, den gleichzeitigen Einfluss auf die Wahrnehmung von emotionalen Ausdrücken, und die erhöhte Rekrutierung kognitiver Ressourcen für authentische Ausdrücke hin. Um die Eigenschaften des Effekts von Authentizität zu verdeutlichen, habe ich diesen Befund auf universelle und kultur-spezifische Einflüsse in drei unterschiedlichen Ländern geprüft. Individuen aus Deutschland, Rumänien und Indonesien wurden in einem ähnlichen Experiment, aber nur auf Verhalten, getestet. Obwohl Teilnehmer aus den unterschiedlichen Ländern die Authentizität der Aufnahmen nur schwer erkennen konnten, war der Authentizitätseffekt auf die Emotionserkennung für alle Kulturen sehr ähnlich. Die wichtigsten Unterschiede kamen durch Neigungen für bestimmte Emotionen zustande. Die deutschen Versuchspersonen waren bei den gespielten wie auch bei den authentischen Aufnahmen eher dazu geneigt Wut zu wählen, während Versuchspersonen aus Rumänien und Indonesien sich bei den authentischen Emotionen, im Gegenteil zu den Deutschen, vermehrt für Trauer entschieden. Dies weist auf eine komplexe Interaktion universeller und kultur-spezifischer Effekte bei der Authentizitäts- und Emotionserkennung hin. Für weitere Aufklärung des Authentizitäteffektes konzentrierte ich mich schließlich auf die proximalen Ursachen des Verhaltens und der Verarbeitung im Gehirn. Zunächst habe ich untersucht, ob der Authentizitätseffekt durch vorheriges Wissen beeinflusst werden kann, indem den Teilnehmern in Zwei-Dritteln der Versuche durch Hinweisung mitgeteilt wurde, ob die vorgespielten Aufnahmen authentisch oder gespielt waren. Diese Aussage war entweder richtig (kongruent) oder falsch (nicht-kongruent). Ganz ohne Hinweise verursachten gespielte Reize eine erhöhte Aktivierung im primären auditorischen Cortex und in Arealen, die wichtig für die Verarbeitung von Prosodie sind. Der Effekt im medialen prefrontalen Cortex war hingegen nicht mehr zu erkennen. Obwohl die Erkennung der emotionalen Ausdrücke durch die gegebenen Hinweise („gespielt“ oder „echt“) nicht beeinflusst wurden, hatten die Hinweise einen klaren Einfluss auf die Gehirnaktivierung. Die allgemeine Interaktion von Hinweis und Authentizität des Reizes verursachten eine erhöhte Aktivierung im superioren temporalen Sulcus und im anterioren Cingulum. Wenn auf den Hinweis eines authentischen Ausdruckes eine gespielte Aufnahme folgte, erhöhte sich die Aktivierung im temporoparietalen Cortex, was auf eine Komponente der ToM Fähigkeit, der gesteigerten Perspektivenübernahme, hindeutet. Unklar blieb, wie Authentizität akustisch wahrgenommen wird. Die Kontur der Grundfrequenz weist  eine größere Variabilität bei gespielten als bei authentischen Aufnahmen auf. Durch eine Analyse des Effektes der Kontur-Variabilität wollte ich feststellen, ob dieser Faktor einen Einfluss auf die Erkennung der emotionalen Ausdrücke und auf die Gehirnaktivierung hat. Aufnahmen mit niedriger Kontur-Variabilität wurden bevorzugt als Trauer oder authentisch kategorisiert, während die Aktivierung im Gehirn durch eine höhere Kontur-Variabilität im primären auditorischen Cortex aufgabenunabhängig erhöht wurde. Hinzu kam, dass die Kontur und die Aufgabe der Versuchsperson (Emotionserkennung versus Authentizitätserkennung) im medialen prefrontalen Cortex interagierten. Eine erhöhte Aktivierung fand bei der Emotionserkennung statt, wenn die Kontur-Variabilität niedrig war, während bei der Authentizitätserkennung eine erhöhte Aktivierung festgestellt wurde, wenn die Variabilität der Kontur hoch war. Der Authentizitätseffekt im Verhalten und in der Gehirnaktivierung scheint also durch Kontur-Variabilität beeinflusst zu sein, ist aber stark aufgabenbedingt in Arealen, die für soziale Kognition wichtig sind. Die Verhaltens- und Aktivierungsdaten zeigen, dass Authentizität ein wichtiger Faktor bei der Emotionserkennung ist, das auch Auswirkungen auf Studien hat, die gespielte emotionale Ausdrücke benutzen. Die Effekte zur Gehirnaktivierung des ToM Netzwerkes suggerieren, dass die Erkennung von Intention einen Einfluss auf die Wertung von emotionalen Ausdrücken in der Stimme hat. Der Einfluss der Authentizität des Stimulus kann gleichzeitig aufgabenabhängig, beispielsweise in Teilen des ToM Netzwerkes, und Stimulus-angetrieben, im primären auditorischen Cortex, sein. Weiterhin können Kontextinformationen die Gehirnaktivierung, die durch Authentizität moduliert wird, zusätzlich beeinflussen. Wenn diese Ergebnisse gemeinsam mit den Unterschieden zwischen den getesteten Kulturen betrachtet werden, wird deutlich, dass der Einfluss der Intention des Sprechers auf die Erkennung von Emotionen auf einer komplexen Interaktion von universellen und kultur-spezifischen Effekten beruht.

Deception is not only part of daily life for adults, but it is also part of typical development throughout childhood. Research has shown that the ability to deceive improves with age and has been found to be related to the development of cognitive skills such as executive functioning processes, theory of mind, and intelligence. However for some children, lie-telling becomes problematic and atypical. For children with conduct problems, deception is one of the most common presenting symptoms and has been found to be pervasive across childhood and into adolescence. While most studies analyze the lying behaviours of these children based on parent and teacher reports, no studies have yet empirically evaluated the actual deceptive behaviours of children with severe conduct problems. The current study investigated the antisocial and prosocial deception rates and abilities of children with and without severe conduct problems. Additionally, cognitive measures and parental reports of lying and parenting styles were considered in order to determine how such variables may be related to deception. A total of 66 children participated in the current study with half of the sample originating from a community agency for children with behaviour problems and the other half consisting of an age- and gender-matched control sample. Results demonstrated that compared to their typically developing counterparts, children with conduct problems were more likely to behave antisocially by committing antisocial transgressions, and subsequently lying. These children were also less likely to tell prosocial lies. Consistent with previous research, many cognitive measures, such as Executive Functioning (e.g., inhibition) and Theory of Mind (1st and 2nd Order) were found to be related to deception for the typically developing sample, though fewer and different cognitive measures were found to be predictive of deception within the clinical sample. Parent ratings of lie-telling frequency were not predictive of antisocial or prosocial deception, though they were predictive of antisocial lie-telling sophistication. Parenting styles were minimally predictive of deception. Results suggest that the mechanisms used by children with conduct problems during deception differ from a typically developing sample. Limitations as well as implications are discussed.

Deception is not only part of daily life for adults, but it is also part of typical development throughout childhood. Research has shown that the ability to deceive improves with age and has been found to be related to the development of cognitive skills such as executive functioning processes, theory of mind, and intelligence. However for some children, lie-telling becomes problematic and atypical. For children with conduct problems, deception is one of the most common presenting symptoms and has been found to be pervasive across childhood and into adolescence. While most studies analyze the lying behaviours of these children based on parent and teacher reports, no studies have yet empirically evaluated the actual deceptive behaviours of children with severe conduct problems. The current study investigated the antisocial and prosocial deception rates and abilities of children with and without severe conduct problems. Additionally, cognitive measures and parental reports of lying and parenting styles were considered in order to determine how such variables may be related to deception. A total of 66 children participated in the current study with half of the sample originating from a community agency for children with behaviour problems and the other half consisting of an age- and gender-matched control sample. Results demonstrated that compared to their typically developing counterparts, children with conduct problems were more likely to behave antisocially by committing antisocial transgressions, and subsequently lying. These children were also less likely to tell prosocial lies. Consistent with previous research, many cognitive measures, such as Executive Functioning (e.g., inhibition) and Theory of Mind (1st and 2nd Order) were found to be related to deception for the typically developing sample, though fewer and different cognitive measures were found to be predictive of deception within the clinical sample. Parent ratings of lie-telling frequency were not predictive of antisocial or prosocial deception, though they were predictive of antisocial lie-telling sophistication. Parenting styles were minimally predictive of deception. Results suggest that the mechanisms used by children with conduct problems during deception differ from a typically developing sample. Limitations as well as implications are discussed.

The current research, across three studies, examined two social practices that involve processing and responding to others’ emotions, theory of mind (ToM) and empathy, and how they relate to dysphoria and the social impairments associated with dysphoria over time. Mildly depressed, or dysphoric, individuals, have been found to have heightened ToM when identifying others’ emotions, despite reporting widespread social impairments (Harkness et al., 2005). The first study (Chapter 2) examined if and how ToM is a mediator in the relationship between dysphoria and social functioning. Attribution style, specifically the internalizing attribution bias, was hypothesized to play a role. The interaction between ToM and internalizing attribution bias was independently associated with social functioning. For internalizing attributors, higher ToM was related to better social functioning, but no relationship was observed between ToM and social functioning among non-internalizing attributors. The second study (Chapter 3) examined the relationship between ToM and empathy, addressing the debate surrounding cognitive and affective aspects of ToM and empathy. Affective ToM and cognitive empathy both have been described as processes involving cognitive inferences about others’ emotions. Current results supported this link, showing that a specific component of empathy, perspective-taking, was related to ToM. Although ToM was associated with some aspects of empathy, empathy remained a separate construct that includes both cognitive and emotional responding to others’ emotions. Chapter 4 shifted focus to empathy to examine how this social practice relates to dysphoria and social functioning. The last study first examined how empathy relates to dysphoria. Results showed that only personal distress, one component of empathy, was associated with greater dysphoria. The final study also examined if the empathy x emotion regulation interaction mediates the relationship between dysphoria and social functioning. Different patterns were observed for different emotion regulation types. The interaction between maladaptive, but not adaptive, emotion regulation strategies and empathy was correlated directly with social functioning. For individuals with negative cognitive emotion regulation strategies, greater empathy was associated with better social functioning, a relationship not present for individuals who do not use negative cognitive emotion regulation. Finally maladaptive, but not adaptive, emotion regulation significantly predicted social functioning after controlling for dysphoria. / Thesis (Master, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2008-10-22 15:25:33.573

This thesis presents a three-phase longitudinal study of naïve psychology and pretend play behaviour development between preschool children in the United Kingdom (UK) and Singapore. Research conducted in the Western contexts has shown that children develop an understanding of pretence and desires at 18 months of age (e.g. Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), before level-1 visual perspective-taking at 2½ years of age (e.g. Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981) and followed by level-2 visual perspective-taking, appearance-reality distinction and false-belief understanding at 4 years of age (e.g. Flavell et al., 1981; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). A major issue that has dominated the field for many years concerns whether naïve psychology follows a universal developmental pattern. The majority of the studies to date have tended to rely heavily on false-belief understanding as an index of children’s understanding of mental representation. Some cross-cultural results have shown that the onset of false-belief understanding coincides with Western norms (e.g. Callaghan et al., 2005) whereas several non-Western studies have demonstrated a time lag in development across cultural groups (e.g. Vinden, 1999). To date no longitudinal study comparing the development of other naïve psychology concepts from 2 to 4 years of age between diverse cultures has been published. The present study aims to address the gap in the literature by tracking longitudinally and comparing the developmental patterns of children’s understanding of a range of naïve psychology concepts in the UK and Singapore at 2½, 3 and 3½ years of age (phases I, II and III respectively). Singapore with its mixed blend of Eastern and Western values represents a unique case for comparative study. This study employed a repeated-measures design, incorporating a large battery of established tasks that tapped children’s understanding of pretence, desires, visual perceptions and beliefs. In addition, a semi-structured observational approach was employed to study children’s naturally occurring pretend play behaviour. A total of 87 children were recruited in the UK (M = 28.60 months, SD = 1.90) and Singapore (M = 29.89, SD = 2.76) in the first phase of study. Of the initial sample, 36 children (M = 42.75, SD = 1.84) in the UK cohort and 38 children (M = 43.68, SD = 2.79) in the Singapore cohort participated in all three phases of the study. This thesis has five research questions. The first question relates to the extent to which acquisition of naïve psychology concepts differ between the two cultures at 2½ years of age. The baseline results reported in Chapter 5 indicate that 2½-year-old children in both cohorts acquired a rudimentary understanding of some aspects of pretence, discrepant desires, action prediction, emotion prediction and level-1 visual perspective-taking. The results showed no gross cross-cultural differences. However, subtle cross-cultural differences in children’s understanding of discrepant desires and action prediction were found. The second question addresses longitudinal cross-cultural differences in naïve psychology development between 2½, 3 and 3½ years of age. The results presented in Chapter 6 reveal cultural similarities in children’s performance on several pretence understanding, the level-2 visual perspective-taking, the appearance-reality distinction and the false-belief explanation tasks. Nonetheless, cultural differences were observed in some aspects of naïve psychology. The UK cohort performed significantly better than the Singapore cohort in the unexpected transfer false-belief prediction task at 3½ years of age, after verbal mental age (VMA) and gender were treated as covariates. Additionally, the UK cohort achieved significantly higher total mean for the level-1 visual perspective-taking task across the three phases and the mental representation in pretence task across phases II and III. In contrast, the Singapore cohort scored significantly higher in total mean for the discrepant desires task across the three phases. The third question considers longitudinal differences in children’s understanding of knowledge-ignorance and beliefs from 3 to 3½ years of age. The analysis in Chapter 7 indicates that the Singapore cohort performed significantly more poorly than the UK cohort in understanding knowledge-ignorance attribution (for the false-belief prediction and falsebelief explanation tasks) and true-belief ascription (for the false-belief explanation task) across phases II and III, after VMA and gender were considered as covariates. Comparison of children’s false-belief prediction and justification scores revealed that the cross-cultural difference in false-belief prediction related to an explicit ability to predict false-belief without concurrent ability to justify a naïve character’s behaviour based on false-beliefs. Twenty-four (66.7%) and 11 (28.9%) children in the UK and Singapore cohorts respectively were able to make correct false-belief prediction at 3½ years of age. Among these children, only six and five children from the UK and Singapore cohorts respectively provided correct justifications on the basis of false-beliefs. These findings therefore indicated cultural similarities in that the same number of children in both cohorts was able to predict and justify other’s behaviour in terms of false-beliefs. The fourth question explores the degree to which presence of sibling(s), birth order, language (VMA) and bilingualism contribute to individual differences in naïve psychology development. The results in Chapter 8 show no evidence that presence of sibling(s) and birth order facilitated understanding of action prediction, discrepant desires, level-1 visual perspective-taking, mental representation in pretence and false-belief prediction in either cohort. With respect to the role of language in children’s naïve psychology development, there were concurrent (within phase) associations between VMA and false-belief prediction at 3½ years of age and longitudinal associations between VMA at 2½ years of age and falsebelief prediction at 3½ years of age for both cohorts. These findings suggest that language ability contributes to individual differences in false-belief understanding. It is worth highlighting that not all aspects of naïve psychology and VMA were related. The fifth and final question focuses on longitudinal cross-cultural similarities and differences in pretend play behaviour and examines the links between pretend play behaviour and naïve psychology development. The observational data in Chapter 9 reveal that the Singaporean children spent significantly more time engaged in non-pretend play and non-social pretend play at 2½ years of age whereas the UK children spent significantly more time engaged in social pretend play. This finding contrasted with the marked cultural differences in naïve psychology development found at 3 and 3½ years of age. It is important to note that the UK and Singaporean children showed similar developmental sequences from non-pretend to non-social pretend and finally to social pretend play behaviour and from simple to complex forms of social pretend play behaviour. With respect to other pretend play behaviour, the UK children spent significantly more time engaged in positive complementary bids, negative conflict, other forms of pretence, metacommunication and in the pretend theme of outings, holiday and weather across all phases than the Singaporean children. The associations between some early pretend play behaviour and later acquisition of some naïve psychology concepts for both cultures provide partial support for the proposition that pretend play behaviour is an early marker of understanding mental representation.

Il presente lavoro di tesi intende affrontare un tema non ancora indagato in letteratura, vale a dire l’analisi dei legami tra la comprensione mentalistica e la fiducia relazionale in bambini di scuola elementare. Tale obiettivo è perseguito in tre differenti percorsi di ricerca. Nel primo studio la Candidata ha creato un nuovo strumento di misura della fiducia relazionale nel tentativo di integrare differenti prospettive teoriche che hanno considerato la fiducia o solo come un fenomeno cognitivo o solo affettivo. Lo strumento creato (Trust Story Task), somministrato a bambini di scuola elementare dai 6 ai 10 anni, valuta le rappresentazioni mentali della fiducia intesa in senso cognitivo/mentalistico e affettivo/relazionale. I risultati dello studio mostrano le discrete proprietà psicometriche di affidabilità e validità dello strumento. Nel secondo studio viene proposta la validazione italiana di uno strumento di valutazione delle credenze di fiducia, Children Generalized Trust Beliefs Scale (Rotenberg e al., 2005). La Candidata esamina le principali caratteristiche psicometriche di affidabilità e consistenza interna e di validità dello strumento, utilizzato poi nello studio successivo. La scala tradotta in italiano, CGTB-I, mostra discrete caratteristiche di affidabilità, di consistenza interna e di validità. La struttura fattoriale, valutata tramite alcune EFAs e CFAs, rispecchia solo in parte quella originale di Rotenberg e colleghi (2005) poiché rintraccia le tre basi di fiducia attese (reliability, emotional, honesty), ma non tutti i quattro target relazionali (madre, padre, insegnante, pari). Gli item dell’insegnante, infatti, non risultano essere significativi. Nel terzo studio, l’obiettivo è verificare se le competenze mentalistiche e le credenze di fiducia (nella madre, nel padre e nei pari) siano predittori del comportamento di fiducia e della trustworthiness (attribuzione di fiducia che i compagni fanno rispetto a un compagno target). Le variabili indipendenti dello studio saranno considerate sia in termini individuali sia in combinazione statistica tra loro nel predire. I risultati mostrano che una buona teoria della mente e delle buone credenze di fiducia predicono in modo significativo la trustworthiness. / This thesis considers the link between theory of mind and interpersonal trust in three different studies. First chapter outlines the crucial theoretical reflections on two constructs starting from theory of mind. First of all, I consider the meaning of the term “theory of mind”, the functions of this ability and same questions linked to terminology more often used. Moreover, I deal with the development of this ability in elementary school children, and then the most important theories on theory of mind development. As regards to the interpersonal trust, I consider the three main fields of research concerning trust as cognitive, affective and behavioural phenomenon. First paragraph shows the cognitive theories of trust that, overall, define it in term of individual’s beliefs on other’s reliability. In a second paragraph, I trait the affective face of trust starting from the point of view of the attachment theory; and, finally, in a third paragraph, I expose the studies of behavioural aspects of trust. In the second chapter, I present a first contribution of validation of a semi-projective task on trust dimension: the Trust Story task. The aim of this measure is to evaluates the mental representation of trust both in a mentalistic and in an affective sense, considering jointly conscious and unconscious aspects and adapted to subjects’ age and gender. In particular, in my first study, I considered some characteristics of this new measure, which are reliability and construct validity. In the third chapter, I present two studies linked each other. In the first of them, I deal with the Italian validation of the Children Generalized Trust Beliefs Scale (Rotenberg et a., 2005), questionnaire that evaluate three bases of trust beliefs (reliability, emotional, honesty) in four targets (mother, father, teacher and peer). The original version of the scale demonstrated good psychometric characteristics and an excellent flexibility of use. The CGTB-I scale derived was used in the second study that I propose in this chapter in which I examine if children’s theory of mind and their trust beliefs in others, individually, and in combination, statistically account for trustworthiness and trustworthy behaviour in children.

Research suggests that there is a relationship between theory of mind and moral development in young children. However, the nature of this relationship is still unclear, specifically in regards to the relationship between theory of mind and moral theme comprehension, which has yet to be studied. The current study attempted to begin to fill this gap in the research by examining the relationship between 8 preschool children’s false belief understanding, as determined by the Sally-Anne task, and moral theme comprehension. Results were not significant, but suggest a trend that children who pass the false belief task may be more able to understand the moral themes of stories. A larger sample size and further research on this topic is necessary.

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships among mentalizing abilities, self-reported autism traits, and two white matter tracts, uncinate fasciculus (UF) and inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), in neurotypical adults. UF and ILF were hypothesized to connect brain regions implicated in a neuroanatomical model of mentalizing. Data were available for 24 neurotypical adults (mean age = 21.92 (4.72) years; 15 women). Tract-based spatial statistics (TBSS) was used to conduct voxelwise cross-participant comparisons of fractional anisotropy (FA) values in UF and ILF as predicted by mentalizing abilities and self-reported autism traits. Self-reported autism traits were positively related to FA values in left ILF. Results suggest that microstructural differences in left ILF are specifically involved in the expression of subclinical autism traits in neurotypical individuals.

Data from a growing number of research studies indicate that children with hearing loss are delayed in Theory of Mind (ToM) development when compared to their typically developing, hearing peers. While other researchers have studied the developmental trajectories of ToM in school-age students who are deaf and hard of hearing (DHH), a limited number have addressed the need for interventions for this population. The present study extends the current research on ToM interventions to the PreKindergarten and Kindergarten levels. This study used a single-case multiple-baseline multiple-probe across skills design with replications across classrooms to examine the effects of a ToM intervention on participants’ false belief understanding as well as outcomes on a near generalization measure (i.e., Sally-Anne Task, Baron-Cohen, Firth, Leslie, 1985) and a far generalization measure (i.e., five-task ToM developmental scale, Wellman & Liu, 2004). A thought bubble intervention (i.e., a visual representation of what people are thinking) developed by Wellman and Peterson (2013) was modified in key areas: (a) participants were substantially younger than the population in the original study and thus required a pre-teaching phase addressing vocabulary and materials, (b) manipulable materials were created from the description provided in the Wellman and Peterson (2013) study along with parallel materials used in assessment probes, (c) a certified teacher of DHH children provided direct instruction to participants in a small group setting, (d) study length was increased to 25 weeks, and (e) methodological design change (i.e., group design to single-case design). These modifications addressed the need for evidence-based ToM interventions that are both proactive and easily implemented by teachers in a classroom setting. Results from the single-case design portion of the study indicate a functional relation between the thought bubble intervention and the participants’ acquisition of the targeted skills in each stage, although progress was not uniform. Results from the pre-post assessments indicate that the children did make progress up the scale, however, children who used spoken language tended to proceed faster through the stages than those who used sign language. These results inform the field in regard to the efficacy and feasibility of a ToM intervention for young DHH children.