The Meno has traditionally been viewed as "one of Plato's earliest and most noteworthy forays into epistemology." In this dialogue, and in the course of a discussion between Socrates and his young interlocutor, Meno, about the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught, “Meno raises an epistemological question unprecedented in the Socratic dialogues.” This question - or rather, dilemma - has come to be known in the philosophical literature as Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry, due its apparently containing an easy-to-detect equivocation of the word ‘know’. Immediately after the paradox, and in an apparent response to it, Socrates recounts a myth: a story told by priests and priestesses about the pre-natal existence and immortality of the soul. From this this myth, Socrates concocts the infamous theory of recollection – a theory according to which the soul has acquired knowledge of everything before it was born, while in a disincarnate state. According to the traditional reading of Meno’s paradox, this theory constitutes Plato’s response to it. The traditional reading has come under fire in recent years by advocates of the epistemological reading (ERM), who argue that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s intended response to the paradox. Instead, they suggest, Plato’s distinction between true belief and knowledge – which appears towards the end of the dialogue – is sufficient for solving the paradox; and as such, it ought to be read as Plato’s response to it. In this thesis, I argue against ERM’s claim that a mere epistemological distinction is all it takes to solve the paradox. To do so, I explore the metaphysics of change in Plato’s ontology. From this, I appeal to our everyday notion of ‘memory’ in order to show that Meno’s paradox, in fact, contains a hidden-premise, which when laid bare, reveals two distinct challenges contained within the argument: a superficial one, and a deeper one. I argue that although it appears at first blush as though the former could easily be dismissed as an equivocation, to which the epistemological distinction between belief and knowledge could provide an answer, the latter cannot. This is because the deeper challenge threatens the very preconditions of knowledge itself – that is to say, it renders cognition impossible – and, as such, it cancels out any effort to provide an epistemological response to the superficial challenge. Hence, unless the deeper-level challenge is satisfactorily disarmed, both challenges remain unanswered. I argue that although the major motivation for the theory of recollection in the Meno is indeed to provide an answer to scepticism about knowledge, nevertheless, it ought to be understood, first, as a theory of cognition – i.e. as a theory about the preconditions and atomic building blocks of knowledge – and not a theory of knowledge per se. This answer comes in the form of a radical theory of the mind and cognition – one that stands in stark opposition to our common-sense views about the mind: a view from which, Plato believed, the paradox arises. Drawing on recent debates between Nativists and Empiricists in the Cognitive Sciences, I argue that it was a great achievement of Plato’s to grasp that our common-sense view about the mind, and its concomitant process of learning, language acquisition and knowledge acquisition, might in fact be at the very root of scepticism about our ability to engage in meaningful philosophical practice, and our ability to acquire objective knowledge – especially, objective moral knowledge. The Meno’s paradox, then – so I contend - is not a puzzle whose solution rests upon merely pointing to an epistemological distinction between true belief and knowledge, as advocates of ERM have suggested. Rather, it is a puzzle about cognition. More precisely, it is a puzzle that targets the rudimentary cognitive stages of initial cognition and truth-recognition - one whose solution entails offering an account of the mind that would make these elementary cognitive processes possible. Accordingly, Plato’s theory of recollection in the Meno ought to be read as an attempt to map the structure of the mind, and as such, to provide an account of cognition. In doing so, he intended to put forward a view about the preconditions of knowledge – the sort of preconditions without which language acquisition and knowledge acquisition would simply not be possible. With this theory, Plato has the beginnings of an argument against the kind of relativism and scepticism prevalent at his time. As such, a correct interpretation of the so-called paradox of inquiry (and Plato’s proposed solution to it via the theory of recollection) should approach it as a puzzle about mind and cognition – and not solely as an epistemological one, as it has previously been treated.

Ξεκινώντας από το θέμα του Μένωνα, χωρίζεται σε δύο μέρη. Το πρώτο μέρος είναι εμφανές ήδη από την αρχή του διαλόγου, όταν ο νεαρός Θεσσαλός θα απευθύνει το ερώτημα στον Σωκράτη αναφορικά με ποιον τρόπο αποκτάται η αρετή. Σύμφωνα με την σωκρατική τοποθέτηση, το εν λόγω ερώτημα δεν είναι δυνατόν να απαντηθεί, αν πρωτίστως δεν διατυπωθεί ο ορισμός της αρετής, οπότε τίθεται εμμέσως ως το δεύτερο μέρος της θεματολογίας. Το ότι ο Μένων έχει μαθητεύσει πλησίον του Γοργία αποτελεί έναυσμα για τον Σωκράτη, ώστε να προκαλέσει τον συνομιλητή του να ορίσει την αρετή, προφασιζόμενος τον αμνήμονα. Ο Μένων επιχειρεί να ορίσει την έννοια της αρετής τρεις φορές, χωρίς μία ορισμένη επιτυχία, εφόσον ο Σωκράτης κατορθώνει να εντοπίζει σφάλματα. Ωστόσο, ο Μένων, οδηγούμενος σε αδιέξοδο, θα διερωτηθεί: πώς είναι δυνατόν κάποιος να ερευνήσει ένα θέμα το οποίο δεν γνωρίζει, και αν το γνωρίσει πώς γνωρίζει ότι αυτό είναι αυτό που αναζητούσε (το παράδοξο του Μένωνα). Ο Σωκράτης θα απαντήσει στην απορία του επικαλούμενος την θεωρία της ανάμνησης, σύμφωνα με την οποία η γνώση είναι ανάκληση του ήδη υπάρχοντος, έχοντας αναντιλέκτως προϋποθέσει την αθανασία της ψυχής. Μάλιστα θα προχωρήσει και σε απόδειξη της εν λόγω εκδοχής, προβαίνοντας σε ένα μαθηματικό πείραμα με έναν από τους δούλους του Μένωνα. Η θεωρητική παράμετρος που θα αποκομίσουν από την διαδικασία του πειράματος είναι η αξία της έρευνας, όταν σκοπός είναι η προσέγγιση της αλήθειας, όπου απαιτείται μάλιστα και η αποδοχή της άγνοιάς μας. Σε μια αντίστοιχη έρευνα έγκειται και ο φιλοσοφικός προσδιορισμός που επιδιώκει ο Σωκράτης και θα παρακινήσει τον Μένωνα να ερευνήσουν από κοινού για την αρετή. Αυτή τη φορά θα ακολουθήσουν την υποθετική μέθοδο μέσω της οποίας θα εξετάσουν με ποιον τρόπο αποκτάται η αρετή, εφόσον δεν κατόρθωσαν προηγουμένως στην συζήτησή τους να διατυπώσουν έναν επαρκή ορισμό.Η αρετή δεν είναι έμφυτη. Διαφορετικά, θα έπρεπε να διαφυλάττονται οι νέοι που γεννώνται ενάρετοι προκειμένου να μην διαφθαρούν. Η αρετή δεν είναι ούτε διδακτή, εφόσον, έπειτα από διάλογο που παρεμβάλλεται με τον Άνυτο, διαπιστώνουν ότι ούτε οι σοφιστές είναι οι αρμόδιοι δάσκαλοι ούτε και οι πολιτικοί κατόρθωσαν να μεταδώσουν στα τέκνα τους την αρετή. Άρα, ένα πρώτο συμπέρασμα στο οποίο οδηγούνται είναι ότι η αρετή δεν διδάσκεται. Όμως, πώς εξηγείται η διαπίστωση ότι υπάρχουν άνθρωποι που προβαίνουν σε ενάρετες πράξεις; Σε αυτό το σημείο ο Σωκράτης οδηγείται στην εκτίμηση ότι μία παράμετρος τους έχει διαφύγει της ερευνητικής προσοχής. Επαναπροσδιορίζουν τα όσα έχουν συζητηθεί και τελικώς εναποθέτουν τον ενάρετο χαρακτήρα των ανθρώπων στην εκ θεού αποκτηθείσα ορθή γνώμη, εισάγοντας με αυτόν τον τρόπο την διάκριση από την επιστήμη. Ωστόσο, ο διάλογος καταλήγει σε απορία, καθώς δεν διατυπώνεται ένας επαρκής ορισμός για την αρετή. / The main question of platonic dialogue Meno is distinct in two topics. The first one is manifested by the beginning of the dialogue, when younger Thessalian asks Socrates for the way that virtue is acquired. According to Socratic account, this question is impossible to be answered because it is required the formulation of determination of what the virtue is. That is the second topic of this dialogue that is mentioned indirectly. The fact that Meno was student of Gorgias is a Socrates' motivation to challenge his interlocutor to determine the notion of virtue, pretended his ignorance. Meno tries to determine the notion of virtue three times, without successful, since Socrates identifies many errors. However, Meno having reached deadlock wonders himself how someone can investigate something that he does not know it, and by extension if he know it how he can know that this is what he searched about (Meno's paradox). Socrates answers to that paradox with the theory of recollection, having presupposed the immortality of soul. Indeed, he proceed in the evidence of that theory by doing a geometrical experiment with one of Meno's slaves. What they reap from this experiment is the value of researching, for which is required the acceptance of our ignorance. The aim is to approach the Truth. In a similar way lies the philosophical determination that Socrates seeks and he prompts Meno to search about virtue together. In this point they follow the hypothetical method through which they search the way of acquiring the vitrue, since they did not succeed to give a sufficient definition.Areti is not inherent. Otherwise, young guys born virtuous should have been preserved in order not to be corrupted. Areti is not teachable. After the intervening dialogue with Anitos, they result to the fact that neither Sophists nor politicians are appropriate teachers and they are not able to teach the virtue to their children. Therefore, a first conclusion they lied to is that virtue is not teachable. But, how can someone explain the fact that there are people doing virtuous actions? Thus, at this point Socrates realizes that something is missed. They redefine their words and at the end they attribute the virtuous element of people in the orthi gnomi given by god. By this account they introduce the distinction between opinion and science. However, this dialogue result in query because an adequate definition about virtue is not formulated.