This thesis explores three of Nietzsche in terms of his conception of nihilism and his attempt to overcome it. It is argued that Nietzsche views modernity as being characterized by nihilism and in a state of crisis. Nietzsche responds to this crisis by offering both an aetiology of it, and a vision of a future beyond nihilism. It is Nietzsche's vision which is the primary concern of this work. Nietzsche's first attempt to overcome nihilism is found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this book Nietzsche offers a solution of individual salvation which is elucidated in terms of a trio of ideas - the Superman, the will to power and eternal recurrence. Since nihilism is a social problem, however, this individual overcoming of it is insufficient. In Beyond Good arid Evil Nietzsche, realizing this, offers a more inclusive solution which centres on a political vision of an aristocracy which lies beyond, and outside of, social morality. In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche attempts to show that the creation of such a future does not involve any ahistorical leaps, that the potential for it is already present, though repressed, in Western culture. In sUbjecting Nietzsche' s vision of the future to critical evaluation it is argued that his visions of individual and society are both unattractive and unfeasible. The Nietzschean individual is argued to be less a model of psychological health and well-being than a case study in alienation. The aristocratic society which Nietzsche envisages seems sure to lead to a new crisis. It is further argued that this lack of a workable and attractive vision of the future is based in a misinterpretation of the present, which, I suggest, is not characterized by a crisis. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1994.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1985.

This mini-thesis attempts to understand what it means to fear death. It does this by first investigating how Heidegger and then Freud explain fear of death. Heidegger believes that the relationship Dasein has towards its own death allows it the possibility of 'authenticity'. Death presents to Dasein its ownmost potentiality for being. Heidegger explains that this means that in facing death Dasein has the possibility of completeness and absolute individuality. Dasein is called to this possibility of authenticity by the anxiety it experiences in the face of its own death. However, Dasein does not necessarily respond to this call. By reducing anxiety to a fear it is possible for Dasein to disregard its fear of death and correspondingly not respond to the call of authenticity. Thus, for Heidegger, fear of death is symptomatic of inauthentic Dasein's relationship towards its own death. For Freud, on the other hand, death cannot be conceptualised without reference to the social world. Freud believes that the relationship we have towards our own death is learnt through living in this world. Furthermore, Freud argues that it is impossible for the human being to ever understand that death can be an annihilation. When the human being dreads, fears or even desires death, Freud believes it does so symbolically. In this regard Freud explains, by way of the death instinct, that the psyche understands death as a return to before birth. One of Freud's explanations of fear of death is that this fear is actually for the loss of Eros. This fear, however, is in conflict with the phantasy to return to before birth. One of the results of this conflict is the arousal of anxiety. The differences and similarities between Freud's and Heidegger's explanations are detailed in the final chapter. Examining these details leads to a closer investigation of Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety. On this issue this mini-thesis finds that Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety are in conflict with each other. After attempting to avoid placing Freud and Heidegger against each other, this mini-thesis demonstrates that Heidegger's explanation of anxiety is lacking in detail. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, 1999.

This dissertation explores Ainslie's account of self-defeating behaviour as portrayed in Breakdown of Will (2001). Self-defeating behaviour can be described as voluntarily doing that which we know we are going to end up regretting (Ainslie 2001:3). It is puzzling why anyone would willingly choose to behave in such an ill-rewarding manner of which they know the negative consequences it will bear prior to them engaging in that behaviour; yet, at the same time, it is also fascinating, as despite it being behaviour people know that they are undoubtedly going to regret; many can claim to have fallen prey to it. Exploring this weakness of self-defeating behaviour, I refer to Ainslie's explanation of the phenomenon and his suggestions regarding possible strategies for curbing it. One of the strategies Ainslie suggests against self-defeating behaviour is personal rules (also known as the will), which he argues is a form of intertemporal bargaining between the successive interests, or temporal stages of the self (Ainslie 2001:78-85). Although, for the most part, his description is quite detailed, comparing our successive selves to players in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, there are limitations in his explanation as he seems, for one, not to consider some of the conditions for cooperation associated to the concept of an iterated prisoners' dilemma game. I, thus, turn to social norm theorist, Bicchieri's The Grammar of society (2006), in an attempt at an improved illustration of personal rules beyond its comparison to an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. I note similarities between social norms (Bicchieri) and personal rules (Ainslie) such that the reasons we follow social norms could be analogous to the reasons behind us following certain personal rules. But Bicchieri's description of social norms can be explained in a more general way, which I suggest may be a better framework for thinking about the will than an iterated prisoner's dilemma. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2011.

This thesis traces Freud's debt to classical Greece and argues that the development of his theory should not be considered apart from its roots in this legacy. The psychoanalytic project sheltered under the umbrella of Altertumswissenschaft and used the "ancient world to illuminate the modern". Winckelmann's Hellenism provided the foundations to German culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and dominated the educational and cultural institutions in which Freud lived and worked. Nietzsche later challenged Winckelmann's Apollian vision of Greece, and his "psychology of the Dionysian condition" acknowledged both irrational passion and sexuality. Freud is heir to both Winckelmann's and Nietzsche's Greece, and the dialectical tension between the rational and irrational, the mind and the body, that is evident in the reception of classical Greece in the nineteenth century is often paralleled in Freud's work. Hellenism is an essential element in Freud's theory of dreams and the unconscious. Greek mythology grounds the Oedipus complex, and informs his theorising on human sexuality. It plays an influential role in early sexology, and many of the challenges to psychiatry and neurology have their origin in Greek classicism. Not only does psychoanalysis rely on content drawn from this legacy, but its methodology as well as it structure are deeply influenced by Freud's knowledge of ancient Greece and his involvement in classical scholarship. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008.

Moral judgments have tended to be made through the application of certain moral principles and it seems we think we need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. However, the theory of moral particularism, as put forward by Jonathan Dancy (2004), calls this into question and challenges the traditional principled approaches to moral reasoning. This challenge naturally began a debate between those who adhere to principled accounts of moral rationality, and those who advocate a particularist approach. The aim of this thesis is thus to assess the theory of moral particularism as recently put forward by Jonathan Dancy. In pursuing this project I initially set up a survey of the field of environmental ethics within which to explore traditional approaches to applied ethics. This survey suggests that applied ethical problems have traditionally been solved using various principled approaches and if we are inclined to take the particularist challenge seriously, this suggests a philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, increasingly important and pressing applied environmental ethical concerns suggest there is a practical need for ethical principles, whilst on the other hand, the particularist claim is that we do not need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. The survey of environmental ethics then establishes the first side of the philosophical conundrum. I then move to explore the second side of the conundrum; the theory of moral particularism, looking at why the challenge it presents to traditional principled approaches needs to be taken seriously. I then move to explore theoretical challenges to moral particularism; this is done to establish the current state of the theoretical debate between the particularist and the generalist. I conclude from this that the theoretical debate between the two has currently reached a stalemate; it is, at present, simply not clear which account is correct. As the main goal of this study is to evaluate particularism, this apparent stalemate led me to explore certain practical challenges to particularist theory as a means of advancing the debate. As particularism is a theory that challenges our traditional conception of how to make moral judgments, there will be important implications for applied ethics if particularism turns out to be correct, and 1 thus finally apply particularism to a practical environmental problem in order to assess the validity of practical challenges to particularism. In order to do this, a particularist ethic is applied to the question of whether or not to allow mining in Kakadu National Park in Australia. This provides a means of seeing what an applied particularist ethic could look like, as well as providing something of an answer to the practical challenge to particularism and achieving the goal of evaluating it within the applied context of environmental ethics. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

The debate surrounding whether genuine moral dilemmas exist or is a longstanding one. Proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Ruth Barcan Marcus and Bernard Williams have appealed to the moral residue argument as a means of proving that moral dilemmas exist. Opponents like WaIter SinnottArmstrong, Patricia Greenspan, and Terence McConnell, however, have denied its efficacy on the basis that the moral residue argument begs the question on two counts: Firstly, by assuming that rationally irresolvable conflicts of commitments exist, and secondly, by assuming that agents who experience moral residue have necessarily done something wrong. I argue in this thesis that there is a way that the moral residue argument can be salvaged and provide a more precise account of appropriate moral residue - an account that simultaneously overcomes the objections. Specifically, I argue that the moral residue argument, when interpreted in terms ofthe independent standard of integrity, can provide an account of appropriate moral residue that can explain what the agent has done wrong, and that is neither too strict nor overlooks the fact ofthe agent's harsh self-assessment and moral residue. In so doing I show how the specific accounts of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections are flawed and miss the force of the point about moral residue. By examining two case studies - Williams Styron's Sophie 's Choice, and Euripides' Jphigenia at Aulis - I show that it can be established independently that both Sophie and Agamemnon do something wrong and would do something wrong no matter how they acted in their respective situations. Through Lynn McFall's conception of integrity I show that Sophie and Agamemnon would undermine their integrity regardless ofwhich oftheir alternative they chose to act on. In so doing I establish that their moral residue is appropriate and would be appropriate had they acted on their other alternative. By this means I demonstrate how - when interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity - the moral residue argument can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2003.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Responsibility is either linked to duties and expectations, or it is linked to the freedom of an agent. These links are questionable. It is therefore necessary to investigate the freedom and context of commission and omission. There are numerous difficulties in evaluating suicide: - The problem to distinguish between successful suicide and failed pseudo suicide. - The problem of the mind: The limited accessibility of the emotions and attitudes despite its expressibility And the unexpressibility of the experiences despite its immediate accessibility. And the problem of other minds. - The problem of the freedom of the will. Prove is given that no aspect of the mind is free - despite our illusions of freedom. - The problem of the cause, origin and extent of an act. - The problem of the relation between brain and mind. This problem is important when we consider the origin of acts and the concept of the self. The important issues when solving the difficulties pertaining to suicide are: - Agency: The self is owner of all acts and instances of mind. The self is also the subject of all physical acts and acts of the mind. - The self is an open complex system. The self is entangled in relations of differences, conflict and deferment of meaning. The important conclusions when evaluating suicide are: - The agent is the owner and the subject of his acts. The agent has illusions of freedom. The agent is inseparable from his circumstances. - Acts originate in the context of these circumstances. - Responsibility exists in the context of power in society. - The answers to the questions of Why? Are logical reconstruction and politically correct confabulations - whatever the answer is, it is shared by all participants of the context.The evaluation of suicide: - The self-murderer`s act originates from the context of the circumstances of which he is a participant. - Suicide happens within the context of a pancheiria with aspects of autocheireō and heterocheireō. - The pancheiria started before the autocheireō. - The pancheiria continues after the autocheireō. The autocheireō is but an indication of the seriousness van the larger pancheiria. The self-murderer (autocheir) and his autocheireō persist as a silhouette in our midst. - The possibility of the self-murderer`s illusion of freedom does not liberate us from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither does se sharing of guilt give as relieve from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither will we benefit from any rationalization. Finally we can do nothing but to utter these statements of denial and confession : - Suicide is wrong. - But we have not done it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verantwoordelikheid word óf aan verpligtinge en verwagtinge, óf aan die vryheid van die agent verbind. Hierdie verbindings word betwyfel. Daarom is dit nodig dat die vryheid van handeling en nie-handeling sowel as die konteks waarin die handeling en nie-handeling gebeur ondersoek word. Verskeie probleme ten opsigte van die beoordeling van die selfmoord word uitgewys: - Die probleem om die werklike geslaagde selfmoord te onderskei van die gefaalde selfmoordpoging. - Die probleme van die verstand. Naamlik die beperkte toeganklikheid van die emosies en houdings, alhoewel dit uitdrukbaar is. En die onmiddelike toeganklikheid van die ervarings wat dit te spyt nie uitdrukbaar is nie. Asook die probleem om ander verstande te ken. - Die probleem van die vryheid van die wil. Dit word aangetoon dat geen aspek van die verstand vry is nie. Dit nie teenstaande het ons steeds die illusie van vryheid. - Die probleem van die oorsaak, die oorsprong en die reikwydte van handelinge. - Die probleem van die verhouding tussen die brein en die verstand. Hierdie probleem is belangrik by die oorwegings van die oorspong van handeling en die siening van die self. Belangrike elemente by die oplossing van die beoordeling van selfmoord is: - Die agentskap: naamlik dat die self die eienaar van alle verstandsitems en handelinge is, en dat die self die subjek van alle verstandshandelinge en sigbare handelinge is. - Die self as `n oop komplekse stelsel wat in wederkerige verhoudings is van verskil, geskil en uitstel van betekenis.Gevolgtrekkings wat belangrik is by die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die agent is eienaar en subjek van sy handelinge, het die illusie van vryheid, is deel van sy omstandighede. - Die handeling ontstaan in die konteks van hierdie omstandighede. - Verantwoordelikheid bestaan in die konteks van mag in die samelewing. - Die antwoord op Hoekom? en Waarom? is logiese herkonstruksies en politiese korrekte konfabulasie - maar wat ookal die antwoord is, dit word gedeel deur al die deelnemers aan die konteks. Die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die selfmoordenaar se handeling ontspring uit die konteks van sy omstandighede waaraan hy `n deelnemer is. - Die selfmoord gebeur eerder binne die konteks van `n pancheiria met aspekte van autocheireō en heterocheireō. - Die pancheiria was reeds voor die autocheireō. - Die pancheiria duur voort na die autocheireō. Die autocheireō toon aan ons die erns van die oorkoepelende pancheiria. Die selfmoordenaar (autocheir) en sy autocheireō bestaan voort as silhoeët in ons midde. - Die moontlike illusie van vryheid van die selfmoordenaar kan ons nie die aanklag deur die silhoeët ontsnapping bied nie. - Net so min kan die verdeling van skuld ons van die aanklag laat ontsnap. - Enige rasionalisering van ons kant is nutteloos. Laastens kan ons net sê: - Selfmoord is verkeerd. - Ons het dit nie gedoen nie. Hierdie stellinge dien as ontkennings sowel as skuldbeleidenisse.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis takes Zygmunt Bauman’s book Modernity and the Holocaust as a point of departure in an attempt to show that genocides of the twentieth century are by-products of modernity, and not aberrations, as previously thought. Bauman’s work focuses on the distinctly modern nature of the Holocaust. Using the theory he develops in Modernity and the Holocaust, this thesis attempts to show, first and foremost, that the Holocaust is not the only example of modern genocide. By comparing and contrasting the Holocaust to another, more recent, genocide, namely the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it becomes clear that despite superficial differences between the two genocides, the Rwandan genocide is also a by-product of modernity. This conclusion has important implications, not only for the way in which we remember the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, but also for our understanding of evil and perpetrators of evil. Drawing on the work of Bauman and Hannah Arendt, especially with regard to the Eichmann case, chapter three investigates our traditional assumptions and expectations with regard to evil and perpetrators of evil and notes the unsettling differences between our assumptions and the modern reality. In order to truly understand the nature of perpetrators of modern genocide, it is important to look at the influence of morality on such perpetrators and the reasons why morality seems incompatible with modernity. In this regard, Haas’ book Morality after Auschwitz is of critical importance. Given the various failures and unexpected by-products of modernity, one has to wonder whether postmodernity would offer a better moral alternative to modernity. Chapter five investigates this supposition, and finds it wanting. Drawing yet again on Bauman, the notion of an ethics of responsibility is put forth as the only safeguard against modern evil. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis neem Zygmunt Bauman se boek Modernity and the Holocaust as ‘n beginpunt en probeer om te wys dat die volksmoorde van die twintigste eeu byprodukte, en nie afwykings, van moderniteit is nie. Bauman se werk fokus op die moderne eienskappe van die Holocaust. Deur gebruik te maak van die teorie wat hy in Modernity and the Holocaust ontwikkel, probeer hierdie tesis om, eerstens, te wys dat die Holocaust nie die enigste voorbeeld van ‘n moderne volksmoord is nie. Deur die Holocaust met ‘n ander, meer onlangse volksmoord, die Rwandese volksmoord van 1994, te vergelyk en te kontrasteer word dit duidelik dat ten spyte van die oppervlakkige verskille tussen die twee volksmoorde, die Rwandese volksmoord ook ‘n byproduk van moderniteit is. Hierdie gevolgtrekking het belangrike implikasies nie net vir die manier waarop ons die Holocaust en die Rwandese volksmoord onthou nie, maar ook vir die wyse waarop ons die kwaad (evil) en perpetrators of evil1 verstaan. Deur verder gebruik te maak van Bauman se werk sowel as die werk van Hannah Arendt, veral met betrekking tot die Eichmann saak, ondersoek hoofstuk drie ons tradisionele aannames en verwagtinge met betrekking tot die kwaad (evil) en perpetrators of evil en wys die onaangename verskille tussen ons aannames en die moderne realiteit uit. Ten einde werklik die aard van perpetrators van moderne volksmoord te verstaan, is dit belangirk om na die invloed van moraliteit op hierdie perpetrators of evil te kyk, asook die redes waarom moraliteit blykbaar teenstrydig is met moderniteit. Haas se belangrike boek, Morality after Auschwitz, word hier geraadpleeg. Gegewe die verskeie tekortkominge van moderniteit, moet ons wonder of postmoderniteit nie dalk ‘n beter morele alternatief bied nie. Hoofstuk vyf ondersoek hierdie stelling en vind dat postmoderniteit ook nie voldoende is nie. Laastens word Bauman weereens geraadpleeg en sy seining van ‘n etiek van verantwoordelikheid word voorgestel as die enigste beskerming teen moderne kwaad. / Harry Crossley Foundation

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: A changing world brings about many different challenges. The same applies to business operating in society. These changes and challenges relate to business ethics in general and how it impacts on the decisions that business makes every day. The ethical challenges that business has to face have a profound effect on meta-ethical concerns. Awareness of this situation can help to direct business and the rest of society to reach positive outcomes. When looking at current cases it is evident how corporate culture and leadership play a very important role in this matter. The cases shows how the power of business is exerted in practice and it can serve a positive purpose in determining meta-ethics. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 'n Veranderende wêreld gee tot baie verskillende uitdagings aanleiding. Dieselfde geld vir besigheid wat in die samelewing funksioneer. Dit hou verband met sake-etiek in die algemeen en watter invloed dit uitoefen op die besluite wat besigheid elke dag moet neem. Die etiese uitdagings wat besigheid elke dag in die gesig staar, het 'n diepgaande uitwerking op meta-etiese kwessies. 'n Bewustheid van hierdie situasie kan help om leiding aan besigheid en die res van die samelewing te bied ten einde positiewe resultate te bereik . As die huidige gevalle in ag geneem word, is dit klaarblyklik dat korporatiewe kultuur en leierskap ’n baie belangrike rol in hierdie verband speel. Dit toon hoe die kragtige invloed van besigheid in die praktyk gebruik word en hoe dit 'n positiewe rol kan speel om meta-etiek te bepaal.