Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2006. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 277-285). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR19839

This thesis explores the relative strengths of particularism and generalism in the area of meta-ethics in philosophy, utilising justice as a case study. More specifically, this thesis examines the claims of Jonathan Dancy in his book on moral particularism, Ethics Without Principles (2004), that one can construct a moral philosophy without reference to any general principles, or invariant reasons. His book is primarily a study of reasons, and this thesis also presents a study of reasons through the eyes f both the particularists and the generalists. At its core, the particularism holds holism to be true in the theory of reasons, whereas generalism, at its core, holds atomism to be true in the theory of reasons. In my thesis I find that the strongest form of atomism and the strongest form of generalism is Rossean generalism. I conclude that these two pictures combined provide a superior account of what reasons are and how they work than Dancy's particularism. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

Original publication from author's Habilitationsschrift--Zürich, 1976. / Translation of Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins. Includes bibliographical references (p. [295]-297) and indexes.

The aim of this project is to argue that practical reason governs our normative responsibilities in one voice. There are no genuine conflicts within law, none within morality, and none between law and morality. On the contrary, there are single right answers to questions about what law and morality, considered separately or together, demand. I try to show that this claim, which I refer to as the "Unity Thesis", is both ordinary and deeply valuable. It concerns the correct way to understand, judge, and reason about the normative principles our political, legal, and moral practices establish. The Unity Thesis holds that we ought to, and that we already tacitly do, regard these principles as constituting an integrated, mutually supportive practical system--a unity of principle.

Moral judgments have tended to be made through the application of certain moral principles and it seems we think we need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. However, the theory of moral particularism, as put forward by Jonathan Dancy (2004), calls this into question and challenges the traditional principled approaches to moral reasoning. This challenge naturally began a debate between those who adhere to principled accounts of moral rationality, and those who advocate a particularist approach. The aim of this thesis is thus to assess the theory of moral particularism as recently put forward by Jonathan Dancy. In pursuing this project I initially set up a survey of the field of environmental ethics within which to explore traditional approaches to applied ethics. This survey suggests that applied ethical problems have traditionally been solved using various principled approaches and if we are inclined to take the particularist challenge seriously, this suggests a philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, increasingly important and pressing applied environmental ethical concerns suggest there is a practical need for ethical principles, whilst on the other hand, the particularist claim is that we do not need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. The survey of environmental ethics then establishes the first side of the philosophical conundrum. I then move to explore the second side of the conundrum; the theory of moral particularism, looking at why the challenge it presents to traditional principled approaches needs to be taken seriously. I then move to explore theoretical challenges to moral particularism; this is done to establish the current state of the theoretical debate between the particularist and the generalist. I conclude from this that the theoretical debate between the two has currently reached a stalemate; it is, at present, simply not clear which account is correct. As the main goal of this study is to evaluate particularism, this apparent stalemate led me to explore certain practical challenges to particularist theory as a means of advancing the debate. As particularism is a theory that challenges our traditional conception of how to make moral judgments, there will be important implications for applied ethics if particularism turns out to be correct, and 1 thus finally apply particularism to a practical environmental problem in order to assess the validity of practical challenges to particularism. In order to do this, a particularist ethic is applied to the question of whether or not to allow mining in Kakadu National Park in Australia. This provides a means of seeing what an applied particularist ethic could look like, as well as providing something of an answer to the practical challenge to particularism and achieving the goal of evaluating it within the applied context of environmental ethics. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

Original publication from author's Habilitationsschrift--Zürich, 1976. / Translation of Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins. Includes bibliographical references (p. [295]-297) and indexes.

Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T21:11:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_WellingtonDamascenode_M.pdf: 1255869 bytes, checksum: 5f38aca62110ab8573d4639015f530b7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: Nas páginas que se seguem, o leitor encontrará um estudo detalhado sobre aquele que é considerado por Aristóteles o mais difícil entre os impasses formulados em Metafísica III (Beta) e que é respondido no capítulo 2 do livro X (Iota): a Décima Primeira Aporia. Em tal aporia, Aristóteles rivaliza (i) a concepção que os antigos Physiologoi tinham do Um, em que tal princípio é concebido como uma natureza subjacente que extrapola os contornos demarcados pela noção de Um, e (ii) a perspectiva platônico-pitagórica, que prefere conceber o Um em si mesmo, segundo as suas próprias determinações internas e desprovido de qualquer articulação com alguma realidade que lhe seja exterior / Abstract: In the following pages, the reader will find a detailed study of what Aristotle considered the most difficult aporia formulated in Metaphysics III (Beta), which is answered in chapter 2 of Book X (Iota): the Eleventh Aporia. In such aporia, Aristotle rivals: (i) the conception assumed by the ancient Physiologoi, which takes the One to be an underlying nature whose being is not exhausted by being One, and (ii) the Platonic-Pythagorean view, which prefers to conceive the One in itself, according to its own determinations and apart from any connection with some reality outside it / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia