Objectives. The empirical qualitative study explored Older People’s (over 65 years of age) perceptions of psychological change and the processes by which these occurred. It also aimed to add to understanding of the barriers to therapeutic change. Subsequently, a systematic review of the current literature pertaining to older people’s attachment styles, and how attachment is measured within this population, was conducted. This scrutinised the literature regarding role of attachment (as a trans-diagnostic construct) in old age, as this may influence their change processes. Design. As the empirical study was exploratory, it adopted a Grounded Theory methodology, influenced by the constructivist perspective as described in Charmaz (2014). Data was obtained via semi-structured interviews, with the later interview schedule grounded in emergent codes and memos of earlier interviews. Literature pertaining to older people, attachment, and how attachment is measured, was obtained from a systematic review. Method. Twelve participants were interviewed using a semi-structured interview, following discharge from an Older Peoples Psychological Therapy Service, for the empirical project. Participants were aged 65 years or over and had received varying models of therapy over varying durations. Those reporting improvement, or no change, as a result of receiving psychological therapy, were approached to participate. Through detailed analysis, a tentative model of older people’s psychological change processes was constructed. This model was further checked by some participants for quality control. Subsequently the systematic review explored a key theme of attachment (as suggested by the categories highlighted in the empirical project). Literature regarding attachment, older people and how attachment is measured within this population, was obtained through a systematic search through major databases, compared against a checklist, constructed for this review, with all analysis prorated by qualified clinical psychologists supervising this study. Results. Interview transcriptions were analysed in line with a constructivist perspective of grounded theory. A non-linear model of psychological change, grounded in the data, was constructed. The main concepts of the model were Age as Context, Seeking Help and Entering the Therapeutic Environment, Building a Therapeutic Relationship, Developing a New Understanding, Therapeutic Changes and Post Therapy Reflections and Commitments of Continuation. In addition, some similar processes were highlighted across different therapeutic modalities, thus supporting trans-theoretical models of psychological change. In addition, the model highlighted a theme of models of relationships having continuity through the lifespan (as evidenced in the concepts of Seeking Help and Building a Therapeutic Relationship). This echoed the trans-therapeutic concept of attachment. Therefore, a systematic review of attachment in older people was conducted. Overall the quality of the literature pertaining to attachment, older people and how attachment is measured within this population was poor. There was a paucity of evidence of minimisation of bias reported in either design or analysis. Conclusions. The empirical project demonstrated the process of psychological change in older people is non-linear in nature. Some constructs of change were similar to those found in the adult literature, but there were also some constructs relating specifically to ageing, and the theoretical developmental stage of old age. This supports suggestions that age specific constructs should be held in mind when working therapeutically with older people. The systematic review found research exploring attachment in older people is a growing field of research, but one which is still in its infancy compared to other clinical populations. In addition, several studies had serious methodological issues and therefore readers are encouraged to interpret their results with caution.

Traditionally, consistency is the only criterion for the quality of a theory in logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions. This work goes beyond that and contributes to the meta-theory of actions by investigating what other properties a good domain description should satisfy. Having Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) as background, we state some meta-theoretical postulates <br />concerning this sore spot. When all postulates are satisfied, we call the action theory modular. We point out the problems that arise when the postulates about modularity are violated, and propose algorithmic checks that can help the designer of an action theory to overcome them. Besides being easier to understand and more elaboration tolerant in McCarthy's sense, modular theories<br />have interesting computational properties. Moreover, we also propose a framework for updating domain descriptions and show the importance modularity has in action theory change.

This paper provides an overview on the evolutionary theory of the firm. The specific feature of the evolutionary approach is that it explains the adaptive behaviors of firms through the tension between innovation and selection. It is suggested that the evolutionary theory can provide a useful basis for a theory of the firm which is concerned with change over time and development. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers Series "Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and Competitiveness"

Accomplishing desired benefits from investments in planned change is problematical for organizations, their leaders and the change agents charged with delivery. This is despite a well-developed literature, replete with advice on how change should be achieved. Examination of this literature shows the primary focus on change agents and their practices. This research widens the focus by observing the influence of change agents, change recipients and line managers on organizational routines undergoing planned change. It examines the interplay between stability and change in organizational routines, adopting a social practice perspective, and the routine intended to change as the unit of analysis (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, 2005). The research builds on claims that to understand the patterns of action within routines requires the internal dynamics – the claimed duality between ostensive (in principle) and performative (in practice) aspects - to be examined. A research method to operationalize the study of this claimed duality was devised following the principles of Strong Structuration (Stones, 2005). This method enabled a unique conceptualization of the study of routine dynamics, focused on planned change from the perspective of multiple, interdependent actors. Two cases of change agents following the advice in the planned change literature were explored. In one case, stability of the routine persisted when change was intended. In the other, change was relatively easy to achieve irrespective of change agent actions. The primary contribution is the demonstration of how the attitudes to change of change recipients, line managers and change agents influence the internal dynamics of routines undergoing planned change. Other contributions pertain to the method of ‘unpacking’ organizational routines and its potential for shaping future practice. This research does not offer new ‘normative’ advice but instead sensitizes planned change practitioners to the level of analysis they need to carry out to ensure that their interventions are suitably designed.

Drawing upon punctuated equilibrium theory, stakeholder salience theory and status quo bias theory, this research develops a framework for dealing with organisational change recipients’ resistance to change. Due to the effects on the organisational environment of political, legal, and technological triggers, organisations need to change in order to survive, remain competitive and prosper. However, deploying a given organisational change, and in particular radical change, is challenging for change managers. A major reason for this is change recipients’ resistance to change. Therefore, this research advances understanding of how to cope with change recipients’ resistance in times of organisational change, and specifically radical planned change i.e. reorientation. To do so, this research develops a framework that incorporates the salience level of change recipients in relation to reorientation program, which has not been considered in prior studies, in association with the modes and causes of their resistance to change to identify relevant strategies that address their resistance to change. The research methodology adopted for the research is qualitative case study. The findings are derived from 30 semi-structured interviews along with relevant documents from two cases (14 interviews from Case A and 16 interviews from Case B) that implemented an organisational reorientation program. The findings reveal that the three attributes of stakeholder salience theory (i.e. power, legitimacy, and urgency) are inadequate to identify the salience of change recipients in relation to change. In addition to these attributes, a further attribute is required, which defines the extent to which change recipients are affected by change namely the attribute of impact. Furthermore, the findings introduce seven strategies (negotiation and agreement, education, implicit coercion, persuasion by peers, two-way communication, facilitation, and rewards) that are effective for overcoming the resistance to change of recipients who belong to six salience classes and resist change for different reasons and to various levels. These findings make a theoretical contribution to each of the theories employed in the research, punctuated equilibrium theory, stakeholder salience theory, and status quo bias theory, as well as the extant literature regarding strategies to cope with change recipients’ resistance to change. The findings have implications for practice by introducing a diagnostic tool that change managers can use to explore the modes and causes of change recipients’ resistance as well as their levels of salience in relation to change.

This thesis consists in six articles and a comprehensive summary. • The pourpose of the summary is to introduce the AGM theory of belief change and to exemplify the diversity and significance of the research that has been inspired by the AGM article in the last 25 years. The research areas associated with AGM was divided in three parts: criticisms, where we discussed some of the more common criticisms of AGM. Extensions where the most common extensions and variations of AGM are presented and applications where we provided an overview of applications and connections with other areas of research. • Article I elaborates on the connection between partial meet contractions [AGM85] and kernel contractions [Han94a] in belief change theory. Also both functions are equivalent in belief sets, there are notequivalent in belief bases. A way to define incision functions (used in kernel contractions) from selection functions (used in partial meet contractions) and vice versa is presented. It is explained under which conditions there are exact correspondences between selection and incision functions so that the same contraction operations can be obtained by using either of them. • Article II proposes an axiomatic characterization for ensconcement-based contraction functions, belief base functions proposed byWilliams and relates this function with other kinds of base contraction functions. • Article III adapts the Fermé and Hansson model of Shielded Contraction [FH01] as well as Hansson et all Credibility-Limited Revision [HFCF01] for belief bases, to join two of the many variations of the AGM model [AGM85], i.e. those in which knowledge is represented through belief bases instead of logic theories, and those in which the object of the epistemic change does not get the priority over the existing information as it is the case in the AGM model. • Article IV introduces revision by comparison a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of propositions. Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. The method uses reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of information. Two kinds of semantics for this idea are proposed and a logical characterization of the new model is given. • Article V focuses on the extension of AGM that allows change for a belief base by a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. In [FH94], Fuhrmann and Hansson presented an axiomatic for Multiple Contraction and a construction based on the AGM Partial Meet Contraction. This essay proposes for their model another way to construct functions: Multiple Kernel Contraction, that is a modification of Kernel Contraction,proposed by Hansson [Han94a] to construct classical AGM contractions and belief base contractions. • Article VI relates AGM model with the DFT model proposed by Carlos Alchourrón [Alc93]. Alchourrón devoted his last years to the analysis of the notion of defeasible conditionalization. His definition of the defeasible conditional is given in terms of strict implication operator and a modal operator f which is interpreted as a revision function at the language level. This essay points out that this underlying revision function is more general than AGM revision. In addition, a complete characterization of that more general kind of revision that permits to unify models of revision given by other authors is given. / QC 20110211

Η Αλλαγή Πεποιθήσεων είναι το πεδίο που ασχολείται, μελετά και τυποποιεί ένα πλήθος διαδικασιών της συλλογιστικής σκέψης. Οι θεμελιώδεις αρχές της βρίσκονται σε διάφορα φιλοσοφικά συστήματα της περιόδου της αρχαιότητας. Ωστόσο, η σύγχρονη προβληματική που αναπτύσσεται γύρω από το πεδίο αυτό και που καλείται να αντιμετωπίσει εντάσσεται στην ευρύτερη περιοχή της Αναπαράστασης της Γνώσης. Στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 80 και ύστερα από την προσπάθεια μετάβασης σε πιο συστηματικές και μαθηματικές προσεγγίσεις, η Αλλαγή Πεποιθήσεων αποκτά την τελική της μορφή. Ο όρος Αλλαγή διαιρείται σε τρεις ευρείες υπό-ενότητες: την πρόσθεση, την αφαίρεση και την αναθεώρηση. Η πρόσθεση αναφέρεται στη συλλογή νέων πληροφοριών (επέκταση πεποιθήσεων), η αφαίρεση την απώλεια πληροφορίας, ενώ η αναθεώρηση ερμηνεύει τη μερική ή ολική αλλαγή στο σύνολο των πεποιθήσεών μας, εξαιτίας της εμφάνισης μίας νέας πεποίθησης. Κάθε διαδικασία Αλλαγής συνοδεύεται από ένα σύνολο ορθολογικών αξιωμάτων. Τα αξιώματα διατυπώθηκαν με κύριο σκοπό την ομαδοποίηση, ταξινόμηση και περιορισμό των συλλογιστικών μας ενεργειών. Εκτός από τους τύπους αλλαγών και τα σύνολα των αξιωμάτων που αναφέρθηκαν στο χώρο της Αλλαγής Πεποιθήσεων υπάρχουν και άλλες σημαντικές - συμπληρωματικές διαδικασίες. Μία από τις πιο γνωστές και επωφελείς είναι αυτή της Επαναλαμβανόμενης Αναθεώρησης. Ενώ η απλή αναθεώρηση ερμηνεύει καταστάσεις που προξενούνται από την εμφάνιση μίας και μόνο πληροφορίας, η επαναλαμβανόμενη αναθεώρηση διασαφηνίζει περιπτώσεις μάθησης μέσα από το φάσμα των διαδοχικών πεποιθήσεων. Η παρούσα διατριβή θα μπορούσε να διαιρεθεί σε τρεις μεγάλες κατηγορίες. Η πρώτη εξετάζει συστηματικά τις διάφορες μεθόδους και τεχνικές που αναφέρονται στη διεθνή βιβλιογραφία. Η δεύτερη περιλαμβάνει την κυριότερη ερευνητική μας συνεισφορά καθώς και οι προτάσεις μας πάνω σε ανοικτά προβλήματα της Αλλαγής των Πεποιθήσεων. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, στο αρχικό στάδιο της έρευνάς μας αποτυπώνεται η προσπάθεια σύνδεσης της αναθεώρησης με την επαναλαμβανόμενη αναθεώρηση πεποιθήσεων. Η σύνδεση αυτή επιτυγχάνεται με την εισαγωγή ενός νέου αξιώματος που ονομάζουμε αξίωμα επαναλαμβανόμενης ανάκτησης. Αποδεικνύεται ότι το αξίωμα της επαναλαμβανόμενης ανάκτησης μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθεί σε πολλές περιπτώσεις κατά τις οποίες το δεύτερο αξίωμα (DP2) των Darwiche και Pearl χαρακτηρίζεται αρκετά ισχυρό. Αποδεικνύουμε επίσης την ορθότητα και πληρότητα του παραπάνω αξιώματος μέσα από το σύστημα σφαιρών του Adam Grove. Στη συνέχεια η έρευνά μας στρέφεται στην προσπάθεια σύνδεσης δύο πολύ σημαντικών περιοχών στην αλλαγή πεποιθήσεων: την Επαναλαμβανόμενη και τη Relevance-Sensitive αναθεώρηση πεποιθήσεων. Τα αποτελέσματα της απόδειξης αφενός αποκαλύπτουν την ύπαρξη μη-συνέπειας μεταξύ τους αξιώματος (P) για τη Relevanse-Sensitive αναθεώρηση πεποιθήσεων με κάθε ένα από τα (DP) αξιώματα της επαναλαμβανόμενης αναθεώρησης πεποιθήσεων, αφετέρου αξιώνουν μία αναγκαία και γενικότερη αποκατάσταση στα τυπικά μοντέλα της αλλαγής πεποιθήσεων. Ακόμη μπορεί να αποδοθεί στη δική μας έρευνα και κάτι διαφορετικό, σε σχέση με τις άλλες: ότι η διαδικασία της αφαίρεσης πεποιθήσεων βασίζεται σε Horn Clauses. Ωστόσο, η αμιγής ερευνητική μας προσπάθεια αναφέρεται την παροχή σημασιολογίας βασιζόμενη σε διατάξεις πιθανών κόσμων για τη διαδικασία του e-contraction που εισήγαγε ο James Delgrande. Η Τρίτη κατηγορία, τέλος, αποβλέπει στην παρουσίαση της κλασσικής θεωρίας της Αναθεώρησης Πεποιθήσεων μέσα από την εφαρμογή της στην επιστήμη των υπολογιστών και πιο συγκεκριμένα, μέσω του Σημασιολογικού Ιστού. / Belief Change is an area that studies and standardizes several reasoning processes. However, the problems it has to confront rest in the wider area of Knowledge Representation. In the mid-1980s and after a transition effort to more systematic and mathematical Approaches, the Belief Change gets into its final form. The term “change” splits in three wide subgroups: expansion, contraction and revision. The expansion regards the collection of new information (belief expansion), while contraction concerns the loss of information. Finally, the revision explains the partial or total change in our beliefs, deriving from the appearance of new information. Every Change process is coupled with several rational postulates. Those were mainly formulated to group, classify and constrain our reasoning. Apart from the change formulas and the postulates mentioned above, in the field of Belief Change there are other important – additional processes. One of the most known and useful is the Iterated Revision. While the simple Revision explains conditions that are induced from the emergence of one and only information, the Iterated Revision clarifies cases of learning through the spectrum of successive beliefs. The present dissertation is classified in three major categories. The first one concerns the systematic study of several methods and techniques found in the international bibliography. The second incorporates our main contribution in research and our propositions with regard in open problems of the Belief Change. More specifically, the initial stage of our research is an effort to connect the revision with the iterated belief revision. This connection is achieved with the introduction of a new postulate called “iterated recovery postulate”. It is also established that the iterated recovery postulate (IR) can be used in many cases where the second postulate DP2, by Darwiche and Pearl, is qualified as rather strong. Moreover, we prove hereby that the postulate is sound and complete through the Adam Grove’s System of Spheres. Our research continues to connect two very important areas in the Belief Change: the Iterated and the Relevance-Sensitive belief revision. The conclusions of this proof reveal the inconsistency between the (P) postulate, regarding the Relevance-Sensitive belief revision, with “each and every one” of the DP postulates of the iterated belief revision. Likewise, they urge for a broad and imperative recovery of the “belief change” typical models. Unlike others, our contribution in research has to do with the belief contraction process, based on Horn Clauses. Our pure research regards the provision of semantics based on possible worlds orderings for the process of e-contraction, introduced by James Delgrande. Finally, the third category tries to present the classical theory of Belief Revision through its application in the computer science and specifically through the Semantic Web.

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The ability to change one's beliefs in a rational manner is one of many facets of the abilities of an intelligent agent. Central to any investigation of belief change is the notion of an epistemic state. This dissertation is mainly concerned with three issues involving epistemic states: 1. How should an epistemic state be represented? 2. How does an agent use an epistemic state to perform belief change? 3. How does an agent arrive at a particular epistemic state? With regard to the first question, note that there are many different methods for constructing belief change operations. We argue that semantic constructions involving ordered pairs, each consisting of a set of beliefs and an ordering on the set of "possible worlds" (or equivalently, on the set of basic independent bits of information) are, in an important sense, more fundamental. Our answer to the second question provides indirect support for the use of semantic structures. We show how well-known belief change operations and related structures can be modelled semantically. Furthermore, we introduce new forms of belief change related operations and structures which are all defined, and motivated, in terms of such semantic representational formalisms. These include a framework for unifying belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, new versions of entrenchment orderings on beliefs, novel approaches to withdrawal operations, and an expanded view of iterated belief change. The third question is. one which has not received much attention in the belief change literature. We propose to extract extra-logical information from the formal representation of an agent's set of beliefs, which can then be used in the construction of epistemic state. his proposal is just a first approximation, although it seems to have the potential for developing into a full-fledged theory. / Computing / D.Phil.(Computer Science)

The ability to change one's beliefs in a rational manner is one of many facets of the abilities of an intelligent agent. Central to any investigation of belief change is the notion of an epistemic state. This dissertation is mainly concerned with three issues involving epistemic states: 1. How should an epistemic state be represented? 2. How does an agent use an epistemic state to perform belief change? 3. How does an agent arrive at a particular epistemic state? With regard to the first question, note that there are many different methods for constructing belief change operations. We argue that semantic constructions involving ordered pairs, each consisting of a set of beliefs and an ordering on the set of "possible worlds" (or equivalently, on the set of basic independent bits of information) are, in an important sense, more fundamental. Our answer to the second question provides indirect support for the use of semantic structures. We show how well-known belief change operations and related structures can be modelled semantically. Furthermore, we introduce new forms of belief change related operations and structures which are all defined, and motivated, in terms of such semantic representational formalisms. These include a framework for unifying belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, new versions of entrenchment orderings on beliefs, novel approaches to withdrawal operations, and an expanded view of iterated belief change. The third question is. one which has not received much attention in the belief change literature. We propose to extract extra-logical information from the formal representation of an agent's set of beliefs, which can then be used in the construction of epistemic state. his proposal is just a first approximation, although it seems to have the potential for developing into a full-fledged theory. / Computing / D.Phil.(Computer Science)