For nearly 30 years, researchers have been proposing and testing theories of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie children’s abilities to comprehend the mental states of others and to predict behavior on the basis of those abilities. One such theory, the “theory theory,” contends that children evaluate their own understanding of others’ minds, developing a theory and expanding it when they encounter situations incongruent with their predictions. Wellman and Liu (2004) present a scale of the changes that children’s understanding of mental state representations commonly undergo as children develop a mature theory of mind. The present study aims to clarify how children pass from one stage of understanding to the next, employing a training study paradigm to examine the possible role of verbal scaffolding on children’s progression in this sequence. Specifically, the present study hypothesizes that verbally emphasizing the connection between one’s knowledge and thoughts will advance children’s performance on false belief tasks. This hypothesis was not supported. Even though children may appear to be at the same developmental level on Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale, the variation in their performances after training may indicate more nuanced underlying processes than are currently expressed by Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale.

Poor Insight is a common symptom of schizophrenia and it is conceptualised as having at least three principal components, namely unawareness of symptoms, unawareness of the need for treatment, and unawareness of the consequences of the disorder. These deficits have long been of clinical interest and have been shown to predict poorer treatment compliance, clinical outcome, social function, and response to vocational rehabilitation (Amador & David, 2004). Additionally, difficulties to establish and maintain social relationships are core features of schizophrenia, and there is evidence that these may to some extent stem from an alteration of the neural circuits that regulate social behaviour, and in particular deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) (Lee et al., 2004). While deficits in insight in schizophrenia have been widely and consistently reported in the literature, evidence on the nature of the ToM dysfunction in this disorder is still controversial. This is mainly due to methodological differences across studies as well as limitations regarding the instruments used for ToM assessment. The first aim of this research consisted of clarifying some of these issues -whether a specific ToM dysfunction existed in schizophrenia and whether this most suitably fitted in the state or trait deficit views- trying to overcome previous methodological drawbacks. We did so by the use of a well matched control group, by controlling for important confounds and by the inclusion of ToM instruments of different nature (verbal and pictorial tasks). Results of this project were included in a first paper (Pousa et al., 2008a) and also led to the publication of a letter discussing part of the conclusions of a recent meta-analysis on ToM in schizophrenia (Pousa, Ruiz & David, 2008). Following this preliminary work and on the basis of a number of phenomenological parallelisms between insight and ToM dysfunctions that could be appreciated both clinically and in the literature, we decided to explore the relationship between insight and ToM. Given the scarcity of previous studies specifically focused on this issue, the nature of the study was mainly exploratory. The most relevant results of this investigation led to a second paper (Pousa et al., 2008b).Besides the mentioned publications, two complementary published works are added in the present thesis for their relevance to the project. The first is the manuscript of the Spanish adaptation of the SUMD (Ruiz et al., 2007). The second is a chapter of a book on mental disorders from an evolutionary perspective, titled "Theory of Mind as an evolutionary brain module". This chapter describes the concept of ToM, its measurement, as well as its neurobiological basis and philogenetic development, and was part of the literature review carried out while working on the design of the project (Obiols & Pousa, 2005). References:- Amador X & David A. Insight and Psychosis. Awareness of illness in schizophrenia and Related Disorders. (2nd Edition) (2004). Oxford University Press. - Lee KH; Farrow TFD; Spence SA & Woodruff PWR. (2004) Social cognition, brain networks and schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine 34: 391-400.- Obiols, JE; Pousa, E. (2005) La Teoría de la Mente como módulo cerebral evolutivo. En J Sanjuan y CJ Cela Conde (Eds) 2005, cap 6, pp105-119. La Profecia de Darwin. Ars Médica. ISBN: 84-9751-090-9- Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Brébion, G; David, AS; Ruiz, AI; Obiols, JE. (2008a) Theory of mind deficits in chronic schizophrenia: evidence for state dependence. Psychiatry Research, 158: 1-10.- Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Navarro, B; Ruiz, AI, Obiols, JE; David, AS. (2008b) Exploratory study of the association between insight and Theory of Mind (ToM) in stable schizophrenia patients. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13, 210-232.- Pousa, E; Ruiz, AI; David, AS. (2008). Mentalising impairment as a trait marker of schizophrenia? Correspondence. British Journal of Psychiatry, 192, 312-315.- Ruiz, AI; Pousa, E; Duñó, R; Crosas, JM; Cuppa, S; Garcia-Ribera, C. (2008). Adaptación al español de la Escala de Valoración de la No Conciencia de Trastorno Mental SUMD. Actas Españolas de Psiquiatria, 36, 111-118.

Theory of mind är att kunna tillskriva andra människor mentala tillstånd som förklarar deras beteenden. Dessa mentala tillstånd kan röra sig om uppfattningar, intentioner eller känslor.    Theory of Mind Scale är en bedömningsskala utformad av Wellman och Liu (2004), som undersöker olika nivåer av theory of mind. Theory of Mind Scale är uppbyggd i skalsteg med stigande svårighetsgrad. Syftet med föreliggande studie var att översätta Theory of Mind Scale från engelska till svenska samt validera bedömningsskalan för barn mellan 3 och 4 år. Studien syftade även till att se om det fanns ett samband mellan dessa barns förmåga till theory of mind, impressiva grammatiska förmåga och impressiva ordförråd.      Valideringen i föreliggande studie visade att skalstegen i den amerikanska originalversionen av Theory of Mind Scale var applicerbara på barnen i föreliggande studie, med undantag för den sista uppgiften. Istället för att exkludera den sista uppgiften skulle ett alternativ till en bedömningsskala kunna vara att jämföra barns resultat mot ett medelvärde med en normalvariation. I föreliggande studie kunde ett barn mellan 3;0 och 3;11 års ålder förväntas klara 2,83 ± 2,50 uppgifter och ett barn mellan 4;0 och 4;11 års ålder förväntas klara 3,71 ± 1,50 uppgifter.    Resultaten visade att sambandet var starkare mellan ickeverbal intelligens och theory of mind än mellan impressivt ordförråd och theory of mind. Inget signifikant samband fanns mellan impressiv grammatisk förmåga och theory of mind. Översättningen och valideringen som gjorts i samband med föreliggande uppsats gör det möjligt att kvalitativt använda bedömningsskalan i det kliniska arbetet med barn som misstänks ha svårigheter med theory of mind. / Theory of mind is an ability to ascribe other people mental states to explain their behaviors. These mental states may regard beliefs, intentions or feelings.    Theory of Mind Scale is an evaluation scale designed by Wellman and Liu (2004). The scale consists of different scale steps of theory of mind, with an increasing difficulty. The purpose of this study was to translate Theory of Mind Scale from English to Swedish and validate the scale for children from the age of 3 to 4 years. The study also aims to examine if there is any relationship between children’s theory of mind, grammatical understanding, receptive vocabulary and non-verbal intelligence.    The validation of the present study showed that the order of the scale steps in the American original version of the Theory of Mind Scale was applicable to the children in the present study, with an exeption of the last task (real-apparent emotion). An alternative to the scale would be to compare the children’s performance against a normal variation. According to the present study a child between the age of 3;0 and 3;11 years could be expected to complete 2,83 ± 2,50 tasks and a child between the age of 4;0 and 4;11 years could be expected to complete 3,71 ± 1,50 tasks.    The results indicated a stronger correlation between theory of mind and non-verbal inteligence than between theory of mind and receptive vocabulary in children between the age of 3;0 and 4;11 years. No significant correlation existed between receptive grammar and theory of mind. The translation and validation of Theory of Mind Scale enables qualitative clinical investigations of theory of mind deficits in children.

A landmark experiment by Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn, and Paul Bloom demonstrated that infants as young as 6 months old possess previously unrecognized abilities to form social evaluations. In the experiment, infants were shown a shape that was made to appear as if it was climbing a hill. In one event, another shape helped the climber up the hill, while in a separate event, a different shape prevented the climber from reaching the top. When offered a choice between the helping and hindering shapes, both 6- and 10-month-olds chose the helping shape over the hindering shape, showing that they had evaluated the actions and preferred the helper as a result. In an additional test, the climber was made to appear as if it was "choosing" the helping shape or the hindering shape. Infant looking times were measured in order to assess which "choice" was more surprising. Interestingly, the 6-month-olds looked equally for both events, while the 10-month-olds looked longer when the hinderer was approached. This demonstrated that the 10-month-olds were attributing preferences to the climber, and expected that the climber would prefer the helper just as they had. This ability was apparently beyond that of the 6-month-olds, but no assessment or explanation has been offered for why this would be. The current study attempted to remedy this problem by replicating this experiment with 7- and 8-month-olds. The 7-month-olds in this experiment performed as expected, preferring the helper over the hinderer. The 8-month-olds, however, showed no clear preference. This was unexpected and not easily explainable. Neither age showed a difference in looking time whether the climber approached the helper or the hinderer. These looking time data suggest that 7- and 8-month-olds are closer to 6-month-olds in their ability to attribute evaluations to other agents, indicating that these abilities do not develop until later infancy, around 9 or 10 months. However, lack of significant results on the looking time test need not indicate a lack of social knowledge, and may instead stem more directly from developing theory of mind abilities. Options for future studies pitting social knowledge against theory of mind are explored.

It is well known that humans are able to represent the mental states of others. This ability is commonly thought to be unique to humans. However, recent studies on the food caching, gift giving, and cooperative behaviours of Corvids and Parrots provide evidence for this ability in birds. Upon examining the empirical evidence, I argue that the best explanation for these behaviours is that birds are able to represent conspecifics as having particular mental states. I further argue that birds are able to do this by simulating the minds of conspecifics.

This study investigated the Internal State (IS) language input of parents, IS language use by children, and children’s performance on perspective taking and false belief Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. Two groups of participants were included: children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (N = 12, M chronological age = 7; 4, M language age = 6;0) and typically-developing (TD) children (N = 13, M chronological age = 6;0, M language age= 6;5), matched on language age. Independent means samples t-tests showed that the transcripts of the two groups of parents or the two groups of children did not differ in regards to total number of words, utterances, or mean length of utterance. ANOVAs were used to test for differences in IS language category or elaboration in the two groups (ASD, TD), in parents and children. For the parent data, no statistically significant differences emerged. For the analysis of child talk the ANOVA revealed that the main effect of group approached significance, with a trend towards TD children using more IS language than children with ASD. ANOVAs were also used to test for differences in ToM task performance (perspective-taking, false belief) in the two groups of children; TD children performed significantly better on ToM Tasks overall than the children with ASD. Partial correlations found that for the TD group, there were no significant correlations between the parent’s or the child’s use of IS language with the child’s performance on ToM tasks when chronological age was controlled for. For the ASD group, after controlling for chronological age and language age, the parent’s use of elaborated affect terms was significantly positively correlated with their child’s performance score on perspective-taking tasks, and the parent’s use of elaborated cognitive terms was significantly negatively correlated with their child’s performance on false-belief tasks. Also for the ASD group, the child’s use of simple affect terms was significantly positively correlated with their performance on false belief tasks after controlling for chronological age and language age. Findings are discussed in relation to prior research and clinical implications.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to recognize that individuals have mental states such as beliefs, perspectives, and emotions that guide their behaviour. The measures that are currently used to assess ToM are highly dependent upon linguistic skill, and typically ignore affective ToM. In the present study, two non-verbal affective ToM tasks were created. The Affective Visual Theory of Mind Task (AVToM) assessed the perception of emotions such as happy or sad, while the Emotional Narrative Task (ENT) assessed the ability to recognize the more complicated emotion of embarrassment. Participants also completed two established ToM assessments, thus allowing us to examine the relationships between the various ToM tasks. Positive correlations were found between some of the different ToM measures; importantly, these relationships were not mediated by verbal skill. However, the correlations between the measures were weak, suggesting that each task may be assessing different, but overlapping, components of ToM.

Barns fem första levnadsår präglas av en omfattande utveckling av språkliga förmågor och exekutiva funktioner, vilka är färdigheter som visat sig ha en stor påverkan på hur barn utvecklar förståelse för sina egna och andras tankar, det vill säga deras Theory of Mind. En central aspekt inom forskning har varit att undersöka hur förmågorna samvarierar vid olika åldrar. Syftet i föreliggande studie var att undersöka sambandet mellan Theory of Mind, språkliga förmågor och exekutiva funktioner hos barn i tre års ålder med typisk utveckling. Av intresse var även att undersöka om det förelåg skillnader i resultat mellan pojkar och flickor samt om de del-tagande barnens demografiska förhållanden vad gäller antal äldre och/eller yngre syskon, socio-ekonomisk status och vuxenkontakt påverkade de deltagande barnens Theory of Mind. Totalt medverkade 30 barn med typisk utveckling, varav 16 var flickor och 14 var pojkar. Åldersanpassade testmaterial användes för att undersöka Theory of Mind, grammatisk förmåga, semantisk förmåga, kognitiv flexibilitet, arbetsminne och fonemdiskrimination. Den demografiska informationen inhämtades i form av en enkät som föräldrarna fick fylla i. Resultatet indikerar att treåriga barns förmåga att hantera och förstå Theory of Mind-uppgifter samvarierar med både grammatisk förmåga och kognitiv flexibilitet. Samvariationer påträffades även mellan grammatisk förmåga och kognitiv flexibilitet, vilket stärker att språk, exe-kutiva funktioner och ToM har ett beroendeförhållande till varandra. Föreliggande studie framhåller att samtliga förmågor är mer eller mindre integrerade vid olika åldrar och korrelationerna visar på att vissa delförmågor inom språk, ToM och exekutiva funktioner går hand i hand och utvecklas i samspel med varandra. Specifikt kan den exekutiva komponenten kognitiv flexibilitet och den språkliga förmågan grammatik ses som viktiga förmågor för just treåriga barns ToM. / A childs’ first five years are characterized by an extensive development of language abilities and executive functions. These are skills that have demonstrated large impact on how children develop their understanding of their own and others’ thoughts, that is, their Theory of Mind. Within contemporary research, a central question has been to investigate how these abilities correlate at different stages of age.  The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between Theory of Mind, language and executive functions in typically developed three-year-old children. A central part in this study was also to assess whether differences in performance between boys and girls occurred and also if the number of younger and/or older siblings, socioeconomic status, and adult contact did affect the children’s performance.  A total of 30 children with typical development participated, of whom 16 were girls and 14 were boys. Age-appropriate test materials were used to examine, Theory of Mind, grammatical ability, semantic ability, cognitive flexibility, working memory, and phonetic discrimination. The demographic information was based on a questionnaire that parents of the participating children had to answer.  The result of this study indicates that the three-year child's ability to manage and understand tasks that assess Theory of mind seems to covariate with both grammatical skills and cognitive flexibility. A Correlation was also found between grammatical skills and cognitive flexibility, which indicate that language ability, executive functions and ToM have a strong dependent relationship.  The present study confirms that all abilities are more or less integrated at different ages and the correlations indicate that certain abilities in language, ToM and executive functions are de-veloped in interaction with each other. Specifically, the executive component cognitive flexibility and the grammatical ability are important abilities for three-year children’s ToM.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to recognize that individuals have mental states such as beliefs, perspectives, and emotions that guide their behaviour. The measures that are currently used to assess ToM are highly dependent upon linguistic skill, and typically ignore affective ToM. In the present study, two non-verbal affective ToM tasks were created. The Affective Visual Theory of Mind Task (AVToM) assessed the perception of emotions such as happy or sad, while the Emotional Narrative Task (ENT) assessed the ability to recognize the more complicated emotion of embarrassment. Participants also completed two established ToM assessments, thus allowing us to examine the relationships between the various ToM tasks. Positive correlations were found between some of the different ToM measures; importantly, these relationships were not mediated by verbal skill. However, the correlations between the measures were weak, suggesting that each task may be assessing different, but overlapping, components of ToM.

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