Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1983 / Bibliography: leaves [185]-188. / Microfiche. / vii, 188 leaves, bound 29 cm

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 135-145).

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The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

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The central thesis of this dissertation is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from psychological investigation. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of justified beliefs a psychological capacity which humans do not have. A different way of stating this view is that the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from psychological investigation. In sum, there is a meta-theoretical constraint of psychological realism on accounts of epistemic justification which requires appeal to psychological investigation in its employment. After defending these proposals, I illustrate how the constraint of psychological realism has been and can be used both to test candidate accounts of epistemic justification and to guide the construction of such an account which is intuitive and psychologically realistic. These two kinds of applications of the constraint can involve either scientific or non-scientific psychological investigation. I give examples from current epistemological literature of critical employments of the constraint which appeal to both of these kinds of psychological investigation. Finally, in illustrating the role of the constraint of psychological realism in guiding the construction of an account of epistemic justification, I consider both reliabilist views and a variety of positions which feature the notion of cognitive design. I suggest that this latter approach holds out promise for yielding an account of epistemic justification which is both psychologically realistic and intuitive.

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Western science claims to provide unique, objective information about the world. This is supported by the observation that peoples across cultures will agree upon a common description of the physical world. Further, the use of scientific instruments and mathematics is claimed to enable the objectification of science. In this work, carried out by reviewing the scientific literature, the above claims are disputed systematically by evaluating the definition of physical reality and the scientific method, showing that empiricism relies ultimately upon the human senses for the evaluation of scientific theories and that measuring instruments cannot replace the human sensory system. Nativist and constructivist theories of human sensory development are reviewed, and it is shown that nativist claims of core conceptual knowledge cannot be supported by the findings in the literature, which shows that perception does not simply arise from a process of maturation. Instead, sensory function requires a long process of learning through interactions with the environment. To more rigorously define physical reality and systematically evaluate the stability of perception, and thus the basis of empiricism, the development of the method of dimension analysis is reviewed. It is shown that this methodology, relied upon for the mathematical analysis of physical quantities, is itself based upon empiricism, and that all of physical reality can be described in terms of the three fundamental dimensions of mass, length and time. Hereafter the sensory modalities that inform us about these three dimensions are systematically evaluated. The following careful analysis of neuronal plasticity in these modalities shows that all the relevant senses acquire from the environment the capacity to apprehend physical reality. It is concluded that physical reality is acquired rather than given innately, and leads to the position that science cannot provide unique results. Rather, those it can provide are sufficient for a particular environmental setting.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1981. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 181-186). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 152 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-134).