Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Prof. F P Cilliers acted, until his death on 31 July 2011, as the original promotor of this dissertation / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation departs from the argument that an encounter with complexity exposes the breakdown of traditional doctrines that have been taken for granted for too long (markedly modernist reductionism). Contrary to reductionist strategies that rely on the methods of analysis and isolation, the study of complex phenomena focuses on the dynamic relations and organisation of systems and their environments. Although the proliferation of ideas concerning the notion of complexity is abundant, there is no agreed upon definition that informs an overarching ‘Theory of Complexity.’ This problem is addressed by following the historical development in the field of systyms thinking. A distinction is made between ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ theories of complexity. The study problematises the conceptual and empirical difficulties of studying complex phenomena. The impossibility of being able to have complete knowledge of complex systems is discussed in detail. It is argued that although the study of complexity serves as an alternative approach to reductionist approaches, our knowledge of complexity in principle remains a reduction thereof. This insight leads to the claim that the study of complex phenomena is at best a post-reductionist effort, which is necessarily a critical position. It is argued that the ‘complexity approach’ coincides with other poststructural approaches in the field of philosophy in general and with deconstruction in particular. However, situating the complexity approach within poststructuralism is not unproblematic, seeing that poststructural forms of critique are marred by problems of legitimation. Allegiance to postmetaphysical ideals implies that objective grounds for justifying or warranting the choice of norms from where to launch critical inquiry are sacrificed. A deconstructive reading of the Kantian concept of ‘critique’ reveals a double movement that is at work in the concept. This double bind displaces the definition of critique to change to mean ‘critique as stricture.’ From this perspective the logic of différance is at work in critical analysis and the limitations of our meaning making strategies are exposed. It is suggested that ‘critique as stricture’ is a poststructural form of critical inquiry that regains legitimacy by operating in the tension of the force field created by antagonistic positions. A provisional grounding in the name of the limit emerges. The kind of thinking that can be cognisant of this general movement of ‘critique as stricture’ is found in the notion of ‘complex thinking.’ By drawing on Derrida’ and Morin’s reappropriation of Bataille’s distinction between the restricted and general economy, it is demonstrated how complex thinking is operating within the movement of the general economy. The study concludes with the argument that informed by ‘critique as stricture,’ the complexity approach progresses to what Cilliers calls ‘critical complexity.’ This brand of complexity distinguishes itself by a normative turn, which is distinguished by three imperatives: 1) the Provisional Imperative, 2) the Critical Reflexive Imperative and 3) the World-disclosing Imperative. All of these operate under the influence of the general economy, which allows critical inquiry to be grounded and legitimised in the tension of thinking antagonistic positions together without reducing them to one another. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie proefskrif word aangevoer dat die verskynsel van kompleksiteit die disintegrasie van tradisionele leerstellings se aansprake, wat te lank as vanselfsprekend aanvaar was, ontbloot (merkbaar reduksionistiese modernisme). In teenstelling met reduksionistiese strategieë wat staat maak op metodes van analise en isolasie, fokus die studie van komplekse verskynsels op die dinamiese verhoudings en organisasie van sisteme en hul omgewings. Alhoewel die studie van kompleksiteit ’n byna alledaagse verskynsel geword het, bestaan daar geen bindende definisie wat ’n enkele ‘Teorie van Kompleksiteit’ daarstel nie. Daar word spesifiek op hierdie probleem gefokus in terme van hoe die wetenskaplike studie van kompleksiteit histories ontwikkel het. Dit word aangevoer dat dit sinvoller is om eerder tussen ‘beperkte’ en ‘algemene’ teorieë van kompleksiteit te onderskei as om ’n oorkoepelende teorie te ontwikkel. Heelwat probleme duik op in die poging om komplekse verskynsels konseptueel en empiries te bestudeer. Alhoewel die studie van komplekse verskynsels ’n alternatiewe posisie tot reduksionistiese benaderings daarstel, kan kennis van kompleksiteit in beginsel slegs ’n reduksie daarvan wees. As gevolg hiervan word die studie van komplekse verskynsels ten beste as ’n post-reduksionistiese poging beskryf wat noodwendig ’n kritiese posisie impliseer. Die kompleksiteitsbenadering stem in die algemeen met post-strukturele filosofiese benaderings, en spesifiek met dekonstruksie ooreen. Hierdie ooreenstemming is egter nie onproblematies nie, aangesien post-strukutrele kritiese posisies deur probleme van legitimasie gekenmerk word. Lojaliteit aan post-metafisiese ideale het tot gevolg dat daar geen objektiewe, grondige vertrekpunt bestaan vanwaar normatiewe begrondings geregverdig kan word nie. ’n Dekonstruktiewe lees van Kant se idee van die begrip ‘kritiek’ openbaar dat daar ’n ‘double movement’ aan die werk is wat die konsep ‘kritiek’ kan verruim ten einde dit te verander om ‘critique as stricture’ te beteken. Die werking van différance is altyd betrokke tydens kritiese analise waardeur die beperkinge van ons singewende strategieë blootgestel word. Hierdie her-definiëring van kritiek as ‘critique as stricture’ stel ons in staat om nuwe lewe in die kritiese projek te blaas deurdat legitimiteit gevind word in die spanning van die kragveld wat geskep word tussen antagonistiese posisies. ’n Voorlopige grondslag word in die naam van die beperkings van ons denkstrategië gevestig. ‘Kompleksiteitsdenke’ (‘complex thinking’) stel ’n denkstrategie daar wat tred hou met die dinamiese beweging wat in ‘critique as stricture’ teenwoordig is. ‘Kompleksiteitsdenke’ word aan die hand van Derrida en Morin se interpretasie van Bataille se onderskeid tussen die beperkte en algemene ekonomie gedoen ten einde te demonstreer dat ‘kompleksiteitsdenke’ binne die beweging van die algemene ekonomie val. Die studie word afgesluit met die argument dat, ingelig deur ‘critique as stricture’, die kompleksiteitsbenadering tot die begrip ‘kritiese kompleksiteit’ ontwikkel soos voorgestel deur Cilliers. Kritiese kompleksiteit word deur ’n normatiewe impuls gekenmerk wat in sigself weer deur drie noodsaaklike eienskappe uitgeken kan word: 1) die Voorlopige Imperatief, 2) die Kritiese Refleksiewe Imperatief en 3) die Wêreld-ontsluitende Imperatief. Al drie hierdie imperatiewe staan onder die invloed van die algemene ekonomie wat ons toelaat om kritiese analise te begrond in die spanning wat onstaan wanneer antagonistiese konsepte saam gedink word sonder dat hulle tot mekaar gereduseer word.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

The work undertakes an examination of Indian metaphysical theories and their relationship to ethical ideas and moral conduct, as these operate in Indian thought. Special account is taken of the samkhya, advaita and visistadvaita systems, the metaphysical conceptions presupposed in these systems, and the ethical theories proposed by them. The peculiarities characteristic of each system in terms of both metaphysics and ethics are set out and examined in terms of the vital concepts of dharma, karma and mok~a. It is demonstrated that, in the case of each system the original classical formulations, as supported by a relatively consistent dialectic through the centuries down to modern times, in fact accentuate and harden the distinctions among the systems . se fuat 1he three systems appear to be supporting distinctly differing patterns of ethical behaviours. The safukhya is seen to be supporting a somewhat simplistic model of life-denying ethics as flowing from its metaphysical premises, while the visistadvaita, with its clear accent on theism, gives the impression of a more positive attitude in ethical thought and practice. Its ethical concerns, however, are seen to be markedly individualistic in character and operation. The advaita system, with its singular peculiarity of a splitlevel theoretic orientation, is seen to vac~te between a negative withdrawal from life, and a mor-e positive concern towards life in the world. The complex character of advaita metaphysical constructs, in their relation to the more ~ractical aspects of life, are seen to be related to the operation of some stresses and tensions reflected at the individual and social levels. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1988.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1986.

There is a standard problem in action theory regarding weakness of the will. The problem arises from a pair if claims that seem to be mutually exclusive. On the one hand there is the traditional account of action as put forward by Davidson in 1963 which says that an action x is intentional if the agent judges there to be a good reason to x , and so does x. On the other hand it seems that often an agent intentionally performs some action and yet that action is not what they judged to be best and so we call that action weak willed. The former statement of intentional action cannot account for the intentional action in the latter claim, and so there is on the face of things, a problem for the traditional Davidsonian account of action. Richard Holton argues that we need to completely redefine weakness of the will in terms of the revision of resolutions. He offers a range of arguments which he thinks show the traditional account to be flawed. In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting (2009) Holton argues that there is both theoretical room for, and evidence of, intentions (and more specifically resolutions) as self-standing states. Resolutions are a second-order type of intentions with the specific goal of defeating contrary inclinations. Holton argues that, using resolutions, we can redefine weakness of the will. His claim is that an agent is weak willed if an only if the agent unreasonably reconsiders and revises their resolution to act. Much of this relies on his exposition of the notion of choice, where he argues that intentions and resolutions are formed independently of judgments. This means that weakness of the will in terms of resolutions avoids some of the problems posed by unorthodox cases of weakness of the will. In this dissertation I will argue three central points. First, Holton does not show adequately that resolutions are the sorts of intentions that can be formed prior to judgment. Second I will argue that even if the first argument were to fail, there is no real problem for the Davidsonian account of weakness of the will. Finally I will argue that the inclusion of intentions warrants much further investigation. I will show that following Holton's elucidation of choice, the intentions-theorist faces a dilemma. I will argue that neither of these options is palatable for the intentions-theorist. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.

One thing that ethics attempts to determine is the right way to live in order to attain human flourishing. Both Aristotelian and African ethics give us communitarian accounts of how flourishing is attained by individuals who are brought up to have the right sorts of character. I argue that there are significant similarities between the accounts of the formation of ethical character in Aristotelian and African ethics. I aim to show that through a critical comparison of these two accounts, an account of the kind of society required from human flourishing can be developed. This can then be used to critique a dominant view of human flourishing: that of contemporary individualism. First I set out the Aristotelian account showing how it depends on a certain conception of the nature of persons. Second, I explore the African account of ethics and ethical character and show how this account is based on a similar communitarian conception of the nature of persons. In both Aristotelian and African ethics, society and upbringing play a crucial role in the attainment of human flourishing. Thus, third, I examine in detail the kind of society required for the formation of ethical character according to Aristotelian and African ethics respectively. I argue that there are many fruitful structural similarities between the two accounts. Lastly, I use the work done in the third chapter, as well as the work of certain prominent communitarian theorists, to critique a contemporary individualist view of human flourishing. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2005.

This study deals with the problem of transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda in the light of South African experience. Transitional justice, a kind of justice pertinent to societies in transition from dictatorship to democracy where the new democratic regime faces the challenge of how to redress the abuses of the past, varies according to each case. While South African transitional justice has taken a form of mixed memory and punishment with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the case of Rwanda still presents a number of difficulties. First and foremost, unlike South Africa, Rwanda is a case of genocide and so far there is no agreement about how to think of and understand this genocide. Of the three different sources considered in this study, Adedeji and the Human Rights Watch Report argue that genocide was planned in advance, while Mamdani contends that it was a result of the failure of governmental forces to win the war and the advancement of the rebels, and nothing as such was planned before. . Besides the genocide, the continuation of human rights violations and the lack of will to change, the lack of democracy, the continuation of international support despite the lack of transparency in governance, along with other elements, hold Rwanda in the pretransition stage. In this study, I examine the close links between transitional justice and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I raise the question of what it would mean for Rwanda to have a successful Truth and Reconciliation Commission; given the history of genocide, and I discuss the failure of the Commission in Arusha. For transitional justice to take place in Rwanda, every form of armed struggle must stop so as to allow Rwandans (all conflicting parties involved) to take the genocide seriously and face its entire truth with courage and honesty. The truth of genocide would clarify the misconception of Rwandan history and would allow Rwandans to change their mentality and belief that ethnic majority means necessarily political majority and to embrace a more transethnic political identity. Then the establishment of a judiciary system capable of dealing with the abuses of the past would be possible. This new democratic regime, which would be democratically organized when all these requirements are met, would determine what kind of transitional justice would be pertinent to the Rwandan case. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.