Research has shown a possible causative link between playing the popular videogame Tetris and improvements in Mental Rotation performance. The aim of the present study was to address a question about an aspect of Tetris expertise that had not yet been factored into any of the existing work on Tetris and Mental Rotation. David Kirsh and Paul Maglio (1994) have shown that skilled Tetris players appear to use physical actions as substitutes for, or compliments to, mental operations. This is hypothesised to include physically rotating game pieces instead of Mentally Rotating them. The specific question we sought to address in the present study was whether these physical substitutes for mental operations, which Kirsh and Maglio call epistemic actions, have an effect on Tetris' efficacy as a Mental Rotation training task. In order to address this research question, three groups of subjects were administered tests of Mental Rotation ability before and after a five week training period. The training period consisted of a total of five, hour long, laboratory sessions - evenly spaced across the training period - in which each of the three groups were required to play an assigned video-game. The results showed that a group of subjects (N=13) who received Tetris training on the version of the game that made epistemic actions involving rotation impossible showed no greater Mental Rotation performance gains when their results were compared to a group of subjects (N=13) trained using a Standard version of Tetris. This suggests that the occurence of epistemic actions does not have an impact on Tetris' efficacy as a Mental Rotation training task. Further, neither of these two groups showed greater Mental Rotation performance gains than the non-Tetris control group (N=14), a result which suggests that, at least under some circumstances, Tetris training fails to impart Mental Rotation performance gains any greater than what can be expected due to retest effects. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013.

This thesis is a critical examination of Fukuyama's "end of history" version of liberalism, in which he announces the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy as a universal form of governance. The thesis seeks to investigate Francis Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy and his arguments for it, in order to assess the normative impact of market driven political and economic outcomes on the human context or life satisfaction, especially recognition. This is contrasted with Amartya Sen's notion of well-being in order to show that Fukuyama does not pay attention to some of the basic moral demands of human life. The thesis is comprised of an introduction and six chapters. The contents of these chapters can be presented briefly as follows: • The first chapter looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state. Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are the values of freedom, equality, and independence of the individual, the process of consensus, the primacy of self-preservation and the necessity of the state. Together these laid the basis for a philosophically reasoned and progressive theory of politics. This chapter also looks at the theory of laissez-faire, which paved the way for a free market economy. This doctrine was developed in the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham. For Fukuyama these thinkers inaugurated a tradition of political thought that ultimately led to liberalism and democracy. • The second chapter discusses the teleological view of history underlying the philosophical theories of history advanced by Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Each of these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or goal. It is from these philosophers that Fukuyama appropriates the idea of universality to envisage the universality of liberal democracy. • The third chapter analyzes Fukuyama's "end of history" claim and his arguments for it. When communism finally collapsed, liberal democracy was the only remaining option, he claims. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal history, Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's materialist interpretation of history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. It is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of its citizens' freedom. • The fourth chapter stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama claims that human-beings desire recognition, and can best satisfy this desire through liberal democracy. Sen for his part claims that people need well-being, and can only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a universal value. The discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen may share similar political values they differ ideologically and in historical vision. • The fifth chapter deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy. Several issues present major problems for liberal democracy. These issues are liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal democracy; the global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural homogenization of the world; the problem of parallel histories versus a single inclusive history; desire-satisfaction versus need-satisfaction, and the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy. • The sixth chapter recapitulates the preceding chapters and spells out the conclusion reached in the course of the thesis. The findings on the notion of the "end of history" show that Fukuyama wishes the equal and mutual recognition of the freedom and dignity of all individuals as well as the affirmation of their individual rights. This concern for the individual is laudable. However, excessive individualism threatens the fabric of every society, and Fukuyama realizes that this threat is especially strong in liberal democracy. His suggested solution is to cultivate social capital in the form of trust. This thesis concludes that Fukuyama's medicine is no match for the disease; the whole thrust of the intellectual tradition leading to liberal democracy - and of much else in Western culture since Hobbes - is in the direction of excessive individualism and the withering of community. Moreover, where Fukuyama sees isothymia - the desire for equal recognition, the psychological truth is probably that people desire to be recognized as superior - mega/othymia, again making individualism intrinsically more threatening to a sense of community than Fukuyama seems to realize. Fukuyama suggests that an international consensus in favour of liberal democracy is emerging. But it appears that such a consensus is unlikely to arise nation- states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation and thus insist on their sovereignty, effectively blocking any shift from the nation-state to a homogeneous and universal liberal state. It is difficult to generate the consensus needed to receive it as a universal system, because not all people subscribe to its cultural preconditions. The satisfaction of human desire of any kind cannot be universalized since human existence is centrally characterized by diversity of context, culture, and perception. Any attempt to impose cultural or ideological homogeneity requires conquest - cultural or military imperialism. The triumphant emergence of liberal democracy cannot be the ultimate end of the whole of human history. If this were the case, it would no longer be worth trying to increase human knowledge, since knowledge always points to an open future in terms of how it will be used for further advancement. Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative consequences. Liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology leading to human satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations to come as long as human thought evolves. This will remain the case as long as Fukuyama's admission that liberal democracy only works where its cultural preconditions are met, remains true. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2003.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1979.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1985

This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

This work is an investigation of the influence of academic philosophy on non-academics in the Early Modern period (the 16th and 17th centuries). The first chapter will use Craig’s Similarity Thesis to examine Early Modern philosophy in general, Philosophy of Science and Theology and how they interacted to elevate human reason to the level of divine certainty. The second chapter will draw on Dear’s description of the changing status of mathematics in academia in the Early Modern period. This second chapter will draw the importance and divine relevance of rationality as developed in the first chapter into the discussion to further explore the relationships between science, metaphysics, mathematics and the divine. The third and final chapter will examine one particular instance of the influence of these ideas on popular thought, specifically in Girard Thibault’s early 17th century treatise instructing the reader in swordsmanship, who uses the view of mathematics and the rational mind that is discussed in the preceding chapters to inform his theories of martial arts practice and pedagogy. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2009.

The aim of this thesis is to defend what is known as the primary quality view of colour. It will do this by arguing that this view better meets our conceptual schema than either of its rivals the subjectivist view or the secondary quality view. In pursuing this project, I highlight the five core beliefs (as identified by Johnston 1992) that make up our colour conceptual schema, identifying the two strongly realist beliefs as making up our prime intuition, and on these grounds I immediately reject the subjectivist stance. I then set out the primary quality view's main rival, the secondary quality view, and show how dispositionalists have argued that this view is best able to accommodate our core beliefs. However, I identify empirical findings that raise problems for the secondary quality view, revealing its inability to satisfy our extended colour concepts as well as an inability to adequately explain certain deviant cases. The core of my argument against the secondary quality view comes from what I call problems of causation, where I argue that as dispositions are not causes they are unable to meet our prime intuition, and therefore cannot be colours. I therefore set up a version of the primary quality view of colour, identifying colours with microphysical properties (or complexes thereof) and show why this view does not face the same problems of causation as the secondary quality view. I then argue that the secondary quality view does not have the advantage over the primary quality view, when it comes to the rest of our core beliefs, as its supporters would have us believe. I show how a primary quality view is able to fit all these core beliefs into our overarching colour conceptual schema, without having to appeal to the ontological extravagances that dispositionists must bestow upon colour. Finally, I address two criticisms from commonsense that are laid against the primary quality view, and argue that the primary quality view is able to meet these conceptual demands and thereby conclude that the primary quality view is the better of the putative candidates competing for capturing the ontological status of colour. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2001.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.) - University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2007.

In a previous dissertation I argued that conceptions of citizenship and civil society have changed in three significant ways. Firstly, from being moral agents, citizens are now primarily rational agents. In other words, citizens now act in civil society when it best serves their own rational self-interest as opposed to recognising what I term the intrinsic moral worth of the public sphere. Secondly, the motivation for action by citizens used to be duty but is now instrumental: that is, citizens rarely act out of a duty to their country or their fellow citizen but instead act in order to achieve a certain end. Thirdly, while citizens used to act as a group, they now act individually, no longer pursuing a common good but each seeking their own individual good. In this dissertation, I move from the primarily theoretical nature of my honours dissertation to an empirical analysis of South Africa, establishing the validity of my theory while offering a more thorough analysis of South African citizenship and civil society. By looking at the empirical examples of the civil service in terms of Education, Bureaucracy, and the SANDF, this dissertation analyses both the state of South African civil society, and the underlying reasons for this state. Once it is clear how citizenship and civil society have changed and why this change is problematic, it then becomes important to establish why they have changed and who is responsible for the change. The attitudes of both citizens and the government are analysed as well as the influence they have on each other. I argue that the attitude of citizens is deeply influenced by governmental behaviour and thus if we want to alter the direction of citizenship and civil society, we need to change attitudes at the governmental level. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2011.