Over the past 25 years, there has been tremendous interest in the development of children’s ability to reason about others’ mental states, or “theory of mind”. Much research has explored children's understanding of situational cues that lead to knowledge, but only recently has research begun to assess children's understanding of person-specific differences in knowledge. A number of studies (Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig, Clément & Harris, 2004) have recently demonstrated that at least by age 3 children pay attention to others' history of accuracy and use it as a cue when deciding from whom to learn. However, the nature and scope of children's interpretations of other's prior accuracy remains unclear. Experiment 1 assessed whether 4- and 5-year-olds interpret prior accuracy as indicative of knowledge, as opposed to two other accounts that do not involve epistemic attributions. This experiment revealed that preschool children can revise their tendency to prefer to learn from a previously accurate informant over an inaccurate one when presented with evidence regarding each informant's current knowledge state. Experiment 2 investigated how broadly a person's history of accuracy influences children's subsequent inferences, and showed that 5-year-olds (but not 4-year-olds) use information about an individual's past accuracy to predict her knowledge in other related domains as well as her propensity for prosocial or antisocial behaviour. Overall, children's performance in these experiments suggests that both 4- and 5-year-olds interpret others' history of accuracy as indicative of knowledge; however, 4-year-olds make a more restricted attribution of knowledge while 5-year-olds make a more stable, trait-like attribution. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for research on theory of mind and more broadly on children's social and cognitive development. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

A broad review of assessment and intervention research relevant to Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, 1985) and Autism Spectrum Disorders from birth to age twelve was conducted. Nine assessment articles were reviewed to examine the major differences between children with autism spectrum disorders and children who are typically developing, particularly in the area of social perception. Assessment tasks aimed to discover a child's thoughts relevant to another's thoughts, beliefs, and emotions. It was discovered that children with autism spectrum disorders performed less well on Theory of Mind tasks, and tended to provide responses that were more egocentric and idiosyncratic in nature. A review of the intervention research revealed improvement in Theory of Mind domains is possible when teaching strategies explicitly target goals relevant to perspective taking. Generalization of skills to natural environments was a lacking area across all twelve articles, indicating a need for more intensive practice in natural environments. Interestingly, when social skills were taught in the absence of Theory of Mind training, no collateral effects were observed to Theory of Mind domain. / text

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This study was conducted to investigate the extent to which affectionate physical contact (i.e., cuddling) affects preschoolers’ and parents’ abilities to engage in theory-of-mind reasoning. We explored the hypothesis that if affectionate contact affected theory-of-mind, then preschoolers and parents who cuddled would outperform those who did not. To test this hypothesis, we recruited 44 preschool aged children (3.8-4.6-year-olds) and their primary caregivers. We found that children who cuddled with their primary caregiver during a storybook reading task performed significantly better on theory-of-mind tasks compared to children who did not receive a cuddle. Importantly, our findings support the contention that affectionate contact affected children’s performance on theory-of-mind related tasks specifically, but not performance on executive functioning or non-mental representation tasks. A secondary goal of this study was to explore whether any effects of affectionate contact would be mediated by functional polymorphisms of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR). Although we were unable to obtain a sample size that was sufficient to directly test this hypothesis, we found that parents homozygous for the G allele at rs2254298 were significantly better at decoding the affective mental states of others compared to those who carried at least one A allele. Thus, our results support the hypotheses that affectionate contact promotes children’s theory-of-mind reasoning abilities and that adult’s mental state decoding skills can be predicted by allelic variations on the OXTR gene. This study offers preliminary support for the role of affectionate contact and, separately, the oxytocinergic system on tasks related to theory-of-mind reasoning. These claims are discussed with respect to possible alternative explanations for our findings, as well as future directions to directly test the extent to which such experiential and psychobiological factors can affect theory-of-mind reasoning. / Thesis (Master, Neuroscience Studies) -- Queen's University, 2013-08-15 14:13:54.174

One of the most heavily researched topics of cognitive development concerns children's growing understanding of people's behaviors as reflecting mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. Anthropomorphism is the overextension of this conceptual framework, referred to as "theory of mind", to nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. In this dissertation, I investigate the development and correlates of anthropomorphism building on and extending past research with children and adults. In Study 1, I investigated the relation between anthropomorphism, social understanding, and social behaviors that are known to correlate with theory of mind, such as empathy, and prosocial attitudes in a college sample (N = 919). Contrary to my predictions, results showed that anthropomorphism is only weakly related to the measures of social understanding. There was, however, some evidence for a link between anthropomorphism and imaginary companions; individuals who had a history of imaginary companions scored higher on anthropomorphism. In Study 2, I examined the link between theory of mind and anthropomorphism in preschool children. In addition, I investigated the developmental trajectory of anthropomorphism from age 4 to 6 and the relation between anthropomorphism and role play and social preferences. Seventy-four children (36 girls; Mage = 5 years, 5 months; SD = 9 months) took part in this study. In order to assess anthropomorphism in this age group, I used two methods: interview and movie narrative measures. Results revealed no age-related changes in anthropomorphism scores of the children. As in Study 1, I did not find a strong relationship between the theory of mind measures and anthropomorphism. There was, however, more evidence for a link between the interview measure of anthropomorphism and role play, and social preferences of children. Overall, in both studies, theory of mind, the most obvious candidate as a correlate of anthropomorphism, was, at best, not a strong predictor of the anthropomorphism, suggesting the need to rethink how developing knowledge about people is related to the overextension of this knowledge to nonhuman entities. It is possible that a rudimentary understanding of humans is necessary to be able to overextend it, but whether you overextend it might be linked to other factors.

The current study examined whether there is a curvilinear association between differential parenting and children’s Theory of Mind (ToM) and two similar abilities we defined as “ToM- in-Action”. These were, use of perspective taking language and cognitive sensitivity (providing tailored verbal or non-verbal guidance) while completing a challenging task with a younger sibling. A community sample of 372 children (52% were males, average age=5.6), their younger siblings (average age=3.14) and their mothers were observed in their homes. Findings showed a linear association rather than a curvilinear effect, where favored older siblings had significantly poorer cognitive sensitivity and perspective taking when interacting with their younger sibling in a challenging task. This relationship remained significant when other variables such as age and SES were controlled. The relationship between differential parenting and ToM was non-significant. Results demonstrate the specific and complex impact of differential parenting on children’s social cognition.

Vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by extensive interpersonal dysfunction. A framework that has been used to understand this impairment is theory of mind, or the ability to decode and reason about others’ mental states. Previous research has identified a mental state decoding advantage in individuals with a past history of MDD, which has been explained in terms of an enhanced social orientation in those with depression vulnerability. Although social phobia is highly comorbid with MDD, there is no research investigating theory of mind abilities in individuals with social phobia, nor has there been research examining how social anxiety may better account for the relation of depression to heightened theory of mind ability. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research investigating whether evidence of such a relation extends to the more complex task of reasoning about others’ mental states. Thus, the goals of the current investigation were to examine whether heightened ToM accuracy in those with a history of MDD is better accounted for by social phobia, and whether superior ToM skills in those with past MDD are seen across tasks that tap the domains of decoding and reasoning. Participants (N = 109) were assigned to one of four groups based on a structured diagnostic interview: (a) past MDD only (n = 36); (b) social anxiety disorder only (n = 9); (c) comorbid past MDD and social anxiety disorder (n = 23); and (d) no psychiatric history (n = 41). Results show that having a history of MDD is associated with heightened mental state reasoning abilities only in the presence of current social phobia. However, theory of mind decoding was not elevated in this condition. This suggests that social phobia differentially influences the relation of past MDD and theory of mind ability for decoding and reasoning abilities. Furthermore, social phobia without a history of depression was associated with poor theory of mind decoding and reasoning. This reduced ability in individuals with social phobia may be the result of self-focused attention or avoidance of potential negative evaluation, but future research is required to specifically address these possibilities. / Thesis (Master, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2012-08-28 10:30:44.686

The current study examined whether there is a curvilinear association between differential parenting and children’s Theory of Mind (ToM) and two similar abilities we defined as “ToM- in-Action”. These were, use of perspective taking language and cognitive sensitivity (providing tailored verbal or non-verbal guidance) while completing a challenging task with a younger sibling. A community sample of 372 children (52% were males, average age=5.6), their younger siblings (average age=3.14) and their mothers were observed in their homes. Findings showed a linear association rather than a curvilinear effect, where favored older siblings had significantly poorer cognitive sensitivity and perspective taking when interacting with their younger sibling in a challenging task. This relationship remained significant when other variables such as age and SES were controlled. The relationship between differential parenting and ToM was non-significant. Results demonstrate the specific and complex impact of differential parenting on children’s social cognition.

This thesis is about common-sense psychology and its role in cognitive science. Put simply, the argument is that common-sense psychology is important because it offers clues to some complex problems in cognitive science, and because common-sense psychology has significant effects on our intuitions, both in science and on an everyday level. The thesis develops a theory of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology. Anthropomorphism, the natural human tendency to ascribe human characteristics (and especially human mental characteristics) to things that aren't human, is an important theme in the thesis. Anthropomorphism reveals an endemic anthropocentricity that deeply influences our thinking about other minds. The thesis then constructs a descriptive model of anthropomorphism in common-sense psychology, and uses it to analyse two studies of the ascription of mental states. The first, Baron- Cohen et al. 's (1985) false belief test, shows how cognitive modelling can be used to compare different theories of common-sense psychology. The second study, Searle's (1980) `Chinese Room', shows 'that this same model can reproduce the patterns of scientific intuitions taken to systems which pass the Turing test (Turing, 1950), suggesting that it is best seen as a common-sense test for a mind, not a scientific one. Finally, the thesis argues that scientific theories involving the ascription of mentality through a model or a metaphor are partly dependent on each individual scientist's common-sense psychology. To conclude, this thesis develops an interdisciplinary study of common-sense psychology and shows that its effects are more wide ranging than is commonly thought. This means that it affects science more than might be expected, but that careful study can help us to become mindful of these effects. Within this new framework, a proper understanding of common-sense psychology could lay important new foundations for the future of cognitive science.

Theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others and to predict their behaviour based on inferences about their mental states, for example their perception, desires, or beliefs. Forty years ago, research on theory of mind originated from the question of whether or not chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have a theory of mind, a question that – after all this time – is still debated. In the present thesis, I investigate theory of mind and its precursors in birds of the crow family, specifically Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius), California scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica), and carrion crows (Corvus corone corone). Corvids have been reported to possess theory of mind-like abilities. This qualification reflects the fact that most research on theory of mind in these birds has revolved around the ability to respond to perceptual and desire states of conspecifics, and so far has not produced evidence for or against an ability to also respond to others’ beliefs. Further, it is unclear which mechanisms could be the basis of corvids’ abilities. Thus, there are two open questions in regard to corvid theory of mind my thesis aims to address. To address these questions, first, I investigated the ability of Eurasian jays to respond to the false belief of a conspecific in a caching paradigm, where the knowledge of a conspecific observer about the accessibility of two caching sites was manipulated (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 I explore which behavioural cues might present the basis of the jays’ ability to respond to the desire of a conspecific in a caching context. In Chapter 4, I report a study on biological motion perception in scrub-jays, a phenomenon suggested to be crucial for the detection of social agents. In Chapter 5, I assess scrub-jays’ sensitivity to gaze of a human and a conspecific. Finally, in Chapter 6, I report a study investigating the face inversion effect in carrion crows, an effect that is indicative of a ‘special’ relevance of faces. I conclude by discussing how the presented studies could help us inform our understanding of corvid theory of mind-like abilities.